



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>



**HARVARD
COLLEGE
LIBRARY**

LONDON:
C. T. RODGSON, PRINTER, 1 GOUGH SQUARE, FLEET STREET.

Kind
2
9

HISTORY

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND:

EMBRACING THE

OPINIONS OF ALL WRITERS ON MENTAL SCIENCE

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME.

By ROBERT BLAKEY A.M.

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS, QUERN'S COLLEGE, BELFAST;
AUTHOR OF HISTORY OF MORAL SCIENCE,
ESSAY ON MORAL GOOD AND EVIL, ESSAY ON LOGIC, &c.

" 4 pt. 2 "

VOLUME IV.

LONDON:

LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS,
PATERNOSTER ROW.

1850.

MS. A. 9. 2. (1/2, 1/2, 1/2)

Phil 801.3.2



Phil 801.3.2 (4, pt. 2)



HISTORY
OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.

CHAPTER V.

METAPHYSICAL WRITERS IN BELGIUM AND HOLLAND, FROM THE TIME OF HEMSTERHUIS (1784) TO THE PRESENT DAY.

FOR many years the speculations of Hemsterhuis exercised a great influence over the philosophic mind of Holland, though but partially recognised in Belgium. They were especially favourable to the Dutch ; for their system of theology harmonised to a considerable extent with the main points in his mental disquisitions. The leading principles of theology were fully embodied and developed in Hemsterhuis's philosophy ; and this circumstance rendered his writings generally acceptable in all the universities and public seminaries of learning in Holland, among a people of such a concentrated, thoughtful, and reflective temperament.

The doctrines of Kant were, for many years after they were rife in Germany, viewed with great suspicion in the Low Countries, by learned Academicians, as well as unprofessional writers.

The speculations of "Pure Reason" did, however, partially gain a footing at last, but not until there had been several violent and personal conflicts among the erudite and philosophic in the chief localities of public instruction. Still the progress of the Kantian theory was slow and lingering; and it is a fact, which the whole philosophy of the Low Countries substantiates, that up to the present moment the "Critique of Pure Reason" has exercised a very slight influence indeed upon the general current of speculative opinion in Belgium and Holland. The doctrines of the Königsberg sage have been viewed at a distance, and never allowed to engross any thing approaching to a concentrated or an undivided attention.

There have been several public incidents in the history of Belgium which have exercised a considerable influence over the ordinary course of speculative studies among her people. And we may notice, in the first place, the zeal which was displayed by Joseph II., son of Maria Teresa and Emperor of Germany, to promulgate certain sentiments and opinions on philosophical subjects in this country, then under the power of Austria. He was deeply imbued with the irreligious and sceptical dogmas of Voltaire and Frederic the Great of Prussia; and so firm a hold had they taken of his mind, that he sent emissaries into Belgium to propagate his ideas, and disseminate them in every direction. He even established Colleges for the express purpose of making his opinions known among the educated portion of the community. A seminary called the *Philosophical College*

was founded at Louvain, and Professors appointed to its chairs, to give a peculiar direction to the speculative studies of the young men who attended the University, and particularly to those who were destined for the Church. This was so openly and offensively carried on, that public feeling became powerfully directed against the Emperor's scheme; and at length his outrageous attempt to undermine the religious opinions of a whole people, excited such universal detestation, that his agents were ignominiously driven out of the country. This gave rise to the first Belgian revolution of 1787. The persecution of the clergy was violent and unprincipled. They were denied all command over the tuition of the students at the University of Louvain. The Emperor even went so far as to remove the Professors' Chairs of Philosophy and Civil Law from this place to Brussels; but such was the antipathy against this interference in matters of education, and such the respect the people entertained for their Clerical Pastors, that not a single pupil attended the philosophical course of Lectures at the new Metropolitan seat of instruction. The clergy taught philosophy in their diocesan schools or academies, in spite of the violence and cruelty of the Emperor. Austria, from these and other political causes, gave up the contest in 1790, after many civil contentions and bloody battles.

Some years after, the same kind of enterprise was undertaken by William, king of Holland, though from very different motives, and with a view to very different ends. The king, seeing

the intimate connection between certain philosophical systems and opinions and the general doctrines of Catholicism, conceived that the only effectual mode of making converts of the whole Belgian people, then placed under his government, and of consolidating his political power, was to commence with the elementary education of those who had to fill the pulpit, the bar, and the political and civil functions of the state. What was termed *philosophical rationalism* was the speculative system he patronised, and ordered to be taught and promulgated at the University of Louvain. The minds of the young were to be in some degree materialised; they were never to be allowed to think or hear of any theories of a spiritual or elevated character; they were to be tutored in the most insipid and formal doctrines; and their mental powers and faculties cut and trimmed in all the dull and formal stiffness so characteristic of Dutch notions and customs. This intellectual tyranny roused the indignant feelings of the whole nation, and was one of the efficient causes of the Belgian Revolution of 1830.

There were, in addition to these circumstances just mentioned, other public events which greatly influenced the speculative philosophy of the Low Countries, in the latter part of the last, and the commencement of the present century. When the French republican wars took place, this section of Europe fell into disorder and distress, and ultimately into the hands of their powerful invaders. Belgium and Holland became a part of the French

territory; and as Napoleon was decidedly hostile to all mental speculations forming any essential part of public instruction, the newly conquered countries soon began to feel the influence of Imperial displeasure and indifference. For many years no work on mental philosophy, of any note for originality, made its appearance in Belgium or Holland; every thing of this nature being viewed as an almost direct act of hostility against the reigning dynasty. It was not, therefore, till the fall of the Emperor, that the human mind regained once more its wonted liberty and scope, and that abstract studies were looked up to, as pursuits honourable to those devoted to them, and beneficial to the State. In 1817, the Universities in Belgium were established; and new speculative vigour was communicated to the national intelligence in this section of the European continent.

There are four Universities in Belgium, where mental science occupies a distinguished position, and is made a necessary part of all public education; namely, at Brussels, Louvain, Liege, and Ghent. In Holland, the Universities of Leyden and Gröningen are the two most important places of instruction in the country.

But before the complete establishment of the Belgian Universities in 1817, there were several zealous and able cultivators of mental science, although their respective publications enjoyed but a very limited circulation, and their names are but little known even in their own country. Most of these writers we shall notice in subsequent

parts of this chapter. Among many of them who have just claims to distinction, there is none to whom the philosophers of Belgium, and indeed of all countries, owe a deeper debt of gratitude for his zeal and talents displayed in the pursuit and interests of mental science, than M. Van Meenen, now President of the "Cour de Cassation" of Brussels. He has laboured disinterestedly and arduously in the cause of philosophy; and our only lament is that we should have so few published memorials of his remarkable acuteness and extensive information in this branch of human knowledge.

As the doctrines of Kant obtained a partial footing in Holland from about the time of the first Revolution, in 1790, till the year 1800, we find that the general system of speculation followed both in and out of the universities of Leyden and Gröningen, was a mixture of the opinions of Descartes, Leibnitz, Wolff, Locke, and Kant. Most of the treatises published in Holland during this period are of an elementary character, and display a comparatively narrow range of observation and discussion. The French system of Condillac and Tracy, now and then made its appearance, in a modified shape; but could scarcely be said to form a constituent element in the philosophical literature of the country.

The philosophers of Belgium at the present moment may be classed under three divisions. Those who still maintain, in its general integrity,

the theory of Condillac and his immediate followers, and who make the impressions on the external senses the chief source of all thought. Secondly, those who are attached to the high Church party, and who take, substantially, the doctrines of the "Ecole Théologique" of France for their guide. And thirdly, the *rationalists*, who blend, in various proportions, the elements of both preceding theories; and who consider that our ideas are derived both from sensation and from the pure *à priori* resources of the mind itself. Speaking generally, and with many reservations, the pure sensational philosophers are but few in number and very limited in influence; the High Church opinions are powerfully and ably supported; but the third and last class of thinkers are decidedly most numerous and influential. They have a preponderance in three out of the four national universities; those of Brussels, Liege, and Ghent. Louvain is the seat of those doctrines which are considered most in unison with the general tenets and ritual observances of the Catholic faith.

In Holland the influence of French speculation has never been so great as in Belgium. Within these twenty years, German opinions have been more generally discussed among the Dutch than they had previously been; but the leading doctrines of philosophy, taught and discussed in their chief Universities, present now nearly the same aspect that they did fifty years ago; being a compound from Descartes and his immediate disciples and

commentators, and the philosophical opinions of Locke and S'Gravesande.

JOHANN KINKER.

Kinker was born at Nieuwen-Amstel, near Amsterdam, in 1764, and took a very active part in the promulgation of Kant's doctrines, both in Holland and in Belgium. He published at the Hague, in the "*Magaziyn der Kritische Wijsbegeete*," a popular abridgment or summary of Kant's system, which was afterwards translated into French, under the title of an "*Essai d'une Exposition Succincte de la Critique de la Raison Pure*," Amsterdam, 1791.

In this work, Kinker considers mind as possessing the following faculties. Cognition he assumes as meaning the general power of thinking. Sensibility designates the passive nature of the mind in receiving impressions from external objects. Perception is the effect of an impression from without. Experience, considered in its comprehensive meaning, embraces perception, conception, understanding, and reason.

In the acquisition of knowledge, the progress of the mind is described in this manner. Objects act immediately upon the mind through the external senses. We then, by a determined inward mental act or process, collect a certain number of these perceptions together, and this collection constitutes a conception. The mind, in like manner, combines a certain quantity of those conceptions under one

aspect; and by this means reasoning and argumentation are produced.*

Kinker applied his metaphysical doctrines to illustrate the sciences of morals, politics, and theology.

The author has popularised Kant so much that there scarcely remain any vestiges of the original. It must have been amusing to many of the learned sages of Germany to see their favourite philosopher dressed out in this garb.

Kinker published "*Briveen von Sophie*," in 1797; in verse, with copious notes. It is written against his zealous and indefatigable opponent Feith, who denounced the system of Kant as an atheistical and pantheistical hypothesis.

Kinker became Professor of Literature at the University of Liege, which he resigned at the Revolution, in 1830. He published "*Briveen over het Naturrecht*," with a view of applying the doctrines of Kant to the illustration of the principles of natural law.

BISHOP NELIS.

This philosopher, Bishop of Antwerp, was a man of a contemplative and highly cultivated mind, and enjoyed considerable political influence and reputation during his lifetime. He was a zealous cultivator of philosophy; but he published most of his speculations privately, for distribution among a

* *Essai*, &c. pp. 6, 8, 10.

few select friends. Sometimes these productions consisted of only a few pages, and probably, on some occasions, only five or six copies were struck off the press. This circumstance has rendered his philosophical reflections and disquisitions extremely rare.* The Bishop's "*Aveugle de la Montagne*" bears, in the first edition, the date of 1789, and appears to have been privately printed, and distributed among the author's friends.

This work is written in the form of "Instructions" or Essays. It is in the epistolary and familiar style, and abounds with sublime and beautiful thoughts and sentiments, clothed in the most perspicuous and harmonious language. The first six Essays are on the "Nature of the Creation." The first and second are especially dedicated to Mallebranche, Dr. Clarke, Leibnitz, Bonnet, and to all the other metaphysicians of the eighteenth century.

In the first Essay or Dissertation, the Bishop gives us a vivid and beautiful impression of the grand truth of a Deity. This is a subject to which, in his eyes, no language can possibly do justice. Philosophers, in all ages of the world, have been filled with wonder and admiration at the existence of a Divine Mind, who called every thing around us into being, and who sustains and governs all, with such consummate order, wisdom, and bene-

* His Excellency, M. Van de Weyer, the Belgian Minister at London, has, as far as I am aware of, the only complete collection of these fugitive pieces. His Excellency has also the MS. copy of the Bishop's "*Elements of Morality*."

sificence. A subject so sublime and interesting, the pious author conceives, ought to awaken in us the most lively emotions of gratitude, love, and thankfulness.

We must not, however, in considering the nature of God, conclude that matter has no veritable existence. The Bishop affirms it is a positive and independent creation; a thing apart altogether from the Deity, and also from our minds. The operations of material bodies upon us are not to be considered in the light of a perpetual Divine operation, power, agency, or influence. They are the result of two certain and positive creations; each having a series of mutual relations to each other; but both endowed from the first with those powers which mark or designate their reciprocal action or influence on each other. The Deity is truly the Creator of all; but it is not by his direct and immediate agency that external bodies affect us; they do so by virtue of that power which Almighty wisdom conferred upon them and us at our respective creations.*

In the second Essay, we have a Dissertation on the nature of matter. This is exceedingly interesting. The Bishop maintains the objective reality of external bodies, and he rests this on the testimony of the senses. Still, however, we know nothing of matter as a real or abstract substance. Our author observes, "Matter is not that which I see; it is only the cause of my sensations. It is

* *Essai, Entretien Second*, pp. 20. 23. 32.

neither red, nor blue, nor cold, nor hot, nor long, nor broad. All these qualities exist only in myself; they are an affection of the senses, a vision, a modification of the mind. That which is external to my mind, that which I denominate matter, must necessarily be a uniform and simple substance.*

The third Essay is occupied with the opinions which many of the ancient philosophers entertained on the nature of a Deity; and the same historical train is maintained throughout the fourth, fifth, and sixth Essays. In the seventh, we come to God. This is a very beautiful piece of writing; and every reader who entertains any just or sound principles of theological truth, will feel pleasure in perusing these few brief though interesting and eloquent pages of this really good and pious philosopher. He here views the Deity in connection with physical nature. In the eighth Essay, we have the Divine Essence, considered in relation to intelligent beings; and in the ninth. the Deity is considered in conjunction with the astronomical science of many worlds. The tenth Essay is on Providence.

In his Essay entitled "*Le Chant du Cygne, ou La Vie à Venir et L'immortalité*," the bishop depicts the glorious prospects of another life, and the reasons we have to hope for it, in the most glowing language. He shows that the whole economy of external nature, as far as man has been able to examine it, and all the internal feelings of

* *Entretien Second*, p. 19.

the heart, unitedly bear testimony to the validity of this great and consoling truth.*

ANDRE ERNEST MODESTE GRETRY.

M. Grétry, a Belgian, is well known in the history of music, in all parts of the continent of Europe. It is a somewhat singular circumstance to have a work of a philosophical character from such a quarter. His "*De la Vérité*," in 3 vols., was published at Paris in 1801. Though not containing much that can strictly come within the range of mental science, yet the general spirit of the treatise is an emanation from the systems of French speculation at the termination of the last century. The various topics treated of, and the manner in which they are discussed, show that the author is a shrewd observer of human nature.

In the first volume we have dissertations on the utility of public instruction, and on the general principles which should guide statesmen in promoting and encouraging it; on the different species of civil governments; on the vices and virtues of respective classes or orders in society; and on public emulation and felicity. In the second volume, we have the arts and sciences dwelt upon, and their general bearings upon the civilization

* See a review of Nelis in the "*Esprit des Journaux*," 1792. His "*Aveugle de la Montagne*" was translated into German by the celebrated Lavater, in 1795. The bishop's first work is entitled, "*Fragments sur les Principes du Vrai Bonheur*," 1764, of which only five copies were printed.

and happiness of mankind. In the fourth chapter of the same volume, the author discusses the various relations which subsist among our sensations, and shows that without such established laws of connection every thing would be merged into an abyss of confusion. Grétry, although he does not adopt the whole of Condillac's opinions on sensations, nevertheless subscribes to all the leading doctrines of the Abbé on this subject. In the other parts of the fourth volume, we have the influence of climate, and various other external agencies on the mind, stated in an agreeable but rather superficial manner.

The metaphysical speculations in the third volume are confined to the immortality of the soul, to the existence of a theological principle in man, to the instinctive powers of his nature, to physical and mental sympathies and antipathies. The author thinks there are some grounds, from the physical constitution of man and of the universe, to hope that there is another state of existence after this. The religious principle, he conceives, is quite an original and instinctive one in our nature; and is so prominently developed that it clearly points out the duty of civil governments to support a system of religious instruction among all classes of the people.

RHYNVIS FEITH.

This Dutch author was indefatigable in his opposition to the introduction of the philosophy of

Kant into Holland. His writings, which are chiefly to be found in the periodicals of the day, were numerous, but mostly confined to the controversy in which he was engaged. He is spoken of as an able man, well versed in mental science and skilled in controversial warfare.

PAUL VAN HEMERT.

Van Hemert was one of the most active and intelligent writers of his day of whom Holland could boast. He was born at Amsterdam in 1756, and while yet a mere youth, displayed a remarkable enthusiasm for philosophical studies. In 1795, he published and edited the works of Kant, in four volumes, and was the first writer of any eminence that made the speculations of the Professor of Königsberg known in Holland. The Dutch had, however, a great aversion to the new "philosophy," as it was termed; and this led Van Hemert into several controversies relative to the merits of Kant, and his "Critique of Pure Reason." In all these disputes Van Hemert displayed uncommon talent and the most profound learning. His small work entitled "Pauli Van Hemert Epistola ad Danielelem Wittenbachium," manifests controversial abilities of the first order.

In Van Hemert's "Elements of the Philosophy of Kant," written in the Dutch language, we find the following summary of matters discussed in his four volumes. He enters into a disquisition on the nature of knowledge in general. This is de-

rived from two sources. A distinction is made between mathematical and philosophical knowledge. All science is characterised by four qualities; it is general, special, true, and necessary. Error is not the result of the circumscribed nature of the intellect. The senses by themselves could never lead us to truth. The author then discusses the nature of reason; points out what constitutes pure reason; shows the subjective nature of the senses; the basis of synthetic unity; the origin of analytical judgments; the source of synthetic judgments; the nature of analogical reasoning; of unity and diversity; of matter and form; of idealism and realism; of the existence of a Deity; the object of the creation; the limitations of human knowledge; its division into theoretical and practical; the nature and principles of the fine arts: and the true standard by which to estimate the relative and positive value of all knowledge and science.

There is a small treatise on the sublime, by Van Hemert, which he published when Professor at the College at Amsterdam; and in addition to the works we have already named, the reader will find a great many disquisitions connected with mental science in the author's general collection of literature, philosophy, and history, under the title of "*Lectuur by het Outbijt en de the-tafel*," in 11 volumes, 1807.

ALLARD HULSHOFF.

Hulshoff was born at Gröningen in 1734, and

in early life devoted himself to the medical profession, which he afterwards abandoned, and confined his attention solely to philosophical studies. His first publication was, "A Demonstration of the Best Possible World;" wherein he attempts to prove, that the principles of Leibnitz and Wolff were destructive to the fundamental principles of theology. This treatise attracted considerable attention throughout the North of Europe, and gave rise to many controversial tracts, both in defence of the author's views, and in favour of the Leibnitzian philosophy. This warfare only terminated in 1789; and from 1764 to this period, Hulshoff published three or four different philosophical works. The leading principles which pervade all these several speculations, are that the Deity is the foundation of all sound philosophy; and that his existence, attributes, and moral government of the world, are all pointed out to us by the internal sentiments of our souls.

In the author's treatise, "On the Existence of God," he expresses his regret that the proofs offered in support of this great truth by Descartes, are not satisfactory. In two other works on the general arrangements of Divine Providence, he affirms that the world does not exist necessarily, but is the creation of a necessary Being. These speculations he designates by the title of "An Exposition of the True Principles of Nature;" which is specially directed against the tenets promulgated by D'Holbach in his "Système de la Nature."

DIONYSIUS VAN DE WYMPERSSE.

This author was a Professor of Gröningen, and afterwards at Leyden, and published his "Abridgment of Philosophy" in 1789. The principles of this work belong to the Eclectic school; and there is but a small portion of originality displayed in its pages. The author had the reputation, however, among his philosophical contemporaries, of being profoundly skilled in all the speculative systems cultivated at that period in the North of Europe.

PIERRE PAULUS.

This author was an active and influential public functionary in the Low Countries, and partial to speculative studies. His work, "Discours sur l'Egalité des Hommes," 1794, displays considerable ingenuity and philosophical reading. The metaphysical questions involved in this inquiry, are directed, by the author, towards giving us a clear conception of those principles and maxims on which civil governments rest. The "Discours," beyond this, has little claim on the attention of the metaphysician.

C. F. DE NIEUPORT.

There are two works of this Belgian author, connected with metaphysical subjects; his "Essai sur

la Théorie du Raisonnement," 1805, and his "Un Peu de Tout, ou Amusemens d'un Sexagénaire," 1818. The first is prefixed to an edition of Condillac's Logic, and enters pretty fully into the rational and mental phenomena of all our abstract judgments. The author informs us in his preface, that what he has here written was the result of his own individual reflections; that he was not a slavish admirer of any writer, but had endeavoured to view the subject under consideration in his own way. As may be surmised, he differs in many particulars from Condillac. He confers a greater degree of spirituality on the mind, than the French philosopher; and enters more fully into the nature and operation of those several intellectual powers which are evidently called into requisition in every process of the reason or understanding.

In the treatise termed "Un Peu de Tout," we have a series of Essays, under the name of "Conversations." Those which bear on mental science are the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, On the Mind. The first "Conversation" is a light, spirited, and ingenious disquisition on the nature of mind, considered relatively to the body. Mind, the author tells us, does not mean an altogether spiritual thing, entirely unconnected with physical agencies. We must take the whole man, that is, body and mind together; and then we shall have a correct idea of his whole, *as a thinking being*. Whatever theory we may adopt on the nature of mind in the abstract, we must still admit that it is under a considerable influence from material causes. This

is apparent in every moment of our lives, and in every situation in which we are placed.*

In the second and third "Conversations" the subject is continued; and the writer's aim is to show, that a very feasible theory of mind may be established from a consideration of physical agencies on the brain and nervous system generally. The subject is treated in a light and humorous strain, in good keeping with the title of "Conversations" which it bears.

The Dissertation in this volume on Analysis in Philosophy, is interesting. The author, as a matter of course, is in raptures with this faculty. He thinks it is capable of accounting for every thing appertaining to the human mind and to human knowledge. He does not, however, throw any additional light on the subject, beyond what Condillac has stated in his chapter on this intellectual power.

* "Considérons donc notre corps comme l'établissement total d'une grande manufacture, dont le chef représentera notre ame. Notre cerveau devient alors le département de la manufacture proprement dite, c'est-à-dire, des magasins, des ateliers, &c., et enfin de tout ce qui concerne, tant l'ouvrage, que la matière même à ouvrir; et cette matière n'est évidemment ici que nos idées primaires. Notre ame, en tant qu'elle préside à ce département particulier, est donc ce que nous nommons en nous *l'intellect*, ou l'être intelligent. Mais de même que le chef de cet établissement, tout en surveillant cette partie importante, ne néglige cependant pas l'entretien des bâtimens, le soin de sa cuisine, de ses écuries, et enfin de tous les accessoires; de même notre ame agit, quoique d'une manière différente, sur toutes nos autres facultés. Ainsi elle est sensible et irritable dans le siège de nos affections; elle digère dans notre estomac, &c.; parce qu'elle est essentiellement en nous le principe de vitalité, et que la vitalité n'est que l'ensemble de toutes ces diverses facultés."—(Un Peu de Tout, p. 6.)

PROFESSOR WYTTEBACH.

This author is chiefly known as a metaphysician from his opposition in Holland to Kant's theory, and his controversies on this subject with Van Hemert. Wytténbach's opinions on the nature of the Kantian hypothesis, are contained in his "*Bibliotheca Critica*," 1809; a work which once enjoyed an extended reputation throughout the whole of Europe. It is generally affirmed by those who may be considered disinterested judges, that he had the worst of the conflict with Van Hemert; who, besides possessing a profound knowledge of Kant's doctrines, wielded a sharp controversial pen, and never failed to strengthen a weak argument by a liberal seasoning of sarcasm and ridicule. In one of the letters of Van Hemert, he accuses Wytténbach of great ignorance of Kant's system. This gave great offence to Wytténbach, who never forgave the insult.*

PROFESSOR LIEBAERT.

We have no metaphysical works from the pen of Professor Liebaert, but he is, nevertheless, entitled to a passing notice in the history of Belgian Philosophy. He filled the chair of Mental Science and Logic at the University of Louvain, during almost the whole period that Belgium was

* See M. Mohr, "*Epistolæ Sodalium Socraticorum Philomathicæ*," 1813.

under the government of France; and he was the principal expounder of what speculative opinions were taught throughout the whole country, during the existence of the Imperial dynasty. The Professor's text book was nothing more than a bare elementary work on Logic, entitled, "*Tractatus de Logica*," 1818. This small work is divided into two parts: the first treats on general and universal laws of thought; on ideas, judgment, and reason; and the second, on the different kinds of truth, and the various degrees of certainty which belong to each class.

IGNT. DENZINGER.

The author's two publications on Logic, "*Prima Lineamenta Logices*," 1818, and "*Compendium Logices*," 1823, contain some metaphysical maxims and views, but not of any great importance. The "*Compendium*" is the most philosophical in arrangement and matter. The third Chapter, on the Philosophy of Logic, and the fourth, on the History of Philosophy, may be read with advantage. They both display considerable reading, and an intimate acquaintance with various modern systems of intellectual science, both in Germany and France.

M. VAN MEENEN.

We have already mentioned that M. Van Meenen is one of the most acute and original

were; we have no occasion for learning it, either in morals, metaphysics, or even in social or political science. It is highly necessary to disengage the truth from the error with which it is incorporated; to separate the pure metal from the base alloy: but when so separated, truth needs only to be presented to the mind, and we embrace it without any conditions or reserve whatever.*

The principle here laid down may, in a certain sense, be considered true; and in another, erroneous. The author assumes truth as a fixed, unalterable *unity*, to which nothing can be added, and from which nothing can be deducted. But this theory is not without its difficulties, (as so profound a metaphysician as M. Van Meenen must know,) not merely of a speculative character, but also when considered relatively to practical life. There are many truths belonging to human nature

* " Je regarde comme fausse, ou comme mal exposée, toute idée qu'il faut défendre par des arguments: si elle ne frappe pas par sa propre évidence, les arguments n'y aideront pas. Les arguments sont un levier dont on peut se servir utilement pour détruire le faux, non pour construire le vrai; car le vrai ne se construit pas; il est indépendamment de nous, malgré nous; il ne s'agit que de le découvrir, et presque toujours que de le dégager des erreurs qui l'offusquent, pour qu'il se manifeste lui-même à quiconque ne se couvre pas les yeux du bandeau des passions. On le sent, on n'a pas besoin de l'apprendre, ni en morale, ni en métaphysique, ni même guère en politique: mais il faut désapprendre l'erreur, les erreurs si nombreuses qu'on prend pour de la science, parce qu'elles ont beaucoup coûté: *hor opus, hic labor est*. Je sais bien que le tour d'esprit ou les préjugés de ceux à qui, ou pour qui, l'exposition se fait, y est pour beaucoup: mais il faut se mettre à leur portée." (Lettre, p. 9.)

which require to be placed in certain positions before the mental eye, by a ratiocinative process, before it can detect them; and arguments, in this point of view, are certainly intellectual instruments of great importance and efficiency. If, however, M. Van Meenen simply means, that when truth is seen, it is instantly seized hold of, and recognised by the mind, as a thing possessing the character of absolute simplicity and unity, then his statements may be allowed to be sound enough. But as the author's observations now stand in his "Lettre," they are apt to be misconceived by the reader, and to give him an erroneous impression as to the nature of truth generally, and of those means or instruments we have of unfolding and promulgating it.

I think, with M. Van Meenen, that the real source of the main portion of error in Condillac's theory, arises from his notions as to the power of *abstraction*. The Belgian philosopher clearly proves to actual demonstration, that, from the Abbé's definition of it, we can never account for any of our general conceptions. The analytical process of the sensational hypothesis, can lead the mind only from one particular thing, attribute, essence, or quality, to another; but can never furnish us with aggregate or general notions, which seem to be the life-spring of all intellectual action and reasoning. M. Van Meenen presses this weak and faulty part of the French theory with so much force, and in so truly logical a manner, that he makes it appear as one of the

most shallow and ridiculous systems that ever occupied the attention of philosophers.

The question is not, as M. Van Meenen justly observes, *how we acquire* general notions, but *if we have them*; and if so, do we derive them solely from the senses? In answer to this question, he enters into a lengthened discussion, which our limited space will not allow us to embody, but the perusal of which will afford the reader much useful instruction. The chief point which M. Van Meenen here insists upon is, that all our important ideas of Deity, of mind, of causation, of personality, of duty, of obligation, of right and wrong, and many others, are altogether inexplicable on Condillac's theory of the nature and process of the power of abstraction.*

M. Van Meenen proceeds in his speculations to show, that in matters relative to reasoning or judgment, the French system is lamentably inadequate to afford any thing like a plausible solution. All judgments rest ultimately upon the internal feeling of consciousness, which is denominated by some philosophers by the term *common sense*.†

* See particularly, "Lettre," Edit. Brussels, 1840, pp. 19, 20, 22, 25, 35, 38.

† "La certitude de nos jugemens repose sur la base irréfragable pour chacun de nous, de notre conscience, que les uns nomment *sens intime*, les autres *sens commun*. C'est là notre critère de la vérité, ou du moins le pivot de notre certitude: car nous n'avons que de la *certitude*; nous ne l'avons elle-même, que parce que nous nous sommes *consciens* de l'impuissance de douter." * * * "Toute proposition énonce un jugement de l'esprit; tout jugement exprime un rapport, ou perçu ou conclu, entre deux idées. Le jugement *pensé* est la vision du rapport entre les

For M. Van Meenen's observations on the nature of language as an instrument of thought, and of moral and religious truths, we must refer the reader to his admirable little work. He will find that our philosopher probes to the bottom all our conceptions and ideas on those interesting subjects, and places them on their true and philosophical basis.

M. Van Meenen has just written an important "Essay," upon the Statistics of Morals, published in the "Mémoires de l'Académie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-arts de Belgique," 1848. This paper was communicated to the Society, in conjunction with another from M. de Decker relative to the nature and importance of M. Quetelet's "Statistique Morale, et les Principes qui doivent en former la Base," which had been formally read to the members of this learned body. M. Van Meenen's "Essay" or "Report" is a beautiful piece of philosophical discrimination; and all who feel interested in these peculiar studies, must, we are confident, peruse his observations and reasonings with much pleasure.

deux idées ; vision qui est instantanée, indivisible ; qui suppose bien les deux idées senties, souvenues, imaginées, perçues, conclues, il n'importe comment, ni depuis quand, ni où, ni pourquoi : mais qui ne suppose absolument rien de plus. Mais, pour *parler le jugement pené*, soit qu'on ne veuille le parler que pour s'en assurer la possession, le rappel, et même la vérification, ou pour le communiquer aux autres, il faut *l'exprimer* ; et on ne peut *l'exprimer*, si on ne nomme les deux termes du rapport, en même temps qu'on énonce le rapport."—(Lettre, &c., pp. 46. 84.)

||

2 E

A. F. M. D'ELHOUNGNE.

This author, a member of the legal profession, published a work of considerable merit, entitled "Dissertation sur le Principe Fondamental du Droit de Punir," 1822. The mental and philosophical principles on which rewards and punishments are grounded, are treated of in the Introduction, and in the first two sections of the work, in a general but distinct manner. The author's publication has been followed in Belgium, in latter years, by several others upon the same subject; all of which show a profound knowledge of the leading principles by which the civil and criminal codes of nations should be guided.

FRAN. MICH. NOEL.

The author's small treatise entitled "Dissertatio Inauguralis Medica de Facultatibus Intellectus," 1825, is connected with physiological studies. M. Noël does not, however, show any decided inclination to materialise the mind; on the contrary, he is anxious that we should hold the balance of evidence fairly between material agencies and intellectual facts. He says that all candid physiologists maintain the *unity* of the thinking principle, but entertain various opinions as to its locality; some placing it in one part of the nervous system, and some in another.*

* Dissertatio, p. 17.

GUEDON DE BERCHERE.

This gentleman belongs to the legal profession in Brussels, and is favourably known as the translator of a part of Locke's celebrated "Essay;" that portion of it which relates to the conduct of the understanding. The translation bears the date of 1826, and appears to have been executed with great care, and scrupulous fidelity to the original.

J. G. OTTEMA.

M. Ottema's work, "*Commentatio ad Quæstionem Literariam, Propositam ab ordine Philos. in Acad. Lovaniensi; Exponatur, Quænam fuerint in Tractanda Philosophia Francisci Hemsterhuisii Merita,*" 1827, was written at the suggestion of the University of Louvain. The author points out all the essential parts in Hemsterhuis' philosophy, and shows their bearings on important doctrines. It is an elaborate and scientific work; but as the Dutch philosopher's speculations have already come before us, we are precluded from entering farther into their nature and merits, or into the able work of M. Ottema.*

BARON REIFFENBERG.

Baron Reiffenberg† is one of the most erudite

* See ante, Vol. 3, p. 529.

† "*De la Direction Actuellement Nécessaire aux Etudes Philosophiques,*" 1828; "*Eclecticisme, ou Premier Principe de Philosophie Générale,*" 1828; "*Principes de Logique,*" 1833.

philosophers of Belgium, and a voluminous writer on many subjects apart from mental philosophy.

The Baron is a zealous and able advocate of the eclectic philosophy, and considers it as the only scientific mode of successfully prosecuting inquiries into the phenomena of the thinking principle. He looks upon the eclectic method of all sciences as based upon the plainest suggestions of the mind, and the most obvious and common-sense views of the end or purpose of all human knowledge. It is that method which mankind follow in every movement and in every simple transaction of life. To cull out, to select, to set apart, what is obvious, indisputable, uncontradicted, certain, is only to give exercise to one of the most early and elementary functions of the intellect.

Philosophy, in its comprehensive meaning, the Baron divides into four parts. 1st, Sensibility, or the generation of the faculties of the understanding and will, which embraces psychology. 2nd, The products of the understanding, which properly appertain to metaphysics. 3rd, The products of the will, or moral determinations, which constitute ethics. And 4th, The rational forms and methods by which we arrange our knowledge and impart it to others; which forms and methods, when embodied into one whole, make that which we denominate logic.

The psychology of the author embraces then the faculties of the mind and the voluntary powers. He prefaces his disquisitions on this branch of his subject with many acute observations and statements, as to the true starting point of psycho-

logical speculations, the *à priori* laws of human thought, the passive and active nature of mind, and the various theories, both ancient and modern, which have been devised with a view to explain the reciprocal influence which exists between thought and matter.

Under the division of sensibility, the author treats of consciousness, attention, memory, comparison and judgment, imagination and reason.

On the nature of the moral faculty, the Baron maintains, that all responsibility depends upon the liberty of the will. He argues this succinctly but forcibly. Necessity in every shape and form is inimical to sound knowledge and rational discussion.

Logic consists, according to Baron Reiffenberg's definition of it, in a right use of the faculties of the soul, in accordance with certain mental laws. It is an instrument for the discovery and promulgation of truth.* All reasoning is a perception of a relation between two judgments. Every judgment is a perception of a relation between two ideas. Logic is divided into four great parts; the idea, judgment, reasoning, and method.

M. HAUMONT.

The metaphysical tracts of M. Haumont, "Discours sur Les Arts et Les Sciences en Général, et sur leur Langue en Particulier," 1828; and "Discours sur Les Systèmes," 1828, attracted some attention among the philosophers of Belgium.

* Psychologie, pp. 2. 29.

They are both interesting publications; and the chief aim of the first "Discourse" is to shew the influence of language upon the general current of mental speculation. The author seems to coincide with the leading principles of Condillac's philosophy, on the nature and influence of language. The second "Discourse" of M. Haumont relates to Systems of Speculation. These he conceives are generally pernicious, and retard the progress of real knowledge. We think that M. Haumont draws too sombre a picture of the pernicious influence of systems. Theories may be greatly abused, but they are not without their use in the general march of science.

LOUIS JOSEPH DEHAUT.

This learned gentleman was one of the Professors at the University of Ghent, and a metaphysical writer of great profundity and extensive attainments. He died a few years ago. The only published work we have on mental science, is his translation of Ammonius Saccas, and an introduction on the nature of his doctrines. The author wrote a treatise, at the request of the University of Louvain, on the existence, immateriality, and immortality of the soul, which obtained the chief prize of the gold medal. This has been considered by some philosophers, unconnected with the University, to be a remarkably able work; so much so, that in 1845, when M. Van de Weyer, the present Belgian minister in this country, was one of the members of the Administration at Brussels, as Minister of the

Interior, a proposition was made to the family of Professor Dehaut to publish this important treatise at the public expense.

SYLVAIN VAN DE WEYER.

M. Van de Weyer,* now Belgian Minister at the Court of Great Britain, received his education at the University of Louvain, where he became a very early proficient in philosophical studies. He was highly favoured in obtaining the instructions of M. Van Meenen; and our author soon entered with all the zeal and enthusiasm of his youthful mind into every plan and suggestion of his master, for the successful prosecution and extension of mental science. As we have already noticed,† M. Van de Weyer edited, whilst scarcely of age, the whole philosophical works of Hemsterhuis; and displayed such consummate ability in the task, that his philosophical reputation, strengthened as it has been by subsequent speculations, is now well known beyond the limits of his own country.‡

* "Dissertation sur le Devoir;" "Discours sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie;" 1827. "Essai sur le Livre de M. Jacotot, intitulé Enseignement Universel, &c.," 1823. "Opuscules de Morale." "Coup d'œil sur la Philosophie d'Hemsterhuis."

† See ante, vol. 3, pp. 94. 526.

‡ "Enfin le Professeur auquel fut confiée la chaire nouvelle, (Bruxelles) se trouva précisément l'homme le plus capable d'en tirer le meilleur parti, M. Sylvain Van de Weyer, l'élève et l'ami de M. Van Meenen, l'éditeur d'Hemsterhuis, dont le zèle connu et le talent remarquable d'élocution étaient tout-à-fait propres à inspirer et répandre le goût de la Philosophie."—(Cousin, "De la Philosophie en Belgique," 1830, p. 142.)

The author commences his "Discourse," by defending the value and importance of mental philosophy, and by especially pointing out its utility in successfully prosecuting many other branches of knowledge. He shows that the same reasons for calling in question the usefulness of mental science, commonly brought forward at the present time, are precisely those which have been the captious instruments in the hands of a vociferous, but small class of philosophical declaimers, from the earliest records of speculation.

The author places philosophy on an elevated position; all his ideas of it are grand and interesting. Nature and her laws; God and His attributes; these are the fundamental principles of all sound speculative science. It is, by virtue of its intrinsic excellence, entitled to take precedence over all others. Shall a classification of animals, of plants, of insects, of minerals, be termed a science; and yet the human mind, with all its splendid powers and faculties; a type of the Divine mind; the instrument of all knowledge; the real source of all scientific truth; be disregarded, or placed in a subordinate station in our estimation? This were indeed to make a perverse and retrograde movement, and to run counter to the plainest dictates and instincts of nature.*

It may be considered as almost a demonstrative

* "Quoi! l'art de décrire et de classer les animaux, les plantes et les minéraux; l'art de composer, de décomposer les corps, et de manipuler la matière, seraient des sciences; et l'étude de l'homme et de son esprit,

truth, that every thing which is true in human nature has already been matter of observation and philosophical remark. Instead, therefore, of setting out in our speculative career with a view of discovering new regions, we should employ ourselves in reconciling the real and apparent contradictions which are to be found among many systems, and to bring their leading principles into something approaching to a harmonious and logical unity. Such labours would prove both interesting and beneficial. We should soon perceive that many theories of mind are separated by apparent rather than real differences; and that when we come to abstract the generally admitted truths on each side, arrange them in proper order, rejecting the false and setting aside the irrelevant or unimportant, there is a much greater unanimity of opinion among philosophers than is commonly imagined. Contradictions relative to general principles would be found to have almost no existence whatever.

M. Van de Weyer defines philosophy to be the science of wisdom. It has man for its object; and by judicious and circumspect observations, it discovers in his actions certain general and universal rules; and in his thoughts certain fundamental principles of truth; and philosophy places all these

de cet esprit, créateur de toutes ces sciences, qui, dans son insatiable activité et sa vaste étendue, embrasse l'univers, interroge le passé, sonde l'avenir; l'étude de l'homme comme être pensant, comme être moral, comme être religieux, n'en serait pas une!!!” (Discours sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie, p. 15.)

in the individual consciousness, or in that which all men feel and practise. It assumes, then, the shape of a science, or collection of rules or principles, embracing all that men know and do; though the knowledge may be vague, and the actions apparently merely the result of habit or instinct. Philosophy, in fact, theorises, or systematises all human action and thought; and simply clothes in a more imposing and fascinating garb the every-day and popular truths and ideas current among mankind. The philosopher takes his departure from the internal feelings of man; tests the truths which lie buried in the depths of the consciousness, by observation and rules of thought; and thus moulds into the form and rank of a science the whole phenomena of human nature. Philosophy is not, therefore, a purely speculative or abstract science; but is founded on the practical results of the actions of mankind in all ages and conditions of life.

Humanity speaks, and philosophy listens; men act, and it observes. It rests, therefore, on consciousness; and the truths developed from this source are denominated by the phrase or term *common sense*. This is the light which guides us in all our philosophical inquiries. From the earliest records of time, and following the course of human events with the light of history, throughout all their diversified aspects, we everywhere recognise the principles of common sense, as universal elements of human thought and action. No violence can suppress, no sophisms obscure them. They

steadily and unerringly guide us through the revolutions and destruction of nations and empires. The eye pierces with rapid glance through the long vista of ages, amid the sanguinary conflicts, the territorial aggrandisements, and chequered fortunes of states and kingdoms; and from the wreck of all that is debasing, glorious, or powerful, we still recognise the great and universal truths of humanity. One generation passes away after another, but they remain for ever the same. They are the life-blood of human nature; the intellectual air we breathe. Without them society could not for a single hour exist; governments, laws, institutions, religion, the manners and customs of men, bear the indelible imprint of their universality and indestructibility. They are revealed in the daily and hourly actions, thoughts, and speech of all men; and must ever form the basis of all systems of philosophy; for without them it can only be a phantom, a delusion, an unmeaning assemblage of words.*

The existence and perpetuity of these universal principles of common-sense, constitute, therefore, a great fact, with which it is the province of philosophy to deal. Its proper office is to recognise these elementary and primary truths, to classify them, to analyse and explain them, and to show their utility and bearings on the vital interests and happiness of men.†

* Discours, &c., pp. 24. 24. 26.

† " L'office propre de la philosophie est donc de reconnaître ces vérités, de les classer, de les expliquer, de les juger, et d'établir que, si

The author tells us, however, that the history of philosophy is not to be identified with a chronological or genealogical classification of human events, manners, customs, or opinions. It has a more profound origin and purpose. It comprehends the history of the human mind relative to those branches of knowledge which we term philosophical. These constitute a multitude of rules, principles, and facts, in relation to man as a feeling, a thinking being, and one endowed with voluntary power or agency ; or the philosophy of human nature may be considered as embracing the physical, intellectual, and moral powers of our race. We are not, however, to consider the history of philosophy as constituting a bare record of speculative notions, or the real or supposed causes of them. It is true, that systems of philosophy have often been the mere creations of times and circumstances, and sometimes have been manifested as causes and sometimes as effects ; and in this point of view their development may form a part of the history of philosophy, but by no means its foundation. This rests upon the

elles sont la vie de l'humanité, elles sont aussi la lumière qui éclaire tout homme venant au monde ; qu'elles brillent et se révèlent dans toute action raisonnable, dans toute pensée juste ; qu'en interrogeant le sens intérieur, guide de nos jugements, et qui sert à reconnaître et à constater ces vérités, on apprend qu'on ne peut les rejeter sans se dépouiller de la qualité d'homme ; qu'on les adopte et qu'on les met en pratique, lors même qu'on les nie en théorie, c'est-à-dire, que, quel que soit le système de philosophie que l'on suive, les vérités du sens commun sont toujours, dans le commerce de la vie, le guide de nos actions, la règle de nos jugements, la lumière de nos pensées, la vie de notre intelligence." (Discours sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie, p. 29.)

entire of humanity as developed in all times, places, circumstances, thought, and action.

M. Van de Weyer proceeds then to show what has been the history of philosophy, and what influence it has exercised over the general interests of humanity.

On this portion of the "Discourse," we are compelled to be brief. Man is to be viewed in all his relations, both theoretically and practically. Whatever appertains to universal humanity, whether appearing under an explicit or implicit form, must be taken as the only real foundation for the principles of *common sense* or reason.

Now if we look into human nature with any degree of care and philosophical skill, and can compare facts with the history of speculative opinions among our race, we shall perceive that there are certain general truths which have been rallying points for the reasoning powers of men in all ages of the world, and which are at the present moment exercising the same power and influence over the ordinary and abstract conceptions and conclusions of reason among all classes of men. These rallying points, or elementary principles, though not numerous, are nevertheless comprehensive. We may enumerate the firm conviction of our own individual existence; the existence of an external world around us; the reciprocal intercourse which subsists between both; the general powers of recognising what is true, beautiful, and good; our notions of freedom or voluntary power; of moral duties and obligations; of justice and

injustice ; of merit and demerit ; of the dignity or worth of human nature ; of the belief in the general stability of the laws of nature ; of the ideas or conceptions of a Deity ; of the immortality of the human soul ; and of religious sentiments, feelings, and duties. These may be considered as forming the staple ingredients of man, as an intellectual and moral being.

The history of philosophy embraces, therefore, a consideration of all these important elements of man's inward frame. It must refer to their origin, to their mutual relations, their influences on the every-day movements and sentiments of mankind ; and, in fact, to all those springs and principles, from which thought, reasoning, sentiment, and feeling take their rise.

In M. Van de Weyer's "Dissertation" on duty or obligation, many excellent thoughts and observations will be found ; for he makes the whole of our ideas of obligation rest upon the *à priori* conceptions of the mind. Nothing can overturn the arguments he adduces, nor the learned authorities he cites. He examines with great acuteness the chief principles of Bentham's theory of Utility, and shows its logical defects. On this point the following remarks are strikingly conclusive and forcible. "To manifest the radical imperfections of this theory, let us cast our eye, for a moment, on man in the exercise of his active moral powers. We see him daily placed, in every moment of his life, amidst a crowd of domestic duties, the obligations arising from civil intercourse, from the rela-

tions of a family, the offices of friendship, and the duties springing out of his social connections; from all of which conditions and states there arises an urgent necessity for prompt and energetic action. How then, may we ask, is it possible, that before he could in any given case discharge a single duty, he could enter into cold and refined calculations as to the greatest good to be obtained? Besides, even supposing the possibility of such a refined and subtile power of balancing contingent benefits, would it not be necessary, from innumerable comparisons of relative interests, that there should be some uniform and active principle, always ready to perform its office, in all such pressing emergencies? That the greatest good or happiness principle of the Utilitarians is insufficient for such a purpose, must be evident to the plainest understanding.*

Many of the important principles of mental science are discussed in M. Van de Weyer's "Essay" on the book of M. Jacotot, who maintains that all men are of equal intellectual capacity. This position, M. Van de Weyer shows, has not the slightest foundation. On the nature of language, as a philosophical instrument of thought, and on the power of generalizing our observations, M. Jacotot makes many statements, the incorrectness of which his acute adversary has not failed to point out. M. Jacotot has also favoured us with several opinions on the philosophy of Kant, which his critic has shown are grounded upon an entire misconception of the system of the Philo-

* Dissertation, p. 51.

sopher of Königsberg. What M. Jacotot has stated in reference to the nature of mathematical evidence, falls, in like manner, under the animadversion of M. Van de Weyer.*

Among M. Van de Weyer's "Opuscles de Morale," are many small dissertations on subjects of great practical importance and interest. They all display remarkable acuteness, and a thorough knowledge of the human heart. His "Moyen Facile et Economique d'Etre Bienfaisant," is a beautiful fragment; and his "Pensées Diverses," are a series of condensed thoughts and maxims full of point and sententious wisdom. "The Art of Saying No," is an Essay showing how much of our moral greatness, worth, usefulness, and happiness depends upon a course of *self-denial* in reference to our passions, desires, appetites, amusements, and recreations. An "Essay on Silence" points out the utility of keeping our loquaciousness within due bounds, and of cultivating a mental habit of inward thought and contemplation. The author illustrates his positions by many happy references to the practice and recommendations of some of the ancient sects of philosophers as to the benefits to be derived from silence; and particularly to the institutions of chivalry, which, among many other things, rigidly enforced numerous rules for the repression of idle or unprofitable conversation. "The Art of being Ill," shows how the mind and moral feelings and sentiments are affected by the physical ailments of the body; and that a certain

* See "Essai," &c. pp. 34, 40, 58, 63, 64.

prescribed moral regimen is requisite for such diseased action. An "Essay on the Dangers of Reading Plutarch," has an especial reference to the influence of warlike and a species of theatrical virtues on the minds of youth. M. Van de Weyer conceives that the perusal of such characters as are sketched by Plutarch, is apt to impart to a young man an erroneous view of moral duty and obligation, and to inspire him, in the outset of life, with an ambition of being a great, rather than a good and useful, member of society.

JEAN HERMAN JANSSENS.

This metaphysical writer belongs to the Clerical body, and was once Professor at the University of Louvain. He is the author of several treatises on mental science, written in the Latin language, one of which I have only seen, and then for so limited a period as not to afford me a sufficient opportunity to speak of its contents. The French names of these works are as follows: "Prolégomènes de la Philosophie, et Anthropologie Somatologique et Psychologique;" "Logique;" "Métaphysique Générale;" "Métaphysique Particulière;" and "Philosophie Morale."

ABBE G. MOENS.

The Abbé's publication "Revue du St. Simonsisme, ou Réfutation de la Doctrine de St. Simon," 1832, is, as its name imports, a formal

||

2 F

refutation of the opinions of St. Simon, whose notions are developed in another part of this volume.* It would appear that, after the French Revolution of 1830, the St. Simonians undertook an excursion into Belgium, for the purpose of extending their opinions among the people of that country. The heads of the sect lectured at some of the chief towns, and circulated an immense number of tracts, which gave a brief but very flattering account of their system. The Clergy became alarmed at the introduction and dissemination of such tenets; and the consequence was that the worthy and pious Abbé Moens took up his pen, and, under the deep impression of religious duty, entered into a full and lengthened refutation, in two volumes, of all the chief principles embodied in the creed of the fanatic and deluded sectarians.

As the views of the St. Simonians, though grounded on certain general metaphysical notions, have a direct reference to social and political objects, they do not necessarily fall under the range of our discussions. We shall merely notice, therefore, that the reader will find the Abbé Moens an able reasoner on the doctrines he has undertaken to refute, and one who has made himself fully acquainted with every argument which his antagonists have brought forward in support of their system.

* See p. 290.

LE COMTE HENRI DE MERODE, AND
LE MARQUIS DE BEAUFFORT.

These are members of two of the oldest and most honourable families in Belgium, and joint authors of a work entitled "De L'Esprit de Vie, et de L'Esprit de Mort," 1833, which has attracted considerable attention among a certain class of philosophers on the Continent. The metaphysical principles incorporated in this treatise are those which belong to the "Ecole Théologique;" but their application is, in this instance, characterised by such an originality of plan and conception, as to entitle them to a specific though brief notice.

The grand object of the work is to repress the doctrines of philosophical rationalism, and to place the elements of pure and refined Christianity in their stead; but this object is developed in so novel a manner, and the reasonings which the authors bring forward to support their views are so plausible, and urged with such an ardent and zealous spirit, that we hope the reader will not consider his patience too severely taxed by a short but necessarily inadequate notice of them.

The idea of Deity is everywhere; and all truth, beauty, and goodness centre in Him. All created and finite beings, which are emanations of the Eternal, can only realize their felicity and perfection in reposing on Him. Finite creations must all necessarily be imperfect, and from this a principle of evil and disorder originates; but how, or

in what manner, is one of the mysteries we are not allowed to look into. The existence of the two principles of good and evil is, however, attested by the unanimous voice of history, as well as by everyday experience. But there is a great difference not only in the nature and objects of the two principles, but also in their original vigour and intensity of operation. Man, in every state of being, recognises the existence and attributes of Deity; they have a firm hold of his affections; he is perpetually panting after happiness, and truth, and goodness, and beauty. These have never ceased, since his appearance on earth, to be the especial objects of his esteem, admiration, and desire. All his movements, all his energies, all his hopes are centred in their acquisition. Not so with the evil principle. It is the exception to the rule; it assumes the character of an isolated obstacle and accidental hindrance, rather than a regular constituted creation. It is not an object relished, sought after, desired, or enjoyed for its own sake. Its nature is innately repulsive, ungenial, forbidden, and repugnant; its fruit, wrath, bitterness, misery, and death. Man invariably searches for good, and avoids evil.

Now there are three leading principles which impel him to action, and regulate all his movements; the theological principle, the social principle, and the intellectual or literary principle. These must all act in harmony with each other, or man's happiness cannot be promoted or secured. The latter is the active principle, which excites derangement in the other two. When it is de-

veloped in a mode or manner not in unison with the theological and social principles, then vice, error, and misery are the inevitable result, both to states and to individuals. Speculative error is just as pernicious as practical error. It is as much the duty and interest of individuals and communities to think right, as to act right. The evidence of a want of harmony among the three great principles of human thought and action is, when the intellectual powers pursue such a course as to diminish the influence and cramp the operation of the theological principle. This opposition or incongruity may assume many different aspects, and be characterised by many different degrees of error.

In the history of mankind, we find nations and individuals suffering under various degrees of vice and misery, in proportion as the derangement between the intellectual and theological principles has been more or less violent and antagonistic. We find in the ancient world disorder and wickedness prevalent, to an almost incurable extent. The Roman Government, until the introduction of Christianity, was one huge mass of iniquity, cruelty, and injustice. When the theological principle was recognised in Christianity, we perceive a great and decided change for the better. And throughout the whole range of European history we find, that when the intellectual and the religious principles have been in harmonious action with each other, a corresponding and beneficial change in the general state of society has been recognised as the infallible consequence. When the mind of man attempts to govern the

affairs of the world, without reference to the inherent principle of theological truth, then it is that he falls into all manner of errors, both speculative and practical; and produces miseries of revolting intensity and number.

The question then comes to this point. We cannot cultivate knowledge and science beneficially, without the assistance and co-operation of religious principles and instruction. The authors of the "*Esprit de Vie*," maintain that this position is established by the most powerful and irrefragable evidence; nothing short of the evidence of the senses, and the universal experience of mankind. The Church is the true conservative principle of human society; and every means of instruction, both public and private, of whatever nature it may be, and whatever purpose it be destined to promote, ought to be based upon its doctrines, its rituals, and its decisions.*

L. A. GRUYER.

This Belgian author† is rapidly gaining distinc-

* "*L'Eglise, douée d'une immortelle sagesse, possède toujours des moyens de salut pour toutes les situations de l'âme et de la société, et si les hommes éclairés par l'expérience et les malheurs, et par les développemens qu'une saine philosophie donne aux vérités religieuses, s'offraient à son action réparatrice, nous n'hésitons pas à le dire, le monde, rajeuni par cette puissance bienfaisante, s'avancerait vers de nouvelles et glorieuses destinées.*"—(De l'*Esprit de Vie*, p. 261.)

† "*Essais Philosophiques*," 1832; "*Tablettes Philosophiques*," 1842; "*Des Causes Conditionnelles et Productrices des Idées, ou de l'Enseignement naturel des propriétés et des phénomènes de l'âme*," 1844; "*Principes de Philosophie Physique*," 1845. "*Méditations Critiques, ou Examen Approfondi de Plusieurs Doctrines sur l'Homme et sur Dieu*," Paris, 1847.

tion and honour, not only in his own country, but in neighbouring nations, for the number and excellency of his philosophical works.

His "*Essais Philosophiques*" contain a great body of metaphysical speculation. In the first and second volumes we have the general principles of metaphysics treated of under the three-fold division, of external bodies, the faculties of the soul, and a sketch of the philosophy of Descartes. Under the second head, of the faculties of the soul, the author has furnished us with more than thirty distinct dissertations. The principles of Descartes are developed with great clearness and faithfulness. In the third volume, we have the properties of external bodies treated of, considered in relation to the sensations we experience from their action on the senses; and in addition to these matters, we have the opinions of all the most distinguished ancient philosophers, on the nature of first causes, and on an universal ether. The fourth volume is devoted to the consideration of method, the principles of certainty, and the existence and attributes of the Deity.

The treatise "*Des Causes Conditionelles*" of M. Gruyer, is entitled to profound consideration. It embraces matters of great moment and complexity. We have here dissertations on conditional causes; on the properties of the soul; on the faculty of thinking; on the metaphysical system of L romigui re; on the Cartesian philosophy; on essence, substance, time, infinity, efficient

causes, innate ideas, the system of Kant, and extracts from his works.

In a work of this kind and extent, comprehending so many topics fruitful of discussion, we cannot pretend to offer even a general outline. We can merely state that M. Gruyer refers all intellectual phenomena to two causes; the one external, which he denominates *efficient*; and the other internal, which is called *conditional*. This division branches out into many ramifications.

M. Gruyer's treatise, "*Principes de Philosophie Physique*," displays his philosophical skill to great advantage. We refer the reader to what he says, in the first part, on extension, impenetrability, atoms, and body. There are many original and interesting speculations scattered throughout this portion of the work. The second part is devoted to the consideration of motion.*

The "*Méditations*" contain many valuable critiques, not only upon several writers and their respective theories, but also on various subjects; such as, Final Causes, Creation, the Beautiful, Liberty and Necessity, and many others. These critiques are conducted in an enlightened spirit, and with a complete command over the grand and prominent points of controversial interest.

These "*Méditations*" give a very favourable view of M. Gruyer's original powers as a metaphysical writer. They abound with acute and striking thoughts and happy illustrations. They

* The reader will find many interesting remarks on the views of M. Gruyer in M. Tissot's "*Observations Critiques*."

grapple likewise with many of the most profound, but as yet unsolved, problems in the science of mind. The Essays on Moral Necessity, Free-will, the Spontaneous Activity of Mind and Motives to Action, are beautifully arranged, and the question in each Essay is stated with great clearness and conciseness. There is, however, a fault in M. Gruyer as a writer. He is a little too captious or hypercritical in his definitions of philosophical terms; and it is from this cause that he seems betimes to labour under a conception that he is demolishing an antagonist's argument, when, in reality, he is only showing the imperfect meaning of his opponent's terms. M. Gruyer sometimes fails to perceive, that the strength of an argument often lies solely in the discordant or incongruous nature of certain ideas, and not in the verbal or formal drapery in which it is clothed. Such incongruities often arise in reference to questions in mental science. And its history furnishes innumerable instances of writers undertaking the solution of difficult problems, through the means of instituting what they considered a more correct definition of terms. In following their lucubrations, we become for the moment enamoured with their remarkable acuteness in detecting the imperfections of the current phraseology on the question, and the precision and aptness of their own language; but we soon perceive the delusion. They go on defining and defining till the new definitions become more cumbersome or incomprehensible than the old, or until we discover that they

have landed us at precisely the same spot from whence we took our departure. The fact is, that many questions relative to the nature and operations of the thinking principle are difficult of solution, from the antagonistic or incongruous complexion of certain *à priori* conceptions. These are to be found in every branch of human knowledge ; but in greater number in the science of mind ; inasmuch as it professes to be the source of all our ideas and notions of every subject of inquiry. These contrary conceptions are not to be rendered harmonious, or explained away by mere verbal definitions ; which are of themselves unquestionably necessary and useful, but often imperfect and unsatisfactory, things. Ideas are what we have to deal with in purely abstract questions. We often labour long and arduously in clearing away what we think the verbiage of imperfect or barbarous terms ; and yet, after all, experience the mortification of perceiving that the logical object of which we are in search still eludes our grasp, and that our critical exertions and ingenuity have been thrown away.

CHARLES MARTIN FRIEDLANDER.

Dr. Friedlander is one of the savans of Brussels, and a metaphysician of some reputation. He has written on the systems of Broussais and Cousin ; and there is also a treatise of his entitled "*Lebens Philosophie*," 1833, which I have not had the opportunity of perusing.

M. NIEWENHUIS.

This is one of the most profound philosophers of Holland; a man of great learning, and talents of a high order. His "*Initia Philosophiæ Theoreticæ*," 2 vols. 1833, I have not seen; but it is considered by many able critics to be a first-rate performance.

The "*Commentatio de Renati Cartesii, &c.*" 1828, is a valuable work of Nieuwenhuis. It contains a very accurate and minute account of the progress of the Cartesian philosophy in Holland and Belgium, and of the successes and obstacles it met with in particular districts of these countries. There is also a reference to all the most distinguished philosophers of the day in the northern parts of Europe, with whom Descartes kept up a general correspondence. This makes the "*Commentatio*" an interesting and useful book for the philosophical historian.

P. F. XAV. DE RAM.

This author is one of the most learned theologians in Belgium, and belongs to the theological school of metaphysics. His "*Historia Philosophiæ*," 1834, is a respectable publication, and contains a very useful summary of the ancient systems of speculation, from the earliest ages to the establishment of the Christian dispensation. There is, appended to the history, an Exposition of the

Philosophical Systems of India, written in the French language.

W. VAN HEUSDE.

Van Heusde* is an author of great learning and talents. His reputation is not confined to his own country; his works are tolerably well known in Germany, France, and even in England.

In the first volume of Van Heusde's "Initia," he enters very fully into the nature of the ancient Grecian system of philosophy; shows its chief bearings on important doctrines; and winds up his reflections by many profound and sagacious observations. The second volume contains all the metaphysical works of Plato, as well as those in reference to dialectics. In the third volume the politics of Plato are discussed and developed, and many excellent remarks made upon the important questions which the Grecian sage discusses.

Van Heusde's work, "The Socratic School of Philosophy for the Nineteenth Century," is considered in Holland and Belgium a useful and valuable production. It has been highly praised by some learned critics.

In this publication the author gives us, in the first place, those arts which are more immediately connected with feeling or general sensibility; such

* "De Socratische School of Wijsgeerte, voor de Negentiende Eeuw," Utrecht, 1834; "Initia Philosophiæ Platoniciæ," 1831.

as poetry, the fine arts, &c. In the second part, we have the nature of scientific truth pointed out, in various chapters of the book. The author asks, What is logic? It is the art of communicating knowledge according to the principles of sound reason; and is not to be confounded with the dialectics of the schools.* The author then treats at some length of the connection of arts and general knowledge in relation to man's internal recognitions of truth. This he considers the most important part of his work. The beautiful and the true are indissolubly connected; and both have such a relation to the human mind as to promote the gradual but certain progress of knowledge among all mankind.

In the second volume, the principles of natural theology and of morals are discussed; and their relation with other branches of human knowledge succinctly pointed out.

ADOLPHE QUETELET.

M. Quetelet is Director of the Royal Observatory at Brussels, and a voluminous writer on many topics of physical science. He has of late years directed his attention to matters connected with the principles of morals, with a view to ascertaining their bearing upon questions of social philosophy. His treatise "*Sur l'Homme*

* *De Socratische School*, vol. 1, p. 281.

et le développement de ses facultés, ou *Essai de Physique Sociale*," 1835, is written with this aim.

The author has entered into some practical details under the title of "*Sur la Statistique Morale*," in illustration of several of the principles contained in his work on Man. These details have come before the "*Académie Royale*" of Brussels, and were published in the volume of their Transactions for 1848. As the subject of which the author here treats lies beyond our sphere of inquiry, we shall merely refer the reader to the statements contained in the volume just mentioned. They will be found to be curious and interesting.

In M. Quetelet's recent publication, "*Du Système Social et des Lois qui le régissent*," Paris, 1848, the moral and intellectual powers of man are considered in relation to his social and political condition; not in a metaphysical point of view, or in their relations to pure abstract ideas or principles. The most interesting portion of the volume to the metaphysician, is the third chapter of the third book, which treats of the development of the intellectual faculties. The author has here started an important question, not as to the operations or powers of the mind, abstractly considered, but as to their practical development in particular sciences and arts, and at particular periods of life. He gives us several examples of remarkable precociousness of intellect, both in science and in

art; but these are evidently only exceptions to the general rule. The author has taken only one view of this question; we shall take the liberty of laying another before him, of some importance, as to the practical education or improvement of man; and curious in itself, as connected with those general laws which govern the mental economy. The comprehensive and important faculties of the mind, such as reasoning, judging, &c., are, in all men, of *slow growth*, compared with some other of our faculties. An individual examination of the most distinguished men of all nations, who have directed their concentrated attention to branches of knowledge in which solid and profound judgment is required, would show this statistical result, that the average age at which literary men have executed such intellectual works as form now the foundation of their respective reputations, would be found to be from *forty-five to forty-seven years*. I ground this calculation on all writers who treat philosophically of human nature; those, in fact, who discuss metaphysics, morals, divinity, politics (theoretically), history, and philosophical history. There are two intellectual pursuits exempted from this calculation; namely, mathematics and poetry. The history of literature, in all ages and countries, furnishes us with instances of able mathematicians and poets at a comparatively very early age. The reason for this is, I apprehend, that the higher faculties of judgment and reasoning are but partially called into requisition in these pursuits. But

whatever may be the cause, the facts will be found as here stated. Scarcely any man ever gained reputation as a metaphysical, moral, theological, political, or historical writer, until he had past what is called the *meridian* of life; and this demonstrates the position, that the mind, in all its loftier and more important developments, is of comparatively slow growth.*

H. GIBON.

The author, a Professor at the University of Liege, has published "Fragmens Philosophiques," 1836; and "Cours de Philosophie," 1842.

M. Gibon is opposed to the views of the sensational school of philosophy, on account of its logical imperfections, and also for its pernicious influence on the minds and morals of youth. His system is a rational spiritualism. There are three striking developments, or characteristic conceptions in the mind of man; ontological, psychological, and logical. Every thing appertaining to human knowledge may be arranged under one or other of these general divisions.

M. Gibon maintains, and the point is often directly and indirectly presented to our notice in

* "La mémoire se développe plus tôt que l'imagination, qui ne fait que reproduire en quelque sorte les éléments acquis par la mémoire, pour en déduire ou des conceptions scientifiques ou des images que la littérature et les arts savent mettre à profit. La raison exige un temps plus long pour arriver à sa maturité." (Du Système Social, p. 131.)

his various speculations, that many of the most distinguished of modern metaphysicians have fallen into a grievous error, by constituting *the origin of our knowledge* a primary and fundamental principle in their respective systems. Locke, Condillac, and several others, have followed this erroneous course. In our author's conception, the origin of knowledge is not so important to ascertain as *its nature*, and the precise intellectual characters which mark its development.*

NICOLAI JOSEPH DE COCK.

The "Ethicæ seu Philosophiæ Moralis Elementa," 1837, is a production from the "Ecole Théologique" of Louvain. All human laws must rest upon Deity; and must be guided in their formation and application by the doctrines and declarations of Scripture. The metaphysical positions laid down in this work will be found under the head of "Prælectiones," from the first to the eleventh page.

G. C. UBAGHS.

President Ubaghs, of the University of Louvain, is a man of great erudition and considerable mental ability. His chief works on Mental Science are, "Précis de Psychologie," and "Précis de Logique Élémentaire," 1838. These are both valuable publications, and enjoy great popularity throughout most of the Collegiate establishments in Belgium.

* *Fragmens*, p. 80.

The author belongs to the High Church party, and his philosophy is based upon that of the "Ecole Théologique" of France. In his psychological illustrations, however, he seems to have taken Condillac and several other French authors of the same school for his guide ; as we find that the nature and operation of the various faculties of the mind are attempted to be explained in accordance with the general views entertained by these writers on the subject.

There are many very excellent observations on the nature of philosophy generally, in the introduction to his "Logique." He shows the grand purposes for which it should be cultivated; and in what manner, and to what degree, it should be placed under the control of theological truth and sentiment. As we have just stated, the author belongs to the school of philosophical theology ; but he is not by any means a servile follower of the leading spirits who are zealous members of it, relative to subjects connected with the science of mind. There is a lofty tone of independence in all the President's speculations ; and a total absence of every thing approaching to narrow views or bigoted intolerance. All his disquisitions are characterised by a truly philosophic spirit, and a desire to obtain the favourable judgment of his reader only through the medium of truth itself.

M. BECART.

Professor Bécart is the author of a small work

entitled, "Exposé des Facultés, des Lois, et des Opérations de l'Âme," 1838. The design of this publication is, to facilitate the mental studies of young men at the Universities, and it is very happily and judiciously arranged for the purpose. More than one half of the work is occupied by a formal dissertation on Logic.

According to Professor Bécart, the human mind possesses three distinct powers or divisions; to *know*, to *will*, and to *feel*. 1st, In reference to the faculty of knowing, there can be no knowledge without a *real object*, nor any inward or imaginary thought or conception, without a *real subject*. Every thing intellectual must, therefore, rest upon subjective and objective reality. 2nd, The faculty of the will renders that *objective*, which was previously *subjective*. 3rd, Feeling involves consciousness, or the state of the soul. When the mind perceives individual and passing things, it is through the instrumentality of the senses, constituting that which we term *sensibility*. When the mind perceives divine and immutable things, the act is ascribed to reason, or superior sense. We must join to these two mental powers, that of *intelligence* or understanding, whose office it is, to render matters clear and definite for the full and free exercise of the judgment.

There are two faculties involved in the will; the one superior or rational; and the other inferior or sensual.

The following table gives us a general view of M. Bécart's system.

SOUL—MIND—INTELLIGENCE,—PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE.

RECEPTIVITY OF SENSIBILITY.

(The Soul in repose is simply affected by forms, colours, sounds, odours, &c. The mind has a representation of an individual object in consequence of internal and external impressions.)

SENSES :

External, Internal,
Space. Time.

Formal Elements,
SENSATIONS.

Material Elements.
ORGANS.

BEAUTIFUL.

ACTIVITY OF SPONTANEITY.

(The active Soul reflects and directs its attention to external and internal objects, with a view to know, desire, or enjoy them. It analyzes and distinguishes objects from one another.)

I.—INTELLECT :

Consciousness, Intellectual Soul, Logical
Power of the Soul.

Attention.
Memory.
Reflection.
Observation.
Comparison :— Relations between Sensations, &c. } Categories.
Judgment.
Imagination.
REASON. } Absolute.

TRUTH.

II.—WILL :

Moral Nature.

Liberty.
Instincts.
Appetites.
Desires.
Passions.
Affections.
Sympathies.
Imitation.

Moral Law,
(Heart.)

GOODNESS.

H. AHRENS.

M. Ahrens is a well known Belgian philosopher, and his "Cours de Philosophie," 1838, is a highly respectable exposition of the leading phenomena of mind.

The first volume is devoted to psychological speculations, which are preceded by a short sketch of the history of philosophy from the earliest date to the appearance of the principal German systems. In the second Lecture we have a discussion on nature in general, and of the different orders of animated existence. Man is an especial object of attention. To obtain any thing like a correct knowledge of him, we must examine him in his unity of being; in his bodily as well as mental capacity. We must ascertain the physical condition of his existence, before we are in a position to distinguish the faculties and laws of his mind.

The first volume of M. Ahrens' work is entirely devoted to an examination of the faculties of the soul in conjunction with the physical frame. His book is interesting; and many acute and original observations are made in the course of his inquiry. In the second volume he takes a higher ground, and discusses the nature of mind and being generally. The three fundamental faculties of the mind are thought, sentiment, and will or volition. In the last two lectures he passes from psychology to ontology; and treats of the Deity, His personality,

providence, good and evil, Divine justice, and of the personal and social happiness of man.

J. PEEMANS.

Professor Peemans belongs to the University of Louvain, and displays in his "Introductio ad Philosophiam," 1840, an accurate and extensive acquaintance with the philosophy of mind. The treatise, though small, contains many original observations, and the arrangement of it is well fitted to guide the student in his course of inquiry. The principles of mental science expounded in the "Introductio," are those which the Catholic clergy maintain; namely, that human reason is not of itself sufficient to lead us to sound knowledge; but that a theological guide is requisite, who derives his information from such subjects as the high and *à priori* conceptions of the mind suggest; and which subjects are the most important for man to know.* In that part of the work where the author shows the connection between natural science and theology, this position is laid down at considerable length, and supported by many references to illustrious names in the annals of speculation.

* "Ratio, stricte loquendo, non sufficit ad cognoscenda, explicandaque cuncta legis naturalis officia. Et revelatio absolute necessaria est ad cognoscenda plurima quorum notitia magni nostra interest, et quæ ad completum religionem etiam naturalem pertinent."—(Introductio, p. 103.)

Professor Peemans is also the author, in conjunction with J. de Decker, of a work on Logic, entitled "*Institutiones Logicæ*," 1842. This is a formal treatise for the use of students at the University; but contains few remarks or observations on the philosophy of the science of general reasoning.

M. ALTMAYER.

The work of this Belgian metaphysician, "*Cours de Philosophie de l'Histoire*," 1840, is founded upon a modified rationalism, and displays an intimate knowledge of the various speculative systems in Europe which are now subjects of philosophic interest. His treatise is elementary and useful; and it has secured the good opinion of many of his learned contemporaries.

SOCIÉTÉ LITTÉRAIRE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ
CATHOLIQUE.

In the Memoirs of this Society, which have been published in several volumes since the year 1840, the metaphysical student will find many excellent papers, on various branches of the science of mind. They are all written with great care, and by philosophers of first-rate knowledge and talent. In the volumes up to 1844, the following interesting Essays will be found. "*Des Conséquences Morales du Panthéisme*," by Professor Ubaghs; "*Le Panthéisme, ou Point de Vue du*

Sentiment," by M. Lemaire; "Théorie de la Création, ou Doctrine de la Philosophie Chrétienne sur Dieu et sur ses rapports avec le Monde, comparée aux principes du Rationalisme Moderne," by Professor Tits; "Examen de la Théorie Philosophique de M. l'Abbé Rosmini, sur l'Origine des Idées," by M. Labis.

N. J. SCHWARTZ.

M. Schwartz is a German, but a Doctor of philosophy and Professor of History of the University of Liège. He is the author of "Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne," 1842, a work of great merit and usefulness. The History is preceded by a clear and concisely written Introduction, which displays a consummate knowledge of speculative systems, both ancient and modern, and a great aptness of generalizing or grouping together detached or isolated facts under some theoretical rules or forms. These qualities of the author's mind render his remarks and statements valuable to general readers, and particularly to young students during their Academical education.

He divides the Ancient systems of speculation into three periods: the first commences with the Ionian philosophers, and terminates with Dionysiodorus of Chios; the second, from Socrates to the New Academy; and the third, from the Greco-Roman to the time of Julian. This Historical Sketch is interspersed with many valuable disserta-

tions, characterised by sound judgment and critical acuteness.

WILLIAM TIBERGHIEU.

The "Essai Théorique et Historique sur la Génération des Connaissances Humaines," 1844, is the production of a very young gentleman, a student at the University of Brussels. The publication reflects the highest credit on the philosophical talents of the author.

The treatise is preceded by a copious and well written Introduction ; and the author divides his matter into two portions ; the theoretical, and the historical. We shall confine the few observations which we can devote to the subject, to the first of these divisions.

All philosophy is occupied with two inquiries : one, which relates to man himself ; and the other, to those objects which are external to him ; or, according to recent and fashionable phrasology, to the *moi* and the *non-moi*. The philosophy of man is psychology ; the philosophy of external objects is ontology.

The philosophical questions relative to man, centre in the origin, nature, and promulgation of his knowledge or ideas. There have in all ages been divers theories to solve the problems arising out of these subjects ; but still the facts of human existence remain always the same ; they are unchangeable, perpetual, abiding, regular. It is

only the speculative creations of man respecting them, which manifest the contrary attributes.

If man have the power of recognising the existence of things in themselves, the origin of knowledge is then *in himself*. Various speculative systems which we have often alluded to, take their rise from this point of inquiry. These must, in some measure, be familiar to all metaphysical readers. We shall not, therefore, make here any further reference to them; but merely observe that all knowledge presupposes three things: a being who knows, an object known, and the existence of a certain *relation* subsisting between the mind and the object. This relation is not, however, strictly conformable to the nature of things. Knowledge is not truth. Knowledge is a subjective or mental conception, a thing relative to the mind itself; truth, on the contrary, is an absolute and independent reality. The source of truth is in Deity; knowledge belongs to man. Knowledge becomes truth from the moment it recognises this absolute reality. Again, truth is not certainty. The former can exist in itself, apart from the mind of man. Truth is transformed into certainty when it embraces a proper philosophical *method*. This forms the bond or link between truth and knowledge.

M. Tiberghien proceeds then to show the nature and importance of certainty and method. Certainty rests on two points; the subjective, or the human consciousness; and the objective, or abso-

lute of being. God and consciousness ; these are the two pillars of all truth and knowledge. Method is an essential condition of the principle of certainty ; and is that path which the mind follows in the search and communication of knowledge.

The principles of certainty are examined and discussed at considerable length ; and he points out, with great acuteness and discrimination, the various degrees in which they are developed in reference to man, God, and external nature.

The author enters into an examination of the knowledge we possess of consciousness ; of the divers modes in which it unfolds itself,—as in thought, desire, will, passion. Then we arrive at the faculties of the mind. We obtain here a view of man simply as an intellectual creation. We possess two parallel faculties, each characterised by its own categories ; *thought* and *sentiment*. The first analyzes, distinguishes, combines, and reasons on matters which we find in the consciousness. The second faculty assimilates itself to things in their aggregation or totality. Both faculties are in strict harmony with the organic construction of every thing we see around us.

The faculty of thought comprehends individual or sensible knowledge ; abstract or reflected knowledge ; and a knowledge of the rational or absolute. On all these topics the author shows great judgment and critical discernment.

The reader must bear in mind that the author's

theory of the origin of human knowledge is to be considered relative to moral, political, and religious principles. When he comes, therefore, to make a practical use of his theoretical views in these important branches of inquiry, he considers certain abstract systems in their actual effects upon the general condition of humanity.

The following tabular statement furnishes us with a bird's-eye view of the system of M. Tiberghien.

1. SENSATION	{ Pure or exclusive Sensualism. Sensualism modified by Reflection.
2. REFLECTION...	{ Reflection, with a tendency to Sensualism. { Pure or exclusive Reflection. Reflection, with a tendency to Rationalism.
3. REASON	{ Rationalism, with a tendency to Reflection. { Pure or exclusive Rationalism. Rationalism, in harmony with other systems.

The consequences which result to morals, politics, and religion, from the predominance of any of these systems just classified, may be stated in the following table.

CONSEQUENCES
OF SENSUALISM.

Each true
Principle of

Morals : Egotism
or Enjoyment.
Politics : Interest
or blind force.
Religion : Athe-
ism.

CONSEQUENCES
OF SYSTEMS OF
REFLECTION.

Abstract or
voluntary
Principles of

Morals : Abstract
formulas,
grounded on
individual in-
terpretations.
Politics : Social
contract; per-
sonal liberty;
exclusive
equality.
Religion : Deism;
an external
Creative intel-
ligence.

CONSEQUENCES
OF EXCLUSIVE
RATIONALISM.

Absolute and
exclusive
Principles of

Morals : Identity
of objects in the
absolute order
of things.
Politics : Iden-
tity of man in
society; abso-
lute communi-
ty or equality.
Religion : Pan-
theism; iden-
tification of
God with the
world.

CONSEQUENCES
OF RATIONAL-
ISM IN HARMO-
NIOUS ACTION
WITH OTHER
SYSTEMS.

Absolute
Organic or
Synthetic
Principles of

Morals : Order,
divine and ab-
solute; the law
of personal ac-
tivity.

Politics : Social
Organism,
reared on the
basis of ration-
al equality and
liberty.

Religion : Theism.
God superior
and indepen-
dent of the
world by vir-
tue of His es-
sence.

The author illustrates all these fundamental positions, in the second part of his work, which embraces a historical narration of the speculative opinions of mankind, from the earliest times to the present day; and the practical effects which these have respectively exercised over the moral, political, and religious condition of mankind, as far as history and observation can verify them.

P. DE DECKER.

This author, a Member of the Chamber of Deputies of Belgium, has directed his attention to the Statistics of Morals; and a paper of his will be found in the volume published by the "Académie Royale" of Brussels, for 1848. He examines the

statements and principles laid down by M. Quectet, and makes many excellent observations upon them.

The following publications of Belgian metaphysical authors may be consulted with some degree of interest. Our limits prevent any special notice of their contents.

EUG. DESWERT.—“Dissertatio de Heraclide Pontico,” Lovaniensis, 1830.

AB. FRED. VERBURGH.—“Specimen Literarium Inaugurale de Carneade Romani Legato,” Amstelodamensis, 1827.

C. H. THIEBOUT.—“De Sapientis Humanitate,” 1825.

JOS. PAQUET.—“Specimen Inaugurale Philosophicum de Actionum Liberarum, &c.” Louvain, 1827.

“Eléments de Logique, ou Principes Propres à former la Raison, avant de l'appliquer à l'Etude des Hautes Sciences,” 1817, by a Clergyman. This is a useful and sensible work; and the reader will find several sections in the *third* part worthy of his attention.

“Remontrances aux Représentants du Genre Humain, sur l'Autorité du Sens Commun,” par un Cosmopolite, Courtrai, 1829. This is a small work, written in the form of dialogue, in which questions of the gravest nature are freely and sensibly discussed.

FRANÇOIS BOUVIER.—“Le Panthéisme,” Mons, 1830.

C. CROMMELINCK.—“Dissertation Medico-Psychologique,” Bruges, 1840.

“De la Civilization au 19^{me} Siècle,” Tournay, 1815.

E. TANDEL.—“Cours de Logique, à l’usage de l’Enseignement Universitaire,” Liège, 1841.*

CHAR. JOSEPH BRETON.—“De l’Origine des Idées ou du Principe Générateur de la Connaissance Humaine,” Louvain, 1842. This is a brief though useful sketch of the subject it attempts to discuss. It is based on the peculiar metaphysics of the University.

M. F. NEVE.—“Etudes sur les Hymnes du Rig-Veda,” Louvain, 1842. There is some important information on the philosophy of India in this small work.

* See Note J. at the end of this Volume.

CHAPTER VI.

METAPHYSICAL WRITERS OF SPAIN, HUNGARY, POLAND, SWEDEN, DENMARK, AND RUSSIA.

WE have but a meagre account to present to our readers, both of the past and present state of mental science in these several parts of Europe. Still, however, its prospects on the whole are cheering. Year by year a decided progress is made in favour of unfettered discussion. The philosophical literature of England, France, and particularly Germany, is becoming more and more cultivated in the remote and less enlightened parts of the Continent. The prejudices of the learned, the jealousies of the Church, and the apprehensions of rulers, are gradually subsiding; and the day is perhaps not far distant, when a full and free interchange of philosophic thought will be established throughout all the civilized nations of the world.

.. ||

2 H

SPAIN.

We have given brief notices of the metaphysical writers of Spain up to the termination of the last century. From that period to the present we have little of original importance to communicate. In the early part of the present century the country was unhappily involved in foreign and civil wars; and its domestic history to the present moment still continues unfavourable to the cultivation of literature generally, and philosophical discussions in particular. Discouraging, however, as Spain appears to the eye of the enthusiastic promoter of scientific knowledge, yet even here, within the last half century, considerable mental illumination has taken place, and improvements have been effected, in the higher branches of education and academical instruction. In most of the seats of learning we still, it is true, find the general character of mental speculation confined to the limits of scholastic doctrines and methodical forms; but these are now undergoing a regular process of transformation, and more liberal opinions and views are being adopted by the clergy and other enlightened classes of society. St. Thomas Aquinas is no longer the Sovereign Pontiff of Spain, from whose philosophical decisions there is no appeal. Students in the Spanish Universities now go through a regular course of metaphysical study, embracing a period of a couple

of years, and are expected to be no mean proficient in the theories and systems propounded in foreign countries.

There have been several elementary works on the human mind published in Spain since the commencement of the present century ; but they are not entitled to any specific notice. The same remarks may be applied to treatises on Logic. Of late years we have a little treatise, entitled "*De la Inteligencia y de la Fe*," which contains many theoretical observations on mind, and the principles of belief, out of the common order of academical works on the same subjects. The principles of natural theology have been philosophically and ably handled by Alejandro Tassoni, in his work, "*La Religion Demonstrada y Defendida*," 1847. D. Teodoro de Almecida has just published his "*Elementos de Filosofia*," 1847, and his "*Elementos de Logica*," both for the especial instruction of the young. These publications reflect great credit on the liberality and intelligence of their respective authors.

Many French systems of philosophical speculation have been translated within these few years into the Spanish language. We may enumerate, among several others, the philosophical works of Voltaire, Cabanis, Condillac, Condorcet, Batteux ; and, what may appear something strange, even the atheistical and material doctrines of D'Holbach. The opinions of Descartes and Leibnitz are to be met with in many academies of public instruction.

HUNGARY.

Besides Hungary Proper, we embrace in our remarks Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia. Within these twenty-five years considerable progress has been made in philosophical pursuits in these countries, not only in places of Academical instruction, but among the more intelligent and wealthy portion of the inhabitants. The progress of civilization has been comparatively slow in all these sections of the European continent. Hungary itself has been little more than a century and a half freed from the dominion of the Turks. But even within the last ten years philosophy has made rapid progress within her territory. One of the chief retarding influences has been the general attempt to revive her ancient language. This has checked, in some degree, the cultivation of the German, which had taken a deep root in Hungary, and which necessarily carried with it much of the speculative knowledge peculiar to the people of Germany.

There are at present several philosophical institutions in Hungary, which were, up to the time when the recent disturbances overtook the country, in a very prosperous condition. There are fourteen Academies, with a full body of Professors in every department of literature and science. There are three institutions expressly for the cultivation of philosophical knowledge. Pesth is the chief seat of learning, though Ofen is the capital of the

kingdom. There are also too Academical institutions; one at Presburg, and the other at Hermannstadt, where philosophy is regularly cultivated by a system of public lectures delivered every year.

In Bohemia, speculative science is cultivated to some extent. There is a University at Prague, the capital, where Professors are appointed to teach philosophy. There is a similar institution at Brün, the capital of Moravia. Lemberg, in Galicia, has also a thriving University, and speculative studies have been cherished here with great zeal and care. Generally speaking, the German systems of metaphysics are much better and more extensively known in these respective countries, than the French. In most of the academies, however, the leading theories of the latter are familiarly known among the tutors and professors.

Paul Joseph Schaffarik, a Doctor of Philosophy at Prague, wrote several works on mental science.

POLAND.

We have little to say of the philosophy of Poland. Before her dismemberment there were several Academical institutions, where the ordinary routine of mental science was taught; but now, deprived of nationality, her literary inhabitants are driven into exile to exercise their talents. The University of Warsaw, when closed in 1831, contained a library of 150,000 volumes of books, which were transferred to St. Petersburg, and all specu-

lative studies were checked in the Polish capital. We may mention here that Joseph C. Szaniński, a native of East Galicia, studied Hegel's philosophy with great diligence and success, and transplanted it into Poland soon after it was known in Germany. The following are three of the treatises of Szaniński:—"Was ist Philosophie?" Warschau, 1802; "Ueber die vorzüglichsten moralischen Systeme des Alterthums," Warschau, 1803; "Ueberblick der Philosophie seit den Zeiten ihres Verfalls bei den Griechen und Römern bis zum Wiederaufleben der Wissenschaften," Warschau, 1804.

SWEDEN.

We are in possession of a fuller and more correct account of the history of philosophy in Sweden, than of any other of the northern States of the European Continent. She has for more than two centuries had distinguished professors in her Universities, who have cultivated the science of mind, and endeavoured to popularise it, with great zeal and some success.

In the sixteenth century there were several metaphysical writers of distinction in Sweden, who illustrated the general tenets of the scholastic philosophy. Fred. Aug. Frankonius was a mystical writer; and in his book he blended the principles of mind with theological speculations in such a singular manner, that his treatise has always been considered by the Swedish literati as a very strange and fantastical production. Several

other writers of the same kind followed in the wake of Frankonius. Georg, Stjernhjelm was one of these. He taught that all things were derived from water, air, and fire. Joh. Buraens, in 1568, illustrated the doctrines of Zoroaster at great length.

In 1570 we have Olaus Nicolai Nericius, who illustrated the doctrines of Ramus. Johan Skytte gave lectures, and afterwards published them, on the metaphysics of Aristotle. He flourished in 1577. Launtius Paulinus Gothus was a professor of theology, and a Bishop; and is represented as a man of vast erudition and great talents. He commented on the metaphysics and logic of Ramus, and his works were published in 1578. J. M. Frougdonius wrote, in 1588, several works on the fundamental principles of morality. About the same date J. Rudbeckius wrote a treatise on Logic, in which the general doctrines of metaphysics are concisely stated. Jonas Magni discussed the principles of mind and ethics in 1583; and Johannes Canuti Lenæus considered these in relation with the leading points of theology, in 1593. In the same year the "Philosophical Conversations" of Joh. Frankenius made their appearance at Upsala, at the University of which he was a Professor.

In the seventeenth century Sweden partook of the impetus which was communicated to philosophy in various other countries of Europe. Speculative pursuits were vigorously prosecuted within her dominions, on every branch of knowledge immediately connected with human nature. Mind, ethics, civil

law, and the principles of theology, engrossed nearly all the active and intelligent men of the day. We have two works on theoretical morality from M. Gyllenstolpe, in 1609; and several others on the same subject, in conjunction with some metaphysical dissertations and discussions on Aristotle's works, from the pen of Alex. Kempe, in 1623. In 1629 Joh. Chesneiopherus flourished as a logician. A mystical writer, Sigfrid Aronus Forsius, excited considerable attention from his works, published in 1624. Petr. Aurivillius wrote on the Logic of Aristotle, and was also the author of a treatise, termed "*Elementa Philosophiæ*," 1636, in which are many able dissertations on important subjects. S. N. Enander, 1640, was also popular at this time as a philosophical lecturer on Logic and other kindred topics of philosophy. Kunnuga Styrlse was contemporary with him, and published a work, in folio, at Stockholm, 1640, on the foundations of natural and revealed religion. He was the author of several other treatises. J. Boëthius, 1641, was a Professor of Metaphysics and Logic, and acquired great reputation in his day; as well as Ol. Lauræus, H. L. Javelin, and Gezelius, who were all writers on subjects connected with mental philosophy, and who filled important offices of general instruction at the same period.

The most distinguished metaphysician about the middle of the seventeenth century was And. Thuronius. His "*Metaphysica*," appeared in 1662, and excited much attention throughout Sweden.

Its principles were, however, severely attacked, in some fugitive pieces, by two or three learned men in the University of Upsala. J. Flashsenius, 1667, was also a philosopher of reputation at the same time. We have two works on philosophy from his pen. About 1670, George Olavi lectured on the mystical views of Plotinus, and collected crowds of students around him. The following writers on the abstract principles of morals, flourished about this period:—J. Billovius, 1660; J. Enhergh, 1675; P. E. Liungh, 1676; A. Iterus, 1680; A. Wanochius, 1680; and Isaac Axelius, 1682. A little after this, G. Sjobergh published an abridgment of the metaphysical works of Thuronius; and P. Rathe distinguished himself in his discussions on the principles of Logic, Ontology, and Ethics, 1721.

The philosophy of Descartes was early introduced into Sweden, and excited great interest and no small share of controversy. On the whole, however, it was very favourably received. And. Rydelius, 1680, was a strenuous advocate for the new system. He was a Professor of Metaphysics, and a man of splendid talents and vast erudition. His works are, "Nödiga och välmenta påminnelser emot den så Kallade Apokatastasin ton panton; beller alla fördömdas ändtheliga återställning i sitt förlorade salighetsstand," 1728; "Epistola de Anima Brutorum;" "Sententia Philosophiæ Fundamentalis;" and "Compendium Logices."

M. G. Block was also an able and zealous advocate for Descartes. His writings on the subject

bear the date of 1708. Joh. Bilberg who was a Professor of Theology, entered enthusiastically into the Cartesian system, and published "Dissertations" on the subject; a treatise on "The Existence of the Deity," 1688; and another learned work on the "Nature of the Human Soul." At the same time Andreas Peträus, also a theological professor, supported the general maxims of Descartes' theory.

The speculations of Wolff opened out a wide field for philosophical discussion in Sweden. In the first half of the eighteenth century, writers on metaphysics became very numerous. N. Wallarius, 1706, was a professor of some note, and an author of several works on Metaphysics and Logic. P. Brunnmark, 1717, was an eloquent lecturer on Moral and Mental Philosophy; J. F. Kryger, 1720, treated profoundly on the leading doctrines of natural religion; as likewise did Joh. Hallman, 1748, a man of some philosophical reputation in his day. About the same date, Lallerstedt, J. Plenning, P. Holstrom, A. Wahlstrom, S. Sinus, Elis. Hyphoff, A. J. Molander, B. Wettersten, C. Mesterton, O. Rönigk, H. Möller, A. Axelsson, H. Busser, M. S. Froling, and A. Ekmark, severally discussed the chief principles of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Wolff, with a view of illustrating ethics, theology, civil law, jurisprudence, and logic. The writings of many of these authors are very voluminous. In 1756, P. Forsakäl published his "*Dubia de Principiis Philosophiæ*," which excited some attention and controversy at the time.

Locke's works became pretty generally known about the middle of this century. M. Van Storkirch discussed logic and ethics, on the English philosopher's system. His chief work on the former branch of knowledge is, "Logica, eller Stutkonsten, som består uti sanningens uppletande; sommanhemtad af ätskillige Auctorer, som i thetta studio varit namnkundige, och på thet tydeligaaste föreställd, med Svensk uttolkning ofver alla definitioner," Stockholm, 1721.

A. Schönberg also wrote his "Inledning till den naturliga lagen och sodoläran," Stockholm, 1759.

E. O. Runeberg illustrated at great length Locke's doctrines of Sensation and Reflection. J. Faxé wrote also "Ethical Dialogues," in the spirit of the English system. P. Kolmark constructed a speculative system on the principles of Wolff and Locke. The best account of the latter philosopher's "Essay on the Human Understanding" which is to be found in Sweden, is from the pen of C. G. Leopold, the author of "Ideer till en populär philosophie öfver Gud och odödligheten, samt om Religionsfriheten och Fornuftsfrihet." Stockholm, 1803.

We must now notice one of the most eminent of all the Swedish philosophers, and the only one, in fact, whose reputation has extended far beyond the limits of his own country. This is the mystical Emanuel Swedenborg, whose opinions, both on matters of philosophy and religion, are known to a considerable extent in England, as well as in other countries. He was born in 1688, and studied

at the University of Upsal, where he greatly distinguished himself by his philosophical knowledge and general academical attainments. After filling some public stations of trust and importance in Sweden, his mind received a sudden impulse and direction. He conceived he had a direct and special intimation from heaven; and under this impression, which he retained till his death, all his philosophical notions and doctrines were concocted.

The mental philosophy of Swedenborg can scarcely be considered apart from his theology. It is only indistinct glimpses we can obtain of the former. It may readily be surmised, that a man who conceived himself living and thinking under the direct influence of heavenly illumination, was not placed in the position of ordinary philosophers, in treating of the nature and springs of human knowledge. Every thing would be viewed by him through another medium. Hence it is; that all his statements and observations receive a marked colouring from this monomaniacal notion; and when his disquisitions become altogether of a speculative character, we recognise at once the radical error which pervades them.

Swedenborg was an acute and faithful observer of nature, and cultivated physical science with great industry and success. The peculiarity of his views becomes developed in his mode of arranging or of systematizing facts. Mechanical science was a favourite pursuit with him; and there are many curious and interesting speculations in some of his works, on matters appertain-

ing to the atomic theory. Nature is here to be studied through the means of *forms*, which characterise all her movements in this direction, and the ultimate form of all material objects is the *angular*. His researches into the "Animal Kingdom" are upon a grand and comprehensive scale. Every thing possessing life and activity comes under the *circular form*, and man is considered the perfect representation of animal existence. What relates to the mind or spirit in conjunction with its material tenement, puts on the *spiral form*, as indicative of its ethereal or spiritual essence.

In the third chapter of the author's "Economy of the Animal Kingdom," we find his opinions on the Soul. We cannot obtain a knowledge of it through the medium of the senses; but we may reason from the material to the spiritual, by adopting the doctrine of *degrees*, which, Swedenborg says, is "to enable us to follow in the steps of nature; since to attempt without it to approach and visit her in her sublime abode, would be to attempt to climb to heaven by the Tower of Babel; for the highest step must be approached by the intermediate."* This doctrine unfolds those relations which subsist amongst all the objects of nature, from the perfect and angelic form in heaven to the most insignificant object on earth. The hypothesis is but a very rude and bungling apparatus, and totally inadequate to accomplish

* Economy of the Animal Kingdom, Chap. III., Sec. 210.

what it undertakes to perform. We fail to discover the intellectual from the material by his proposed method of philosophising. There is not one strikingly pointed illustration of the usefulness or aptness of the instrument.

Our spiritual nature is compounded of many degrees. That portion of it connected immediately by the external senses is the most humble. The mentality inseparable from imagining and deriving, is the *animus*, and is a rank above that which appertains to sensation. The understanding and will have a superior kind of intellection joined with their respective actions; and the highest kind of mind is that which bears the fruit of intuitive knowledge. *The love of God* is the animating and active principle of every thing belonging to man and the universe.*

Swedenborg has had several followers in his own country. The most distinguished of them is Märt Sturtzenbecher, who published a work called the "Philosophy of Nature," which embodies the leading views of his master.

After the establishment of Kant's system in Germany, the Swedish metaphysical writers increased both in number and in the voluminous nature of their productions. P. R. Christiernin was a professor of logic and metaphysics, and felt a lively interest in the speculations of Kant. His views are a compound of Locke's principles with those

* See the works of Swedenborg, published by the Swedenborgian Society in London.

of the "Critique of Pure Reason." In 1794 the author published a work at Upsal, entitled "Försök till en allvarsam och hufvudsaklig Granskning af den Kantiska eller nya sä kallade Critiska Philosophien och det förmenta rena förnuftet, i anledning af Stycken till befrämjande af rätta Begrepp om Philosophien, dess ändemål och närvarande tillstånd."

Towards the latter part of the century, we have Bjurbaeck's Dissertations on Kant, and a treatise on the Immortality of the Soul and the existence of a Deity. The only work we have seen of the author's, is entitled "Försök till en Granskning, af Kantiska Grunderna, för odörlighet och en Gud," Stockholm, 1798.

Nicholas Walleris was an able writer on the Mind, and his works are deservedly held in high esteem in his own country. The following is a list of some of them : "Systema Metaphysicum," Stockholm, 1752, in four volumes ; "Compendium Logicæ," Stockholm, 1755 ; "Compendium Metaphysices," Stockholm, 1755, 1 vol. ; "Psychologia Empirica," Stockholm, 1755, 1 vol. ; "Psychologia Naturalis," Stockholm, 1758, 1 vol.

J. Gottmark illustrated the connection between mind and body upon the Kantian hypothesis ; and published his "Kantiska sä kallade Philosophien från dess själfgjorda obegriphlighet utvecklad och updagad," Stockh. 1796 ; "Tankar om Ordning och Sätt i våra Theologiska Systemer," Westermäs, 1804.

Magnus Blix wrote, about the same time, his

"Philosophiskt Försök, att utur Menniskans egenskaper utröna ändamålet, hvartill människan är skapad samt att utur djurens egen kaper utröna ändamålet för djuren," Upsala, 1797.

Dan Boëthius was well known for his genius and learning. He was a disciple of Locke, and wrote several works, five of which bear the following titles:—"Utkast till Föreläsningar i den Naturliga Sedeläran," 1782; "Försök till en Lärobok uti Natur Kätten," Upsal, 1799; "Anvisning till Sedeläran säsom Vetenskap," Upsala, 1807; "Grundläggning till Metaphysiken för Seder af Im. Kant," Upsala, 1797.

C. A. Ehrensward was an idealistic writer, and obtained some distinction among the learned in Sweden. He published "De fria Konsternas Philosophie," Stockholm, 1782; "Stycken till befrämjande af rätta Begrepp om Philosophien, dess ändamål och närvarande tillstånd," Upsala, 1794.

Th. Thorild was a writer on Esthetical science, and J. Lagerstrom composed a work entitled "Dissertatio de Causis cur in invidiam adducta sit Metaphysica," 1787.

The eighteenth century was closed by the numerous and profound treatises of B. H. Hoijer. The following are the titles of some of his philosophical disquisitions. "Afhandlingar: 1. Om Anledningen till den Kritiska Philosophiens Uppkomst, ofulländad; 2. Hoad är sensus Communis? 3. Om ett pragmatiskt föreställningssatt i historien, ofulländad," Stockh. 1795; "Afhandling om den Philosophiska Constructionen, ämnad till In-

ledning till Föreläsningar i Philosophien," Stockh. 1799; "De Fundamentis Cognitionis Empiricæ. De Reflexione. De Operationibus Intellectus. Aphorismi Logic. transcendent. De Systemate, Dissertationes Academicæ," Upsala, 1812.

The present century ushers in a number of able Swedish writers on philosophy. The various systems to which Kant's speculations gave birth in his own country, became objects of curiosity and interest in the Universities of Sweden; and we find all the chief commentators on his theory, and modern German philosophers generally, well known among the Swedish literati.

Samuel Grubbe distinguished himself in Sweden, in the early part of this century, by his philosophical writings. He was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Upsal. He adopted the speculations of Schelling, though he did not coincide with his subsequent modifications of his principles. Grubbe's works are, "Anmärkningar i anledning af Anmärkningarna om rätta förhållandet mellan och Moralitet," Upsala, 1812; "Om förhållandet mellan Religion och Moralitet," Upsala, 1812; "Anmärkningar öfver Philosophiens närvarande tillstånd," Upsala, 1820.

A. Lidbeck wrote several works of great merit. He was partial to the views of Schelling, and made an attempt to form a system of Kantian eclecticism. His works are, "Anmärkningar hörande till Lärnan om Smaken och det Sköna," Lund. 1805; "Om Medlidande Academisk Afhandling," Lund. 1807;

"Anmärkningar, hörande till läran om Vardighet," Lund. 1808; "Anmärkningar, hörande till läran om ded Löjlige," Lund. 1808; "Anmärkningar, hörande till det läran om Behag," Lund. 1808; Framställning af Wolffs, Baumgartens, Mendelsohns, och Sulzers, Kants, Schillers, och Schellings läror om det Sköna," Lund. 1817.

A. Bethén formed an eclectic system out of Kant's theory, and applied it to several branches of knowledge. J. G. Bure was a metaphysical writer of eminence, and published a work entitled "Utkast till Förnuftsläran eller Konsten att tänka," Stockh. 1812.

G. L. Hartman treated of philosophy in a scientific and methodical manner; and among other works, published "Kunskapslära, Ett försök till framställning af Vetenskapen om Kunskapernas grunder, lynne och värde," Abo, 1808.

Chr. Askelöf was the author of "Reflexioner i anledning af philosophiens föregifna obegriplighet," Stockh. 1811; and E. G. Geyer wrote on the nature of truth, and the elementary principles of theology. He published the two following works, "Om Sann och falsk Upplysning i afscende på Religionen," Stockh. 1811; "Om Historien och dess förhållande till Religion, Saga och Mythologie."

We have a treatise from the pen of L. M. Enberg, called "Afhandling om sambandet mellan en rätt smak och en rätt förståndsodling, samo hoad inflytelse. Smaken, under detta afscende betraktad, han på samhället," 1815; and about the

same period Södersten, who endeavoured to form a union between Wolff and Locke, wrote his "Utkast till den naturliga sedoläran för Ungdom och Begynnare af bägge könen."

D. Munk, of Rosenschöld, adopted Schelling's views, and was popular among a certain class of thinkers in his own country. He published "Tal vid Prestmötet i Lund, I hvilket afscende den Schollingska filosofien ej är öfverensstämmande med Christendomen," Lund. 1815. About the same time W. F. Palmblad obtained some distinction for his metaphysical disquisitions, and published his "Något om den så Kallade nya filosofiens systning," 1814.

L. Hammarsköld wrote a history of Swedish philosophy; and we have from his pen, besides several other works, "Tvänne afhandlingar om det Sköna, efter Plotinos, med Inledning;" "Bref om Plotins filosofiska Lärobyggnad," Stockholm, 1814.

C. M. Schoerbing's views were of a pantheistical and material cast, and were but indifferently received in Sweden. P. A. Atterbörn is a distinguished writer and philosopher of the present day, and has published "Studier till Philosophions Historia och System," Upsala, 1835; "De filosofiska systemernas Historia, af Socher, öfversatt af E. C. Grenander," Upsala, 1820.

And in addition to Atterbörn, C. J. L. Almquist has written a great number of works on mental subjects; and is, in fact, at the head of the philosophical school of Sweden at the present time.

DENMARK.

Denmark and Norway have furnished a certain quota to the general philosophy of human nature. The philosophers of these countries have been greatly indebted to the Germans, and in some measure to the Swedes.

During the latter part of the last century, we have Rothe Tyge, born in 1731, and died in 1795. He published "*Philosophies Idcer til Kundskab om var art*," 1789. He was a clergyman, and his philosophy is based on theology. After him comes Christian Bartholm, who also belonged to the Church. His philosophy was rather practical than of a speculative cast; and he aimed at making abstract views of mental phenomena instrumental in illustrating religious doctrines. His works are, "*Philosophie for Ulaerde*," 1787; "*Philosophiske Breve over Sjælens Tilstand efter Legemets*," 1790; "*Viisdoms og Lyksaligheds Lære*," 1794; "*Philosophisk Undersogelse om de ældste Folkeslags religiøse og philosophiske Moninger*," 1802; "*Historiske Efterretninger om mennesket i dets vilde og raue Tilstand*," 1803, 4 vols.

In 1795, Chr. Hornemann delivered a series of Lectures in the University of Copenhagen on the Philosophy of Kant, with great éclat. And about the same period Laurids Smiths published his "*Forsog til en fuldstaendig Lærebygning om Dyrenes Natur og Menneskenes Pligter imod Dyrene*."

Niels Treschow has, for more than half a century, been the leading metaphysician of Denmark. He has published a great number of works. In his *Philosophical Sketch* he treats of speculative principles generally; of the opinions of Locke and Hume; of the general faculties of reasoning; of *à priori* truths; of objective and subjective knowledge; the categories of the German systems; and of our ideas of eternity, existence, space, and time.

In the author's *Philosophy of History*, he shows what claims it has to be considered a science; and afterwards enters into lengthened discussions on the origin of society, on the progress of the human understanding, and the freedom of the will. His works are, "*Forelaesninger over den Kantiske Philosophie*," 1798, 1799, 2 vols.; "*Anthropologie til Brug for de laerde Skoler*," 1802; "*Philosophiske Forsog*," 1805; "*Om Philosophiens Natur og Dele*," 1811; "*Elementer af Historiens Philosophie*," 1811; "*Om den menneskelige Natur i Almindelighed, især dens aandelige Side*," 1812; "*Almindelig Logik*," 1813.

In the early part of the present century, H. Steffens, who afterwards went to Germany, where he became well known as a philosopher, published "*Indledning til Philosophiske Forelaesninger*," 1803.

Fred Ch. Sibbern has distinguished himself in philosophical pursuits. He has taken Hegel's opinions as his guide, and has even, it is said, gone beyond them in speculative abstruseness. His chief works are, "*Psychologie*," 2 vols., 1828;

"Hinterlassene Briefe des Gabriellis," 1826, which created a great sensation, and drew down upon him the charge of being a mystical philosopher; "Ueber Erkenntniss und Forschen," 1822, which is a speculative Propädeutik, intended for academical study; "Logik als Denklehre vom Standpunkte des Intelligenten Wahrnehmens in Analytisch-Grammatischer Darstellung," 1835.

J. L. Heiberg also wrote very profoundly on philosophical subjects. He was considered throughout Denmark a man of great powers of mind and extensive erudition. He published at Kiel, in 1824, an Essay, entitled, "Ueber Menschliche Freiheit;" and "Ueber die Bedeutung der Philosophie für die Gegenwart," 1833. In this work the author advocates the system of Hegel. Heiberg considers it the most profound and philosophic of any which Germany has produced. He has published another treatise, called "Einleitender Vortrag zum Logischen Coursus."

RUSSIA.

It is almost needless to say that Russia is a country where mental science is at its lowest ebb. But even here, the hyperborean frosts, and the still more chilling effects of an absolute Government, have not altogether depressed the inquisitive and active faculties of man. Here and there, amidst cheerless wastes and perpetual bondage, the powers of thought pierce through the gloom, and quicken into life a few kindred spirits, who claim sympathy

with the great family of mankind, and offer their mite to the common stock of universal knowledge and science.

According to the scanty records of historical literature of Russia, it would appear that one Maxim, a Greek monk of the Watopedsch Monastery, was the first person who excited the speculative spirit of the country. He wrote and published, in the middle of the sixteenth century, "An Inquiry into the uses of Grammar, Rhetoric, and Philosophy." What his philosophy was we are not informed.

In the early part of the last century, Nikodim Sellj, a Russian monk, who had been educated in Denmark, where he studied philosophy, gave private lectures in Russia on mental science, and on the general principles of logic and reasoning. He is reported to have entered profoundly into the Scholastic dialectics, and to have given abridgments of the chief topics of speculation of some of the learned doctors. He died in 1746, at St. Petersburg, where he had resided for many years. There are no printed works of his, but a large number of his manuscripts are said to be in the Library of St. Alexander Newskj; chiefly on philosophical topics, poetry, and grammar.

Prince Kantimir was a contemporary of Sellj, and published several philosophical fragments of his own composition, as well as translations of foreign works. He made the Russians acquainted in their own language with Fontenelle's "Plurality of Worlds," and the moral system of

Epictetus. A few years after this, several French works were translated, which indirectly treated of some of the important questions of the philosophy of mind.

In the year 1756, Nikolaj Popofskj was elected Professor of the University of Moscow, and was the first person in Russia who ever gave public lectures on Philosophy. He wrote "On the Uses and Influence of Philosophy," a work which contained the substance of his public addresses to his students. He translated Locke's work on Education into the Russian language.

After the death of this Professor, Michael Katschenofskj, a Doctor of Philosophy of the same University, delivered a series of Lectures on the mind and its faculties and powers, which excited considerable attention in all the seats of learning and instruction in the country. He was followed in his academical duties by Wassilj Sergejewitsch Podschawaloff, a man of great genius and knowledge. He became Professor of Logic, and a general writer on Polite Literature. We have from his pen, "Psychology, or the Doctrine of the Human Soul," Moscow, 1789. The French "Encyclopédie" was published in 1792, as far as the letter K, by Count A. J. Mussin-Puschkin. Iwan Martunoff, a Councillor of State, translated, in 1802, Longinus on the Sublime, and several of the writings of Rousseau.

Of late years a great number of German and French works on Philosophy have found their way into the Russian dominions; but their circulation

is almost solely confined to a few of the nobility who have a taste for letters, and to the Professors of the several Universities. Kant's philosophy has been ably and learnedly expounded both at Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as the speculative notions of Hegel. These have latterly in a great measure superseded Kant. The latest Russian authors of whom we know anything, are Sidonski, a man deeply versed in all the metaphysical systems of Germany and France, who has published "Einleitung in die Philosophie;" and Kedrew, the author of "Philosophie der Natur."

There are six general Universities in Russia, where mental philosophy is publicly taught at the present time; namely, at

Moscow.....	Established 1755,	with 11 Colleges,	1 Lyceum.
Krakow.....	" 1804	" 8	"
Kiew.....	" 1813	" 9	" 1 "
Kasan	" 1814	" 10	"
St. Petersburg ..	" 1819	" 9	"
Dorpat*	"	" 4	"
Odessa has 6 Colleges and 1 Lyceum, but no University.			

* The University of Dorpat was founded by the Swedish Government in 1632, and was removed to Permau in 1699, but afterwards re-established at Dorpat by the Emperor Paul. It was re-organised in 1803 by the Emperor Alexander. This University is considered the best in Russia. The University of Abo, in Finland, (an old Swedish Province, now belonging to Russia), was transferred, in consequence of a fire, to Helsingfors, and called the Alexandrian University. In 1838 there were twenty-two Professors, besides other teachers; among the former, twelve were Professors in philosophy.

* * See Note K. at the end of the Volume.

CHAPTER VII.

METAPHYSICAL WRITERS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA.

THE metaphysical writers of America are not very numerous, but this comparatively infant Commonwealth has shown no lack of ability to cope with all those subtle questions which the science of mind presents. What works have emanated from the press of this country, on mental philosophy, are all of a highly respectable and judicious character; full of vigorous thought and wholesome doctrines.

A newly-founded country, emerging, as it were, out of wild and boundless forests and prairies; having its public laws and institutions to form, its commerce and agriculture to create, and its independence to maintain; could not possibly prove a very favourable locality for the growth of speculative philosophy. The more pressing physical wants of the community must take precedence over the acquirements and embellishments of the

mind; and the plough, the sail, and the loom, must be the most interesting objects to the mass of the people. Learning and science are, in a certain sense, social luxuries; they spring out of wealth and leisure; and can never exist to any extent in a country actively and pressing engaged in procuring the first elements of national subsistence and power. It is only where large cities are reared, and the surplus wealth of the community takes a direction into channels of refinement and taste, that mental acquirements gain strength, and develop themselves in the foundations of Universities, Colleges, and other institutions of literature and science.

But the United States have been favourably situated in reference to literature in general, and philosophy in particular. She has not had everything to rear from the foundation. From the intimate connection which has always subsisted between the governments, laws, language, and religion of the United States and Great Britain, the former had a philosophy ready for immediate application; and has always shewn a marked predilection for the metaphysical doctrines and opinions of English writers. Their works have been widely circulated throughout the Union, and closely interwoven with the philosophical speculations of the native authors of this portion of the New World. The speculative doctrines of the mother country are taught in nearly all the public institutions of education in the United States. The

mental theories of the Continent of Europe have made but slight progress here ; and, on the other hand, little or nothing is known among the philosophers of France, Germany, or Italy, of the extent or peculiar characteristics of American speculations. Of late years there has unquestionably been a positive increase in French and German metaphysics throughout the States ; but it has not assumed such a commanding influence as to overshadow the theories and systems of British speculation. These still form, in all the seminaries of learning, the ground-work of elementary and scientific instruction.

DR. JONATHAN EDWARDS.

Dr. Edwards was born at Windsor, in the State of Connecticut, 1703. He became a preacher at New York to a Presbyterian congregation ; and in 1724, being then only in his twenty-first year, was chosen Tutor of Yale College.

Jonathan Edwards is one of the most subtle and profound thinkers of whom America can boast. To the present day few have equalled, none surpassed him. He furnishes a remarkable instance of the power of a single unassisted intellect stamping its image on its own age, and giving a fixed and permanent direction to particular currents of thought among considerable masses of men. Few individuals were ever placed in circumstances more unfavourable for the acquisition of this sin-

gular influence. Born in the midst of a wild and thinly-peopled region; educated at a small seminary, affording the most meagre facilities for philosophical pursuits; then becoming a pastor of a secluded village, and eventually an Indian missionary, yielding himself to the hardships and privations of savage life; he nevertheless laid the foundation of a system of speculative thought, which is not only unique in itself as a mere display of intellect, but which, in its practical application to other branches of knowledge, has attracted a large share of attention in the theological world, and will continue to do so till the end of time.

The author's work "On the Freedom of the Human Will," is that which we are immediately alluding to. He has stated and illustrated the principle of necessary connection in a manner altogether different from the way in which Collins, Priestley, Hume, and others have argued it. Indeed Edwards's work is one of the most remarkable specimens of ratiocinative compositions extant. And it is from the application of certain principles therein stated, to some fundamental maxims of theology, and attempted to be demonstrated with scientific rigour, that he has been enabled to establish his fame as a Christian philosopher. These maxims have always been matters of deep interest with numerous and influential sections of the Christian Church in all ages of its history; and particularly with Calvinistic Protestants since the Reformation. He is, and very justly, a great and shining light among them. His peculiar speculations have,

since his day, exercised a marked influence on the theological writings of the Presbyterian Church, both in Great Britain and Ireland, as well as in America. This is not at all to be wondered at, when we remember the extreme subtlety of his genius, and his singular tact in amalgamating his metaphysical notions of cause and effect, with the elementary doctrines of Protestant theology.

We shall divide our observations on Edwards's treatise into two parts; we shall first consider it *metaphysically*, and then in conjunction with certain theological principles. On both points we are compelled to brevity; and, consequently, to offer an imperfect and unconnected outline of the whole as a system. On the first part we have already made several observations* on the general bearings of the doctrine of necessity. That which we shall now add will, in some degree, more fully illustrate what has elsewhere been stated on this knotty question. The second division of our observations will be more extended, as we are anxious to give to the general reader and the student of philosophy, as full a view as possible of the chief bearings which Edwards's metaphysics have on the science of theology; knowing and believing as we do, that among every class of Protestant divines, in our own country as well as in the United States, the leading questions here referred to, constitute matters of deep and general interest.

* See the Articles, "Spinoza," in the second, and "Anthony Collins," in the third volume.

The nature and scope of the author's treatise on the *will*, may be thus stated. In the first part, containing many sections, the author confines himself to the definition of several philosophical terms, such as the *nature of the will*, its *determination*, nature of necessity, impossibility, inability, and contingency; and in the last section of this part, we have a distinction made between natural necessity and moral necessity. These two kinds of necessity, so far as cause and effect are concerned, he considers identical. We shall quote his remarks on this point, because they are important for the perfect comprehension of his views. "Moral necessity," says he, "may be as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause. Whether the will in every case is necessarily determined by the strongest motive, or whether the will ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination, or not; if that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented, may be so powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would

make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it; for this plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty: yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such a thing as a *sure* and *perfect* connection between moral causes and effects; so this only is what I call by the name of *moral necessity*.”*

In the second part, however, we find the leading principles of his whole system. Those are few in number, but full of weighty and important considerations. In fact, Edwards's system hinges on one principle developed in the third section of the second part; namely, *there can be no event without a cause*. His words are: “ But if once this grand principle of common sense be given up, that what is not necessary in itself must have a cause. and he begin to maintain, that things may come into existence, and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of themselves, without any cause; all our means of ascending in our arguing from

* Freedom of the Will, p. 30.

the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God is cut off at one blow. In this case, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their being, their order, beauty and use. For if things may come into existence without any cause at all, then they doubtless may, without any cause answerable to the effect. Our minds do alike naturally suppose and determine both these things; namely, that what begins to be has a cause, and also that it has a cause proportionable and agreeable to the effect. The same principle which leads us to determine that there cannot be anything coming to pass without a cause, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect than in the cause.

“Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come to pass without a cause, we should not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we should be without evidence of the existence of any thing whatsoever, but our own immediately present ideas and consciousness. For we have no way to prove any thing else, but by arguing from effects to causes: from the ideas now immediately in view, we argue other things not immediately in view; from sensations now excited in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the causes of these sensations: and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, which they depend on, as effects on causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves, or any thing else, by memory;

||

2 K

only as we argue, that the ideas, which are now in our minds, are the consequences of past ideas and sensations. We immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other things only by *means* of these, as necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things may be without causes, all this necessary connection and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity or difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a cause; then there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions. For nothing, or no difficulty multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficulty: nothing multiplied by nothing, does not increase the sum.”*

This is a fair specimen of Dr. Edwards’s reasonings. We see clearly that he materialises the whole argument; that he considers cause and effect in the light of one ball hitting another and putting it in motion. It is this naked and physical view of the question of human liberty, that confers such cogency and mathematical precision on his conclusion.

We shall just quote a few more observations on the Cause of Volition, which in fact present another view of the author’s notions of Cause and Effect. We have in many parts of this history mentioned at considerable length the doctrine of mental spon-

* Freedom of the Will, p. 61.

taneity. The Doctor's ideas are in direct opposition to this doctrine, and therefore the reader will have an opportunity of perceiving what can be stated on both sides of the question. "An active being," says he, "can bring no effects to pass by his activity, but what are consequent upon his acting: he produces nothing by his activity, any other way than by the exercise of his activity. But the exercise of his activity is action; and so his action, or exercise of his activity, must be prior to the effects of his activity. If an active being produces an effect in another being, about which his activity is conversant, the effect being the fruit of his activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the effect of it must follow. So it must be, with equal reason, if the active being is his own object, and his activity is conversant about himself, to produce and determine some effect in himself; still the exercise of his activity must go before the effect, which he brings to pass and determines by it. And therefore his activity cannot be the cause of the determination of the first action, or exercise of activity itself, whence the effects of activity arise; for that would imply a contradiction; it would be to say, the first exercise of activity is before the first exercise of activity, and is the cause of it."*

As we have already stated, the metaphysical opinions of Dr. Edwards have excited a great deal

* Freedom of the Will, p. 68.

of attention both in America and in England, and various attempts have been made to overturn and refute them. From the peculiar logical position in which he has entrenched himself, this it is almost impossible to do. Some writers of ability and distinction have attempted to show that there is a fallacy lurking in his process of reasoning, which takes its rise from the hypothetical nature of his premises, and from his mingling them with facts connected with the physiology of mind. This is, I conceive, not a fair and effectual way of meeting the arguments of Edwards. The principle on which his system rests, is one of the most simple and elementary which we possess; namely, *that every effect must have a cause*; and it is upon this naked view of the subject that he has erected his whole scheme of reasoning. The author has, strictly speaking, but one argument through the whole of his book; *one thing must precede another thing*. He has really nothing to do, in his logical arrangements, with the diversified circumstances which may mark various kinds of *motives*, or with the manner in which they may act upon each other. His answer to all these is, Does one thing necessarily go before another? and on this being answered in the affirmative, he is under no logical obligation to examine the complicated processes of volition. The only true way, I conceive, to answer Edwards is, to demand of him, Can you, upon your own principle, that *every effect must have a cause*, rear a system of theological, moral,

and metaphysical philosophy? This is the simple question to be asked; and here it is that the necessitarian feels his own weakness and insufficiency. True it is, that the human mind is so constituted that it must adopt the principle, and act upon it to a certain extent also; but there is a point at which it stops short, and takes the very opposite principle for granted, that *some things exist without a cause*. These are two contradictory elements of the human intellect; but there is this marked and striking difference between them, that the first principle is inadequate to satisfy the demands of a rigorous philosophy; whereas the second principle is the only foundation we have on which to erect a system of human knowledge. On Edwards's theory it is impossible to found the existence of a Deity, and the obligatory nature of moral distinctions. These important doctrines can only rest upon a maxim entirely contrary to that which Edwards so concisely and forcibly lays down in his work.

In the philosophical writings of Dr. Edwards, though he shows himself a most zealous disciple of the necessitarian scheme, we shall find, nevertheless, that when he comes to apply his principles to the doctrines of natural and revealed religion, he illustrates these principles with so many qualifications and reservations, that it becomes not only difficult to say what opinions he really does hold upon necessary influence when applied to religious subjects; but he lays himself open to inferences favourable to the opposite side of the controversy.

From the general line of argument he follows, it would seem that he was very desirous to avoid the doctrine of necessity in its absolute and unconditional sense, as it appeared to him hostile to all our just notions of Deity, and of moral obligation. The following words contain the substance of his remarks upon this subject. "The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do *whatever pleases him* ; whereby 'He doeth according to *his will* in the armies of heaven and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest thou.' The following things belong to the sovereignty of God, viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite *power*, whereby he is able to do what he pleases, *without control*, without any confinement of that power, without any subjection, in the least measure, to any other power ; and so, without any hindrance or restraint, that it should be either impossible or at all difficult for him to *accomplish his will* ; and without any dependence of his power on any other power, from whence it should be derived, or which it would stand in need of ; so far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is absolutely dependent upon him. (2.) That he has supreme *authority* ; absolute and most perfect right to do what *he wills*, without subjection to any superior, or any derivation of authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct independent authority, either superior, equal, or inferior ; he being the head of all dominion, and fountain of all authority, and also without restraint by any obli-

gation, implying either subjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation. (3.) Thus his *will* is supreme, underived, and independent of any thing without himself; being in every thing determined by his own counsel, *having no other rule but his own wisdom*; his will not being subject to, or restrained by, the will of any other, and other wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his *wisdom*, which *determines his will*, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said, as in Isaiah x. 14, 'With whom took he counsel? and who instructed him and taught him the path of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and showed him the way of understanding?' There is no other divine sovereignty but this, and this is properly *absolute sovereignty*: no other is desirable, nor would any other be honourable or happy; and indeed there is no other conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereign, that *God's will is determined by his own infinite all-sufficient wisdom* in every thing; and in nothing at all is it either directed by any inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom, whereby it would become senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design, or end."*

From this passage we may observe, that it is explicitly laid down here that any thing like constraint, influence, or power, exercised over the divine nature, would be totally destructive of its

* On the Freedom of the Will, Part IV. Sect. 7.

essence. This declaration is sufficient to show that our notions of necessary connexion, or dependence, are hostile to correct conceptions of the divine government. But the principal thing worthy of consideration, and which bears upon the doctrine immediately under notice, is that which affirms that the *infinite wisdom* of God regulates, acts upon, impels, disposes, and rules his *infinite will*. The Doctor thought that by removing the divine will from any influence *external to the Deity*, and by placing that influence *within himself*, he was setting the question out of the reach of all cavil; but in this he was mistaken, for the difficulties are only taken from one place and set down in another. How does this attribute of wisdom act upon the will? Does this *infinite wisdom* contain within *itself* the principles of its own movements? Wisdom in the Divine Being, as well as amongst us, his finite creatures, must mean something which *is done*; some particular action or motion, directed to some particular *end*, and productive of some particular consequence or consequences; but if it moved of itself, it must have moved, or acted upon, or influenced another thing *without any cause, end, purpose, motive, or object*, which, according to the principle running through the whole of Dr. Edwards' reasonings on the freedom of the will, must be impossible and absurd. The divine will is here represented as an entirely *passive thing*, unable of itself to do anything without being moved or set in motion by *infinite wisdom*; but in what manner, or by what causes

this attribute of infinite wisdom *itself* is directed or brought into action, we are not informed. This omission is calculated to teach us, that we cannot form to ourselves consistent or intelligible notions of the divine nature, without supposing, or taking for granted, a degree of *spontaneity* in the Deity. If we wish to reason rationally on his attributes, we must invest one of these attributes with *spontaneous motion*, to guide, direct, move, or call into action the rest; and this underived power may, for any thing which can be advanced to the contrary, be as properly invested in the *will*, as in any other attribute. It must always be borne in mind, that the same arguments drawn from the difficulty of conceiving how the human will can act *without motives*, present themselves when we maintain that the *infinite wisdom* of the Deity is exercised *without any motive foreign to its own nature*. The obligations in both cases are founded upon the same principle, and must stand or fall together.*

In the second division of our remarks, we have to notice the application of Edwards's theory of cause and effect to some elementary principles of theology. We shall only bring one of these prominently before the reader's attention; namely, that which relates to the nature of the Deity, and his Divine government and attributes;—fundamental articles of all religious truth.

The Doctor published a theory of morality; and it is here that we find the fullest and most com-

* See the Author's Essay on Free-Will, London, 1848. 2nd Edition. Saunders, 6 Charing Cross.

plete view of the manner in which he applied his metaphysical ideas, and of the light in which he considered the whole of the Divine nature and procedure. We shall state his position,—that morality does not depend upon the *will of God*,—as concisely as possible, and under separate heads.

1st. The doctrine which maintains that what we now call virtue or merit, and vice or demerit, became purely such from an act of the *Divine will*, must be unsound; for if this exercise of the will of the Deity had not taken place, then there would not have been any such things as virtue or vice, merit or demerit. In founding the existence and nature of virtue and vice upon the pure will and pleasure of the Almighty, we stamp both with equal authority, and confound the qualities of each.

2nd. If the mere act of the will of the Deity, abstractly considered, made or created that which we call virtue, and rendered it obligatory, *because*, and only *because*, it was the act of His will or pleasure; then vice, which is in its nature and effects quite opposite to virtue, being likewise created and called into operation by this self-same act of the will, must be considered as possessing a power of obligation upon us every way equal with virtue itself; and that wickedness and folly must become as excellent in their natures and effects as goodness and wisdom; seeing that, if the *will* made virtue, and vice owed its existence to the same will, then they must both be, in every item and respect, alike.

3rd. To affirm that virtue and vice owed their

origin and distinctive characters to the will of God, presupposes that before the exercise of the will, virtue and vice had nothing different in their natures; but were viewed by the eye of the Almighty, as it were, as one and the same thing; therefore there would seem to have been no *motive* or inducement in the Almighty to create a difference, or give a preference to virtue more than to vice.

4th. The Almighty might, had he chosen, have ordained that man should rebel against him, and not obey him; should hate, and not love him; and that he might have violated, with pleasure and advantage, the whole ten commandments.

5th. The doctrine now under consideration is inconsistent with the attribute of the Deity which we call *omniscient*. Every thing which has been from eternity, existed, as it were, in the Divine mind; for the past, the present, and the future, are but as one to Him. All moral natures, moral relations, and moral consequences must have been, with other things, in the Divine mind, prior to their creation; that is, must have existed in the same manner as figurative representations of material or moral objects may exist in our own minds, perfect in all their parts and relations; such, for example, as a landscape, or a moral being endowed with passions, virtues, or vices, such as are commonly described by us in works of fiction.

6th. The scheme that morality depends upon the *will* of God, "not only involves in it, that mankind, with all their impiety, injustice, cruelty, oppressions, wars, and butcheries, are in their na-

ture equally amiable and excellent as angels, with all their truth and benevolence, but also that the character of fiends is in itself, and independently of the fact that God chose it should be otherwise, just as lovely, excellent, and praiseworthy, as that of angels. If then God had willed the character which Satan adopted and sustains, to be moral excellence, and that which Gabriel sustains, to be moral worthlessness, these two beings continuing in every other respect the same, would have interchanged their characters—Satan would have become entirely lovely, and Gabriel detestable—must not he who can believe this doctrine, as easily believe that, if God had willed it, two and two would become five? Is it at all easier to believe that truth and falsehood can change their natures, than that a square and a circle can interchange theirs?" *

We might inquire what is the nature of the will of God? Does that will become good, holy, and just, merely because God willed it should be such; or is that will excellent in its own nature, independently of any exercise of Almighty volition? If we maintain that the will of God is not excellent in its own nature, but became such by an act of His will, then it clearly follows that, "if God had been a being equally malevolent, and by an act of His will had determined that his character should be infinitely excellent, it would of course have become infinitely excellent, and he

* See Works, Vol. II. p. 365.

himself would have deserved to be loved, praised, glorified for his infinite malice, cruelty, and oppression, just as he now does for his infinite goodness, truth, faithfulness, and mercy. According to this scheme, therefore, there is no original moral difference between the characters of an infinitely malevolent being and an infinitely benevolent one; because this difference depends on a mere act of will, and not at all on the respective natures of the things themselves. That a malevolent being would have made this determination, there is no more reason to doubt, than that it would be made by a benevolent being; for it cannot be doubted that a malevolent being would have entirely loved and honoured himself. The question whether God is a benevolent or malevolent being, seems therefore to be nugatory, for all our inquiries concerning the subject, which have any practical importance, terminate in this single question,—What has God chosen?*

We must allow that these objections possess great force; indeed some of them may be said to be entirely unanswerable. But in making this concession, we need not be prevented from laying before the reader a few statements of a directly opposite nature, which, if they are not calculated to produce absolute conviction, may at the least induce us to see that this abstruse and intricate question has two different aspects in which it may be viewed.

We may observe in the first place, that in this

* See these arguments treated more fully in Dwight's system of Theology, vol. 3.

theory of morality, Dr. Edwards seems to have been duly sensible of the weakness of some of his positions, and of the great importance of having correct and explicit ideas of free-will, in all moral judgments and determinations. He makes some curious observations and statements on this point, which clearly display a wish to qualify the extreme results of some of his logical deductions. He observes, "It is not all beauty that is called virtue; for example, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow; but some beauty belonging to beings that have *perception* or *will*. And perhaps it is needless for me to give notice to my readers, that when I speak of an intelligent being having a heart united, and benevolently disposed, to being in general, I thereby mean intelligent being in general; not inanimate things or beings that have no *perception* or *will*."* Here the Doctor lays down the position, that there can be no moral virtue, without the faculty of perceiving, and the *will* to direct that faculty.

But to return to the consideration of those objections which Dr. Edwards urges against morality depending on the will of the Deity, we beg to make the following remarks.

1st, All his arguments hinge on the assumption, that we, finite and imperfect creatures, have an adequate conception of the nature and attributes of God; of his creative power, of his moral con-

* Edwards's Works, vol. 2, pp. 9, 10.

stitution, and of the final ends or purposes for which he has made and ordained all things.

2nd, But waiving this objection, and applying our reasonings to the subject, we shall soon perceive numerous and seemingly insurmountable difficulties in the way of the theory, that morality does *not* depend upon the will of the Deity.

3rd, When we maintain that the Deity has no *motive* to create virtue or vice, or to give a preference to the one more than to the other, we talk after the manner of men ; it is, in fact, to affirm that God is influenced by something external to or independent of his own nature ; for we can attach no idea to the word *motive*, but that of *foreign influence*. If the motive, in this instance, be considered part of the Divine nature, we may then demand to know at what time it began to manifest itself. If it existed from all eternity, it must have exercised its power from all eternity also. But an eternal motive is an absurdity. A *motive* or *inducement* is something arising out of the *circumstances of the case*. To say that a motive always existed, seems nothing short of a contradiction ; and to suppose an infinite series of motives is likewise preposterous ; and when carried out to its logical limits, is alike destructive of the existence of matter, and of the Deity himself.

4th, Besides these considerations, it may be observed that an eternal, self-created, and infinitely wise and powerful being, must, if we can strain our feeble imaginations to grasp at even a faint

conception of the matter, be supposed to be acted upon only by a motive, as eternal, self-created, and infinitely as powerful as himself.

5th, If a divine motive, if we may so term it, was indispensably necessary to stamp the law of God with moral validity, then this is as much as to say that the obligatory nature of this law owed its sole existence not only to this *something*, which we term a motive, which we must conceive to be external to, and independent of, the Deity himself; but of which *something*, we do not profess to have the smallest conception, and which we consequently have not been able to designate by any appellation whatever.

6th, If the law of morality be anterior to, or considered as coeval in point of existence with, the Deity himself; then this law becomes obligatory upon us;—we obey its injunctions, not from any considerations of its being his law, or of his creation, but *solely* on account of its being anterior to, or coeval in point of duration with, himself.

7th, To say that the duties and obligations of morality are eternal, and that the Deity is obliged or necessitated to regulate himself by this eternal law, then this is to place this law above himself, and to make him-entirely dependent upon it. This supposition is also completely at variance with all our notions, whether philosophical or popular, of law in general; for we cannot maintain that any law can have an existence anterior to, or coeval with, the lawgiver, or framer of the law.

8th, If the distinctions between virtue and vice

be of the same nature as the truth or falsehood of mathematical axioms and propositions, and if it be true, as affirmed, that the Almighty could not alter the nature of even the simplest truth in the latter branch of human knowledge; then we are led to infer that mathematical evidence is completely independent of his power, and incapable of receiving any alteration or modification from his omnipotence.

9th, If we grant that the nature of mathematical evidence could not be affected by the Almighty's power, it is but fair to infer that all other kinds of truth must also partake of the same nature—that is, be independent of the power and will of God. And, as we find from experience that the laws of matter and motion, by which the whole universe is regulated and upheld, are possessed of the same degree of evidence as that which is ascribed to mathematics; then we must come to the conclusion, that the universe, as at present constituted, could not have been constituted otherwise; and that the principles by which the movements of great masses of matter are regulated, as well as the principles which bind together the smallest particles or atoms, must have existed from all eternity.

10th, As mathematical truths, and indeed all kinds of truths, are perceived by the mind of man, and bear a certain fixed relation to it; it does not appear an unwarrantable stretch of assertion, to maintain that it might have pleased the Almighty, and that it was within his power, to have altered

||

2 L

the relative connexion, or system of laws, which exists between truth in general and our minds. At any rate, those who maintain that the Almighty had it not in his power to alter the nature of mathematical evidence, must also in consistency maintain, that our minds, by which that truth is perceived, and to which it must be considered to bear a certain fixed relation, could not have been otherwise made than we find them to be. And moreover, it may also be remarked, that as there is a certain connexion subsisting between the nature and operations of our minds and the nature and operations of our bodies, it is but fair to presume, that if our minds could not have been altered from what they are now, neither could our bodies, without destroying that concord and mutual harmony of action which, experience teaches us, do at present subsist between them. With whatever difficulties the position may be attended, there are few persons who would not readily concede, that both our minds and bodies might have been very differently constituted from what they are, if it had so pleased the *will* of the Almighty to have done so.

11th, If all moral truths, and truths relating to other branches of human knowledge, be affirmed not to be independent of the will of the Almighty, in the absolute meaning of the phrase, but only to form part of his *nature* or *essence*, then this view of the matter is precisely the same as that of Spinoza—being founded upon the same principle, and differing only in forms and modes of expression.

12th, The arguments which are founded upon

an analogy between the way in which the Almighty might be conceived to have seen things, before they were actually created, and imaginary representations of material objects of the mind's conception, such as a plan of a house, a landscape, &c., are not perfect and complete, and do not in any conceivable manner seem capable of being applied to the Deity. We obtain our imaginary representations from a knowledge of realities, but in the case of the Deity, as here supposed, the moral and physical truths, and their various relations, are represented as having an existence before any thing material or substantial was created. This consideration, trifling as it may at first sight appear to many, does, in fact, destroy at once the whole argument on this point.*

We could easily extend our remarks on these subjects to a much greater length, but we must now draw our notice to a close.

Dr. Edwards had a peculiarly constituted mind ; —a mind capable of pursuing, with incomparable steadiness and clearness, the longest and most intricate chain of reasoning ; but a mind, withal, by no means endowed with the loftiest powers of logical comprehension. He saw every link in a chain of reasoning with a microscopic eye, which, when its focal power was changed, made every thing at a distance appear hazy, clouded, and ill-defined. He could do one thing as no other man has ever been able to do it ; he could reason from given

* See the Author's "Essay on Free Will," 1848, published by Saunders, 6, Charing Cross.

or assumed premises with perspicuity, neatness, and power, and with an almost superhuman ease and correctness; but he could not embrace a philosophical system as a whole, and show its manifold bearings and relations to other branches of knowledge. He was an acute, but not a great, philosopher. His was a vivid and piercing light; but its illuminating rays, at a certain distance, became limited and scattered, and gave to all surrounding objects a distorted and confused appearance. His ratiocination is so perfect of its kind, that it assumes the appearance of mechanism; and we feel a sort of secret dislike to have all the pegs and wires of an argument so minutely and obtrusively placed before us. Edwards has, in fact, been denominated a "reasoning machine;" and the epithet is by no means misapplied or extravagant. But as a machine can only do its work *one way*, and we cannot humour it, or make its power more pliable; so in like manner do we find the intellectual mechanism of Edwards unyielding and unmanageable, except in its own peculiar fashion. The substantial correctness of these remarks may be verified by a reference to the various speculations of the author. When he is dealing with the question of man's free-will; when he has cause and effect, motive and action, rewards and punishments, like so many tennis balls, to play against each other, he goes smoothly forward, and nothing can resist his logical tact and dexterity; but when he enters upon other topics, the spell seems broken, and he dwindles down to the mere dialectician,

and often to even a lower character than that. Indeed, the truth of this is admitted by the author's able commentator and critic, Mr. Rogers, who makes the following observations on the reasoning powers of the Doctor. "In these papers we cannot fail to observe how ill adapted was the mind of Edwards for those extensive exercises of induction, that long and patient investigation of facts, that laborious collection of the mere materials and elements of reasoning before the process of reasoning and generalization begins, and which are so absolutely necessary in every department of physical science; without which, indeed, the profoundest reasonings, purely hypothetical, must always, on such subjects, be worthless. As though not only conscious where his real power lay, but irresistibly impelled to exercise it, we find him perpetually escaping from the field of experiment and fact; taking his premises for granted, and consequently reasoning absurdly from them; or else, as if aware of the insecure ground on which he trod when he attempted the induction of facts, and impatient to begin his favourite exercise of purely logical illation, he is continually retreating to those obscurest of almost all subjects, the metaphysics (if we may so speak) of natural philosophy; to discussions on the elementary structure of matter, the forms of atoms, their laws of action, the *genesis* of motion, and the original principles of nature."*

* Works of Jonathan Edwards, with an Essay on his genius and writings, by H. Rogers. London, 1834.

The late Mr. Stewart has the following remarks respecting Dr. Edwards's theory :—

“ It has been objected by a most respectable writer to those who, without attempting to discuss Edwards's argument, set it down as nothing more than an intricate puzzle or quibble; that ‘if this argument be what they represent it, there must be some way to unravel the puzzle, although they have not the skill, or will not take the trouble to discover it.’

“ To this proposition I object. 1st, Because I can see little or nothing in the argument of Edwards which has not been completely answered by Clarke, or by Reid. 2nd, Because the consequences to which it leads, (although to the satisfaction of a few speculative men they may perhaps be evaded by means of subtle refinements and distinctions), are so directly *contrary* to the *common feelings and judgments* of mankind, as to authorize any person of plain understanding boldly to *cut asunder the knot* which he was unable to unloose. In looking over the article *Sophisms*, in our elementary books of Logic, I find many, (such as Achilles and the Tortoise, the Liar, the Bald, the Sorites or Acervus, and various others), to which I should be much more at a loss to give a satisfactory reply, than to any thing alleged by Collins or Edwards; and yet I should think it a most unwise employment of my time, to waste an hour in the refutation of any of them. Nor would I feel much mortification if I should be accused of want of candour for neither consenting to admit the con-

clusion, nor to undertake the irksome task of combating the premises. Of the truths *disputed* in these sophisms, there is not one, in my opinion, more *certain* than that of man's free-agency; a fact of which our consciousness is so complete, that we cannot even form a conception of a more perfect freedom of choice than we actually possess. On this point it has been justly and acutely remarked by Mr. Necker, that 'when we reflect upon our own faculties, we can with ease imagine a superior degree of intelligence, of knowledge, of memory, of foresight, and of every other property of our understanding; liberty is the only part of ourselves to which imagination cannot add any thing.' **

LEVI HEDGE.

This American author was a Professor in Harvard College, and published, in 1816, "Elements of Logic, or a Summary of the General Principles of Reasoning." The work, so far as its metaphysical views are concerned, is founded on the opinions of Reid and Stewart. The author divides his subject into three parts. In the first, we have an account of the several powers or faculties of the mind; in the second, he treats of terms and propositions; and in the third, he comprehends those intellectual instruments engaged in the work of

* Stewart's Act. and Mor. Powers, p. 518.

argumentation or demonstration. The treatise is plain and practical, and agreeably written. "Inductive reasoning," the author says, is "founded on a belief, that the course of nature is based on uniform laws, and that things will happen in future, as we have observed them to happen in times past. We can give no proof of a permanent connection between any events, or between any two qualities either of body or mind. The only reason for supposing such a connection in any instance is, that we have invariably found certain things to have been conjoined in fact; and this experience, in many cases, produces a conviction equal to that of demonstration." *

REV. FRED. BEASLEY.

The author of this publication† was, when it was given to the world, Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, and a Presbyter of the Episcopal Church in the city of Philadelphia.

The principal object of the work is to defend the leading principles of Locke, as they are unfolded in his "Essay on the Human Understanding." The following passage, from the Dedication of Dr. Beasley's book, will furnish the reader with a general notion of its scope and tendency. "I certainly," says he, "should not have had the presumption to obtrude upon the public a work of

* Elements, &c., p. 61.

† "A Search of Truth in the Science of the Human Mind." (Philadelphia, 1822.)

such magnitude, and upon a topic so difficult and interesting, if I had not conceived that I had something new, and not altogether unimportant, to communicate. You are aware that in the College of Princeton, to which we were attached, after the fanciful theory of Bishop Berkeley, as a kind of philosophical day-dream, had maintained its prevalence for a season, the principles of Reid and the Scottish metaphysicians superseded it; and during the period of our residence in the Seminary, acquired and maintained undisputed sway. At that time, I, together with all those graduates who took any interest in the subject, embraced without doubt or hesitation the doctrines of the Scottish school. Since, however, I came in possession of the station which I at present occupy in the College of Philadelphia, my duty, as well as inclination, led me to renew my inquiries into this branch of science. The farther I proceeded, the more interesting the subject became; and I determined, if possible, to compass the whole ground, by consulting every author who had written upon it, both in ancient and modern times. I had advanced but a short distance upon this extended plan, before I thought I perceived that the Scottish metaphysicians had either inadvertently or wilfully done their predecessors very great injustice, in their animadversions upon their writings; ascribed to them opinions which they never held; assumed to themselves the merit of broaching and promulgating the very doctrines which they

taught; and, at the same time, had fallen into the grossest errors in that new system of pneumatology, which they claimed the merit of introducing. Dr. Reid, who is, undoubtedly, the best writer upon these topics that Scotland has produced, discovering at times considerable clearness of understanding, and neatness and perspicuity of style, acknowledges 'that he never thought of calling in question the principles commonly received with regard to human nature, until the *Treatise of Human Nature* (Mr. Hume's) was published.' "

A considerable portion of Dr. Beasley's work is devoted to the pointing out of the misconceptions of the Scottish writers, and defending the general positions of Locke's system. This defensive line of warfare has led the author into discussions on almost all the interesting and subtile questions in metaphysical science.

ASA BURTON.

The work of this author, "*Essays on some of the first Principles of Metaphysics, Morals, and Theology*," 1825, was written expressly to bear upon certain religious questions. The author has no particular theory, but says that he takes facts, experience, and common sense as his guides.

There is a great deal of valuable discussion in that part of Dr. Burton's book which treats on the faculties of the mind; on the understanding, per-

ception, memory, judgment, conscience, free-will, and moral responsibility. His language is simple, clear, concise, and impressive.

REV. THOMAS C. UPHAM.

This American author has filled, for several years, the distinguished office of Professor of Moral and Mental Philosophy in Bowdoin College; and is well known in his own country for several works of a philosophical character.

Mr. Upham commences his "Elements"* with an Introduction, embracing the nature and influence of primary or elemental truths; the spiritual or immaterial nature of mind; the laws and rules of human belief; and a classified summary of mental phenomena.

There are three great divisions under which the author classifies all the states or phenomena of mind. 1st, *Intellectual*, or intellective states. 2nd, *Sensibilities*, or sentient states. 3rd, *Volitions*, or voluntary states.†

DIVISION 1st.—INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING, comprehends three parts.

Part 1st.—The External or receptive intellect; intellectual states of external origin.

Part 2nd.—Internal or suggestive intellect; intellectual states of internal origin.

* "Elements of Mental Philosophy, embracing the Two Departments of Intellect and Sensibilities." 2 vols. New York, 1843.

† This third division is embraced in a separate work, entitled "A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on the Will."

Part 3rd.—Imperfect and disordered intellectual action.

The *First Part* is again divided into fifteen chapters, which we shall here enumerate; and they will show the reader the subjects which are treated of, and something of the plan adopted in treating of them. Chap. I. Origin of knowledge in general. Chap. II. Sensation and perception. Chaps. III., IV., V., and VI. contain a full and accurate analysis of the five senses. Chap. VII. Of reliance on the senses. Chap. VIII. Habits of sensation and perception. Chap. IX. Muscular habits. Chap. X. Conception. Chap. XI. Simplicity and complexness of mental states. Chap. XII. Abstraction. Chap. XIII. General abstract ideas. Chap. XIV. Of attention. Chap. XV. Dreaming.

The *Second Part* also contains fifteen chapters. Chap. I. Internal origin of knowledge. Chap. II. Origin of suggestion. Chap. III. Consciousness. Chap. IV. Relative suggestion or judgment. Chap. V. Association—primary laws. Chap. VI. Association—secondary laws. Chap. VII. Casual associations. Chaps. VIII., IX., X., XI. XII., XIII., and XIV. are on memory, reasoning, and imagination. Chap. XV. Complex ideas of internal origin.

The *Third Part* of this FIRST DIVISION contains an account of the *Imperfect* and *Disordered Intellectual Action*. There are here four chapters, which embrace the ill-directed or deranged actions of the intellect, displayed in the operations of all

the states or powers of the mind which have been explained in the two preceding parts.

To the SECOND GREAT DIVISION there are two introductory chapters on the relation of the intellect to the sensibilities, and a classification of the sensibilities themselves.

DIVISION 2nd. — SENSIBILITIES OR SENTIENT STATES.

Part 1st.—Natural or pathematic sensibilities; pathematic sentiments.

Part 2nd.—Moral sensibilities, or conscience; conscious sentiments.

Part 3rd.—Imperfect and disordered sensitive action.

The pathematic sensibilities are subdivided into *Emotions* and *Desires*.

The *Emotions* occupy seven chapters; the principal of which are, emotions of beauty, original and associated; emotions of sublimity, original and associated; emotions of the ludicrous, of cheerfulness, joy, gladness, melancholy, sorrow, grief, surprise, astonishment, disgust, reverence, modesty, shame, adoration, &c.

The *Desires* include the instincts, appetites, propensities; the affections, malevolent and benevolent: and this part is concluded with a chapter on habits of the sensibilities.

The sensibilities belonging to the *Second Part* of this division our author likewise divides into two classes. 1st, Emotions of approval and disapproval. 2nd, Feelings of moral obligation. The

first Class are discussed in five chapters. Chap. I. Proofs of a moral nature. Chap. II. Emotions of moral approval and disapproval. Chap. III. Relation of reasoning to the moral nature. Chaps. IV. and V. On the nature of moral beauty and sublimity.

The author treats the feelings of moral obligation under the following heads. Chap. I. Existence of obligatory feelings. Chap. II. The nature of obligatory feelings. Chap. III. Uniformity in action of moral sensibilities. Chap. IV. Immutability of moral distinctions. Chap. V. Moral education.

The *Third Part* contains a discussion on the imperfect and disordered manifestations of the appetites, propensities, desires, affections, emotions, and feelings.

With respect to the mental doctrine of *primary truths*, on which the author lays considerable stress, his views are, in all essential particulars, the same as those of Father Buffier. His definition is, to the very letter, a translation of the French author's position. These truths Mr. Upham says, are "such, and such only, as can neither be proved nor refuted by other propositions of greater perspicuity."

On the great question as to the origin of our ideas or knowledge, he seems to have adopted the views of Locke and Stewart. With the former he makes *sensation*, the *occasion*, *source*, or *condition* of thought; and with the latter, he coincides in the belief, that many of our most abstract and im-

portant notions spring out of the natural resources of the mind itself. The following observations will fully illustrate this portion of the author's system.

"In making the human soul a subject of inquiry, it is an obvious consideration that a distinction may be drawn between the soul, contemplated in itself, and its acts or states, or the knowledge which it possesses. The inquiry, therefore, naturally arises, under what circumstances the acquisition of knowledge begins? It is enough to express our continued reliance on the general experience and testimony of mankind, so far as it is possible to ascertain them on a subject of so much difficulty, that the beginnings of thought and knowledge are immediately subsequent to certain affections of those bodily organs which we call the SENSES. In other words, were it not for impressions on the senses, which may be traced to objects external to them, our mental capabilities, whatever they may be, would in all probability have remained folded up, and have never been redeemed from a state of fruitless inaction. Hence the process, which is implied in the perception of external things, or what is commonly termed by Mr. Locke, *sensation*, may justly be considered the OCCASION of the introductory step to all our knowledge. But it does not follow from this, nor is it by any means true, that the whole amount of it, in its ultimate progress, is to be ascribed directly to the same source. All that can be said with truth is, that the mind receives the earliest part of its ideas by means of the senses, and that, in con-

sequence of having received these elementary thoughts, all its powers become rapidly and fully operative. And here we come to the SECOND great source of knowledge. The powers of the mind being thus fairly brought into exercise, its various operations then furnish us with another set of notions, which, by way of distinguishing them from those received through the direct mediation of the senses, may be called, in the language of Mr. Locke, ideas of reflection ; or, to use a phrasology embracing all possible cases, ideas of INTERNAL ORIGIN. These two sources of human thought, the internal and external, however they may have been confounded by some writers, are entirely distinct."

Those chapters in Mr. Upham's work which are devoted to the explication of the phenomena of the various organs of sensation, do not present any novelty of thought or argument. They are substantially founded on the Scottish philosophy. "Perception," says he, "may be defined an affection or state of the mind, which is immediately successive to certain affections of the organ of sense, and which is referred by us to something external as its cause."* Our notions of extension, figure, resistance, and of things external to the mind, are, according to our author's ideas, the result of the sense of *touch*, at least he affirms that this organ of sensation is the *occasion*, or *condition* on which these ideas are suggested.

* Vol. 1, p. 81.

Mr. Upham's remarks on what he terms *suggestive intellect*, are precisely similar to what may be found in all the writings of the Scottish metaphysicians. Where distinctions are attempted to be made, they are distinctions without difference.

In the second volume, the Professor enters upon the consideration of the sensibilities, or *sentient states of mind*. He endeavours to point out the positive and substantial difference between the mind, and the moral constitution of man ; between what is purely mental, and what belongs to our emotions or feelings. But here we cannot recognise any novelty, either in the analysis or in the illustrations. There is, however, great clearness and force of expression. On the subject of beauty and sublimity, the author differs from those who consider them as the result of secondary and complex states of mental existence. The author contends that the beauty in certain objects, such as forms, colours, &c., belongs intrinsically to the objects themselves, and is not the result of association, or any other mental power. "Taste," says he, "in the most general sense of the term, is the power of judging of the beauty and deformity of objects, *founded on the experience of the emotions.*"

This second volume of Professor Upham's work is decidedly the best, both for the general reader and the metaphysical and moral student. The exposition of the leading doctrines of philosophy is on the whole very able, though by no means marked with the attribute of originality, either in illustration or argument. His work is comprehensive, syste-

matic, and judiciously arranged; and the general impression which the work leaves upon the mind is, that there is a healthy spirit of philosophical discussion pervading the whole.

S. S. SCHMUCKER, D.D.*

This metaphysical writer is President and Professor of Theology in the College at Gettysburgh, and enjoys among his countrymen a high literary reputation.

In the Introduction to this Treatise on the Mind, there is a review of its various divisions, or its operations, which have in divers ways been descanted on by modern philosophers of almost every school in Europe. All previous classifications the Doctor rejects, and forms a new arrangement, which is also clothed in a new terminology. His system does not involve a division of the powers or faculties of the mind, but only its operations or phenomena.

The whole of the operations or phenomena of mind, he places under THREE GREAT CLASSES. 1st, *Cognitive Ideas*; 2nd, *Sentient Ideas*; 3rd, *Active Operations*. The cognitive class of ideas embraces perception, acts of consciousness, conceptions, judgments, recollections, the results of reasoning, but not the process. The sentient ideas comprise sensations, emotions, affections, and passions, to a certain extent. In the active opera-

* *Psychology, or Elements of a New System of Mental Philosophy.* New York, 1844.

tions, volitions, processes of reasoning, but not the results, are comprehended; the act of memorizing, but not its results; and similar mental operations.

The *First Part* of the treatise, embracing the first class of ideas, contains three Chapters. Chap. I. Of objective entities as subjects of our knowledge. This Chapter consists of four sections. 1st, of the different classes of entities, such as solids, liquids, gases, light, mind, spirit, time, space, number, &c. 2nd, Division of these classes of entities into absolute and concrete. 3rd, Subdivision of concrete entities into substantive, adjective, and composite. 4th, Relation of entities. Chapter II. Of Cognitive ideas. This is also divided into four sections. 1st, The nature of our ideas that constitute knowledge. 2nd, The criteria by which these ideas are distinguished. 3rd, The nature and sources of error in our ideas. 4th, The division of all these ideas into individual and relative; and retrospective, present, and prospective. Chapter III. Of the organic processes by which we obtain our cognitive ideas. Here the author furnishes us with an explanation of the processes of sensation, of which the five senses are the media.

The *Second Part* of the work is occupied with sentient ideas. This is composed of three Chapters. Chapter 1st, Classification of our feelings. These are all considered as individual or relative. The individual are, sensations, pleasant and unpleasant. The relative comprise the benevolent, malevolent, sympathetic, and antipathetic feelings. Chapter

2nd, Of entities as excitants to feeling. Chapter 3rd, The susceptibilities of the mind for feeling, and the laws which regulate these susceptibilities.

The *Third Part*.—The active operations here enumerated are, 1st, Inspection. 2nd, Arrangement. 3rd, Modification. 4th, Mental direction of our physical agency. 5th, Intellectual intercourse. Under these names we have here described the processes of perception, consciousness, conception, judgment, reasoning, remembering, impulses of conscience, classification, association, abstraction, imagination, generalization, composition, &c. The last chapter of the book is on the mode of occurrence of these five active operations. This mode is twofold, voluntary and spontaneous.

• Dr. Schmucker's work is of a different stamp from that of Upham. The Doctor is of the German school, and displays a great deal of the transcendental quaintness and crabbed terminology, which belong to the speculative philosophy of this part of Europe. He calls his lucubrations "A New System of Mental Philosophy;" but there will be found, in reality, very little of novelty in it, save the new terms and phrases in which he has enveloped his ideas.

The mental philosophy of Dr. Schmucker is of the inductive school; he professes to know nothing of mind but what is phenomenal and relative, though he is not able at all times to keep his speculations within the prescribed boundaries which he has chalked out for his inquiries. As an instance of this, we shall just quote two or three passages

relative to the Doctor's classification of the active operations of the soul, which display his leaning to ontological discussions.

"1st, By inspection we would designate that active operation in which the attention of the soul is directed to some entity, simple or composite; prospective, present, or retrospective; with a view to acquire some knowledge concerning it.

"2nd, Arrangement is that active operation of the soul, by which we select some from among the mass, either of external entities themselves, or of our mental representative of them, and place them as wholes or units, in particular order, with a view to a specific purpose.

"3rd, Modification is that active operation of the soul, by which we take some from among our mental representatives, (rarely the objective entities themselves,) and bring them into such forms or combinations as do not correspond to realities; that is, make arbitrary substantive and composite entities out of them."

Dr. Schmucker differs from those writers on the mind who consider it as consisting of distinct faculties or powers. He views the mind through the medium of its *states, operations, or phenomena*. On this controverted point we refer the reader to a discussion on the nature of distinct faculties in a preceding part of this work.

The terminology, as well as the minute distinctions, of Dr. Schmucker's classification of mental phenomena, are decidedly objectionable. They tend to bewilder and perplex the student, and to

retard the progress of sound philosophy. As an example of the Doctor's mode of classification, we shall just mention, that in reference to the *active operations* of the mind we find the following enumeration:—perception, conception, judgment, recollection, and analytical reasoning, referred to the division of *inspection*; the processes of comparison, classification, synthetic reasoning, constitute *arrangement*; and abstraction, generalization, imagination, and fancy, form *modification*. This is by no means a useful and happy mode of arranging mental phenomena.

HENRY P. TAPPAN.

The writer of this work* was a Professor of Moral Philosophy in one of the Colleges at New York, and is the author of a treatise on Free-will, and other abstruse and esteemed publications. The following analysis is confined to his Introductory View of Philosophy in general, and Preliminary View of the Reason.

The *First Part* is in fourteen Sections. Sec. 1. Definition of philosophy. Sect. 2. Distinction between the phenomenal and the metaphenomenal. That which is made known to us in consciousness is the phenomenal; all without, all indeed but the operations of the mind, are metaphenomenal.

* "Elements of Logic. Together with an Introductory View of Philosophy in general, and a Preliminary View of the Reason." New York, 1844.

Sec. 3. Of the reality of the metaphenomenal, that is, the real existence of the external world, and other things, besides the operations of mind.

Sec. 4. The objective and subjective. The subjective is *the me—myself*; the objective, every thing that is *not me*, not *myself*. Sec. 5. Reason and sense. Sec. 6. Sensualism and transcendentalism.

Sec. 7. Ideas and laws. Sec. 8. Primary and secondary phenomena. Sec. 9. Antecedents in time and in necessary existence. Sec. 20. Ideas, the last authority of all judgments or knowledge.

Sec. 11. Divisions of philosophy; *first*, metaphysics, comprehending psychology, dynamics, anthropology, ontology; *secondly*, nomology, comprehending morals, esthetics, domatology, logic.

Sec. 12. Of the relations between philosophy and the sciences and arts. Sec. 13. Reason, the organ of philosophy. Sec. 14. Criteria of a true philosophy.

The *Second Part* is on Reason. Sec. 1. Nature of the reason; it is that which knows and comprehends; the whole, in fact, of the cognitive faculties. Sec. 2. Ideas and functions of the reason. Ideas are of two kinds—metaphysical and nomological. The functions of the reason are, intuition, abstraction, generalization, judgment, invention, mediate perception, induction, memory, recollection, attention, imagination, and consciousness. The remaining parts of the work are occupied with an explanation of the ideas and functions of the reason.

Mr. Tappan's publication is decidedly of a high

German character. He is a transcendentalist of the school of Kant and Fichte. On this point there can be no dispute. The author says, "The first elements of thought, whatever they be, must be the foundations of all subsequent cognitions. If, according to Locke, these first elements were merely the phenomena, which are the immediate objects of consciousness, they undoubtedly would be the foundations of all the subsequent knowledge, as he has represented them. According to the transcendental system, however, the original elements are ideas, or simple intuitions of the pure reason, given upon sensuous conditions, but not formed out of them." * And he afterwards observes, that "it must follow that the ultimate bases of all knowledge and belief must be the *ideas of the reason*."

The following passage is quite fresh from Germany. "The great Creator foreknew all possible being, because he had the ideas of all possible being. Man, the finite mind, knows after creation has taken place, and after he has received, in his sensitivity, motions from that creation; but that he knows at all, arises from a reason made in the likeness of the Divine; and having preconcerted capacities or ideas adapted to primordial, universal, and necessary truths; the very truths in which the outer world, indeed the whole world of created being, lives, moves, and has its being."†

* An able notice of the works of Upham, Schmucker, and Tappan, will be found in the *British Quarterly Review* for February, 1847.

* Page 55.

† Page 131.

R. W. EMERSON.

Mr. Emerson, though a man of genius, and a popular writer, can scarcely be considered a cultivator of mental philosophy. What notions he has on the subject seem to be of an *ideal* cast. In his "Essays," which have been published some years in this country, we find only three out of the number which have any direct reference to metaphysical inquiries; namely, "The Over-Soul," "Intellect," and "Nominalism and Realism." But none of these contain any formal discussions on the nature and laws of thought; only some general metaphysical conceptions, couched in pointed, quaint, and antithetical language, suited to attract the attention of ordinary Essay readers. We shall give a specimen or two of his writing, in order to show the current of his thoughts, and the style in which he clothes them. In the "Essay" on the *Intellect*, he observes, "In the intellect constructive, which we popularly designate by the word genius, we observe the same balance of two elements as in intellect receptive. The constructive intellect produces thoughts, sentences, poems, plans, designs, systems. It is the generation of the mind, the marriage of thought with nature. To genius must always belong two gifts, the thought and the publication. The first is revelation, always a miracle, which no frequency of occurrence or incessant study can ever familiarise, but which must

always leave the inquirer stupid with wonder. It is the advent of truth into the world; a form of thought now for the first time bursting into the universe; a child of the old eternal soul; a piece of genuine and immeasurable greatness. It seems, for the time, to inherit all that has yet existed, and to dictate to the unborn. It effects every thought of man, and goes to fashion every institution. But to make it available, it needs a vehicle or art by which it is conveyed to men. To be communicable, it must become picture or sensible object. We must learn the language of facts."

* * * "The thought of genius is spontaneous; but the power of picture or expression, in the most enriched and flowing nature, implies a mixture of will, a certain control over the spontaneous states, without which no production is possible. It is a conversion of all nature into the rhetoric of thought, under the eye of judgment, with a strenuous exercise of choice. And yet the imaginative vocabulary seems to be spontaneous also. It does not flow from experience only or mainly, but from a richer source."*

On Nominalism and Realism we have the following odd and quaint remarks:—

"In the famous disputes with the Nominalists, the Realists had a good deal of reason. General ideas are essences. They are our gods: they round and ennoble the most partial and sordid way of

* *Essays*, p. 337.

living. Our proclivity to details cannot quite degrade our life, and divest it of poetry. The day labourer is reckoned as standing at the foot of the social scale, yet he is saturated with the laws of the world. His measures are the hours ; morning and night, solstice and equinox, geometry, astronomy, and all the lovely accidents of nature, play through his mind. Money, which represents the prose of life, and which is hardly spoken of in parlours without an apology, is, in its effects and laws, as beautiful as roses. Property keeps the accounts of the world, and is always moral. The property will be found where the labour, the wisdom, and the virtue have been in nations, in classes, and (the whole life-time considered, with the compensations) in the individual also. How wise the world appears, when the laws and usages of nations are largely detailed, and the completeness of the municipal system is considered ! Nothing is left out. If you go into the markets, and the custom-houses, the insurers' and the notaries' offices, the offices of sealers of weights and measures, of inspection of provisions,—it will appear as if one man had made it all. Wherever you go, a wit like your own has been before you, and has realised its thought. The Eleusinian mysteries, the Egyptian architecture, the Indian astronomy, the Greek sculpture, show that there always were seeing and knowing men in the planet. The world is full of masonic ties, of guilds, of secret and public legions of honour ; that of scholars, for example ; and that of gentlemen fraternizing with

the upper class of every country and every culture."^{*}

Our limits will not allow us to dwell on the following works; we, therefore, must barely give the author's names, and the titles of their respective publications.

EZRA STILES ELY.—This author, a Doctor of Divinity, published his "Conversations on the Science of the Human Mind," in 1819, at Philadelphia.

"An Essay concerning the Free Agency of Man, or the powers and faculties of the Human Mind, the Decrees of God, Moral Obligation, Natural Law, and Morality," Montpelier, 1821.

REV. JOHN WITHERSPOON, D.D.—Lectures on Moral Philosophy," 1822.

"The Alphabet of Thought, or Elements of Metaphysical Science," Harrisburgh, 1825.—By a Lady.

SAMPSON REID.—"Observations on the Growth of the Mind," Boston, 1827.

"Essays devoted Principally to the Discussion of the great Metaphysical Question of, How we acquire a Knowledge of External Objects," New York, 1827.

GEORGE PAINE.—"Elements of Mental and Moral Science, designed to exhibit the Original Susceptibilities of the Mind," Boston, 1829.

^{*} Essays, second series, p. 164.

REV. SILAS BLAISDALE. — "First Lessons on Intellectual Philosophy," Boston, 1830.

LYSANDER SPOONER. — "The Deist's Immortality, and on Man's Accountability for his Belief," Boston, 1834.

FRANCIS WAYLAND, D.D. — "Elements of Moral Science," New York, 1835. This treatise contains much that is interesting to the metaphysician. It is grounded on the principle, that a careful examination of human nature will infallibly lead us to true results as to its real character; just, in fact, as a similar careful examination into any other department of God's creation will entitle us to pronounce a verdict upon it.

FRED. A. RAUCH. — This author is a German, but now naturalized in America, and was lately a Professor in Marshall College, Pennsylvania. His work, "Psychology, or a View of the Human Soul," was published in 1835. It is a very excellent and common-sense publication, and has been well received in the United States.

REV. JASPER ADAMS. — "Elements of Moral Philosophy," Cambridge, South Carolina, 1837.

JEREMIAH DAY. — "An Inquiry respecting the Self-determining Power of the Will, or Contingent Volition," Newhaven, 1838.

AMOS DEAN. — "The Philosophy of Human Life; being an Investigation of the Great Elements of Life; the Power that Acts; the Will that directs the Action; and the Accountability, or Sanctions, that Influence the Formation of Volitions," Boston, 1840.

CHARLES K. TRUE. — "Elements of Logic," Boston, 1840.

FRANCIS BOWEN. — "Critical Essays on a few Subjects connected with the History and present Condition of Speculative Philosophy," Boston, 1842.

LEICESTER A. SAWYER. — "A Critical Exposition of Mental Philosophy, or the First Principles of Metaphysics," Newhaven, 1839. This is an able work, though the writer does not appear to have a very extensive acquaintance with the history of philosophy. He lays down his positions, however, with great clearness; and his book must prove useful to general readers, and particularly to students.

RICHARD HILDRETH. — "Theory of Morals; an Inquiry concerning the Law of Moral Distinctions, and the Variations and Contradictions of Ethical Codes," Boston, 1844.*

* See Note L. at the end of this Volume.

CHAPTER VIII.

PHYSIOGNOMY, THE DOCTRINE OF TEMPERAMENTS,
PHYSIOLOGY, AND MESMERISM.

It is quite obvious that as soon as men began to reflect upon their own nature and state, and to mark the divers bodily and mental faculties with which they are endowed, the more prominent relations which subsist between mind and body would be noticed and recorded. The expressions of thought in the countenance; the exhibitions of mental vigour associated with peculiar physical qualities and powers; the effects of health and disease upon the intellectual functions; and a thousand other relations which spring up between the living man and external things around him, must have formed the first rudiments of knowledge, and laid the foundation for every speculative system on human nature of which we have any account.

We find, therefore, that physiognomy, the doctrine of distinct temperaments of the body, physiological speculations as to the nature and

properties of the living principle of existence, and mesmeric phenomena, are among the very oldest memorials of philosophical inquiries. They all spring out of one source ; and, in a certain point of view, are but modifications of each other. They form, however, collectively, a separate school of metaphysical philosophy ; inasmuch as they all have a direct reference to certain modes in which the mind develops itself ; to numerous relations which subsist between minds of different orders when under the influence of various external agents ; and to certain theories, as to the abstract nature or seat of the soul itself.

As we have hitherto refrained from any formal or lengthened notice of these subjects, we shall here make a few remarks upon them ; because we feel conscious that no history of philosophical systems could possibly be considered complete without a knowledge of the leading principles on which the topics enumerated at the head of this Chapter are founded, and of the chief writers who have illustrated and expounded them.

PHYSIOGNOMY.

All men from the beginning of time must have been physiognomists ; and it is equally as true, that all men of the present day are such. No matter what theories they may adopt on the nature of mind, mankind, in their daily intercourse with each other, never lose sight of those leading physical indications of our internal movements, purposes, and desires, which the human countenance,

and bodily frame generally, are so pre-eminently fitted to express.

Physiognomy is, therefore, of the highest antiquity. It was assiduously cultivated in Egypt and India; and it is supposed that Pythagoras was the first to introduce it from these countries into Greece. Plato mentions the subject, and Aristotle has given us a regular treatise upon it. He tells us that the Thracians, the Scythians, and the Egyptians were distinguished from each other, and from other tribes and nations, by peculiarities in their manners and habits, and by certain intellectual and moral qualities. The principle was clearly laid down, that there subsisted a certain and determined relationship between the qualities or external appearances of the body, and the internal powers, dispositions, and feelings of the soul. All noviciates in the Pythagorean schools were subjected to a physiognomical examination before admission; and this fact would seem to indicate that physiognomy must have formed a regular branch of Grecian philosophy at this early period of the history of letters. Theophrastus followed Aristotle, and treated of the physiognomy of manners. And we find from the work entitled "*Physiognomizæ Veteres Scriptores Græci, Græcè et Latine*," 1780, that there were many other Greek writers on the subject.* The celebrated physicians Hippocrates and Galen are among the number.

Physiognomy was also cultivated by the Romans.

* See "*Physiognomizæ*," &c., *Præfatio*, and the first Six Chapters.

Several distinguished orators, and Cicero among the number, were passionately fond of the science. In the latter's oration against Piso, and in that in favour of Roscius, we perceive the use he makes of physiognomy. We have many scattered fragments and observations on the science in the writings of Sallust, Suetonius, Seneca, Pliny, Aulus Gellius, Petronius, and Plutarch. Indeed there is ample proof that the science was cultivated among the Romans by regular Professors, and that it formed an essential branch of public education. In the life of Titus, by Suetonius, it is mentioned that Narcissus employed a professed physiognomist to examine the features of Britannicus, and a prediction followed the examination that Titus would obtain imperial dominion.

The study of physiognomy was in a great measure suspended during several centuries before and after the fall of the Roman Empire; but it was again resuscitated by some active spirits in the middle ages. The names of Cocles, Baptista Porta, Honoratius Nuquetius, Jacobus, Alstedius, Michel Schottus, Gaspar Schottus, Cardan, Taisnierus, Fludd, Böhmen, Barclay, Claromontius, Conringius, Spontanus, Andreas Henricus, Joannes Digander, Goclenius, Alexander Achillinus, Prætorius, Belot, Gratalorus, and the commentators on the *Physiognomica* of Aristotle, Augustin Niphus, and Camillus Balbus, show the general interest which the science excited for many centuries in various parts of Europe.*

* See Morhoff's *Polyhistor*, Vol. 1, lib. 1, and Vol. 2, lib. 3.

In the eighteenth century,* the celebrated work of Lavater gave a new impetus and direction to physiognomical studies. He treated of the matter in a more plain and common-sense style, than most of the writers who had preceded him. He was an acute and accurate observer of nature, and infused great piquancy and life into all his descriptions. The science of physiognomy is defined to be, that of discovering the internal feelings and intellectual capabilities of man, by certain external indications. The speculations of Lavater were attacked by M. Formey, in the Berlin Transactions for 1775, who contended that Lavater's definition of the science could not be supported by an appeal to facts. Lavater's system, however, enjoyed for many years great popularity throughout the whole of Europe; but he experienced, before his decease, in 1801, the mortification of seeing it gradually sink into obscurity and forgetfulness.†

We cannot enter into any formal examination of Lavater's system; but we shall quote an observation or two from him, to show what his general conceptions of human nature were. He says, "Of all the organized beings discoverable by our senses, there is no one in which are collected and blended three sorts of life so different from each other, and

* A short time before the appearance of Lavater's work, there was an animated discussion in the Berlin Transactions for 1769 and 1770, between Pernetty and Le Cat, on the subject of Physiognomy; the former resolved all knowledge into it, and the latter confined it entirely to the human face.

† Lavater first published his work, in the form of a pamphlet, in 1772. His great work appeared three years afterwards.

which at the same time unite, in a manner inconceivably marvellous, to form but one whole ; the *animal*, the *intellectual* and the *moral* life ; each of which is, moreover, a combination of powers essentially different, but perfectly harmonious."

"To *know*, to *desire*, to *act*, or rather to observe or think, to feel and be attracted, to possess the power of motion and resistance ; these render a man a *physical*, *moral*, and *intellectual* being."

"Man can be known only by certain external manifestations ; by the body, by his surface. Spiritual and immaterial as the internal principle is, and however elevated by its nature beyond the reach of sense, it is rendered visible and perceptible only by its correspondence with the body where it resides, and in which it acts and moves, as in its proper element. This principle thus becomes a subject of observation ; and every thing in man that can be known, is discovered solely through the medium of the senses." "The organization of man distinguishes him from all the other inhabitants of the globe ; and his physiognomy, by which I mean the surface and the outline of his organization, infinitely exalt him above all the visible beings which exist and live around him. We are acquainted with no form so noble, so sublime, so majestic as his ; with none that contains so many faculties, so many kinds of life, so many degrees of force, so many powers of action."*

* Works, Vol. 1, pp. 14, 15. Edition 1789.

THE DOCTRINE OF TEMPERAMENTS.

The doctrine of temperaments is very ancient. The nomenclature which is used to express them at the present hour is the same as that used more than two thousand years ago. Hippocrates classified all constitutions under four heads, the sanguine, the phlegmatic, the choleric, and the melancholic; and to these several temperaments various intellectual powers and tendencies were ascribed. In modern times the number of temperaments has been increased by several writers. Boerhaave makes eight; namely, the warm, cold, moist, dry, bilious, sanguine, phlegmatic, and atrabilious. Dr. Darwin attempted to improve upon this arrangement, and established only four temperaments, agreeing with irritation, sensation, volition, and association. Dr. Cullen returned to the original system of Hippocrates; which has continued to be adopted, with some modifications, to the present day.

These various temperaments are blended together in various degrees and proportions; and examples may daily be met with of every form of combination. Climate, habit, and education greatly modify the several temperaments.

In an intellectual and moral point of view, the doctrine of temperaments has been subject to considerable discussion. Various mental tendencies and habits are ascribed to different bodily conformations. Hippocrates tells us that the soul is the

same in all mankind, but that there are great physical varieties of constitution which modify and influence its powers and energy.* Democritus affirms that the intellect greatly depends upon the body, the diseases and ailments of which impair its faculties. This subject is treated of by Hoffmann at considerable length. He tells us that the choleric temperament makes good generals, ambassadors, orators, and conductors of public business; that the sanguine temperament is favourable for courtiers; men of a melancholic disposition should be ministers and councillors of state; and that the phlegmatic ought to be made soldiers and labourers.

Dr. Thomas, a French writer, has promulgated a theory on Temperaments, which has excited considerable attention, both in his own country and in Great Britain. He views the human body as consisting of three great groups of organs, each performing distinct offices, and each consisting of many parts. The first part is contained in the cranium, and it manifests itself in the operations of sensation, and of the faculties of the mind generally. The second relates to the organs in the cavity of the thorax, the lungs, and heart, these being appropriated to the general purposes of sanguification and circulation. And the third group is that contained in the abdomen, the organs of which are employed in converting the chyle into food, and in the ordinary purposes of separation and excretion. These three groups constitute all the living energy

* Hipp. De Victus Ratione, lib. 1.

of the physical frame ; and on the various proportions or degrees in which they are blended in individual conformations, depends the specific temperament of the man. When these groups of organs are blended in suitable proportions, then his animal nature presents the most perfect form ; and the intellectual faculties, sufficiently developed, preserve a steady direction, neither urging into vague conjectures on the one hand, nor lapsing into mental apathy or indifference on the other.”*

Several writers on temperaments go more minutely and profoundly into the mental and moral qualities associated with particular bodily organizations. The *choleric* temperament, it is said, displays great susceptibility of feeling, quickness of perception, and energy of action ; and on this account indicates a lofty state of the bodily organs. The prevailing characteristics of this temperament are rapidity, strength, a lively imagination, violent passions, quickness of decision, inflexible perseverance, a tendency to ambition, pride, and anger, joined, however, with a degree of magnanimity and generosity of purpose. These qualities are combined with a physical form of more firmness than grace ; a rather dark and sallow complexion, sparkling eyes, and considerable muscular power. “These men,” says an able writer, “are urged by a constant restlessness to action ; an habitual sentiment of disquietude allows them no peace but in

* “*Physiologie des Tempéramens ou Constitutions, &c.*,” par F. Thomas, Paris, 1826.

the tumult of business ; the hours of crowded life are the only ones they value ; and they are to be found wherever hardness of resolution, prompt decision, and permanence of enterprise, are required." The *phlegmatic* temperament is, in a great measure, the reverse of the choleric. The phlegmatic has little inclination to action ; a very limited portion of sensibility ; no great stock of physical strength or dexterity ; has rather a dull and gloomy appearance ; all the feelings assume a subdued and tranquil tone ; the mind clear but limited ; little imagination and profundity ; and displays a strong disposition to repose and tranquillity. All the vices and virtues of this class of persons are of a mediocre character. The *sanguine* temperament is indicative of a lively susceptibility ; little inclination to action ; promptness without much perseverance ; a lively fancy ; no great depth of thought ; changeable in temper, but not of violent feelings and passions ; a tendency to pleasure, levity, and a fondness for admiration and fame. Persons of this organization are commonly distinguished for beauty and grace ; and the bodily frame bespeaks vigour and vivacity in all its leading functions. They are usually witty, gay, elegant, and engaging in society. The *melancholy* temper has but little susceptibility, but great energy of action ; a reserved and contemplative manner ; great firmness of purpose ; indefatigable perseverance ; profound reflection ; constancy of feeling and of friendship ; an inclination to gloomi-

ness, despondency, asceticism, insanity, and misanthropy.

It is generally conceded that there is much truth in the doctrine of temperaments. Every physician takes it in some measure as a guide in his professional avocations. It is, however, just one of those systems which are liable to fanciful and absurd conclusions, when closely applied to the solution of intellectual phenomena.*

PHYSIOLOGY.

Physiology takes a wider range than physiognomy and the doctrine of temperaments. It embraces nicer and more refined speculations, and is more closely allied to metaphysical disquisitions.

Physiological speculations held an important station among the Greek philosophers. Pythagoras taught that man was a microcosm of the universe; that the human soul was nourished by the blood, and became obedient to the general laws of universal harmony. Alcmaeon considered the brain as the seat of the intellectual powers. Empedocles and Democritus had each their respective theories on the subject. Plato and Aristotle were also great speculators on physiological phenomena; and it was about their era that the cultivators of the science became formally divided into two

* See Hippocrates, "De Natura Hominis," tom. 1; Galen, "De Elementis ex Hippocrate," tom. 1; Oribasius, "Synopsis," lib. 5; Aëtius, "Libri Medicinales," lib. 4; and Haly Abbas, Averroes, Alharavius, Avicenna, Hoffmann, Dr. Pritchard, &c.

classes, the materialists and the spiritualists; a distinction which may be appropriately adopted at the present day.

During the whole of the middle ages, physiology was more or less cultivated; chiefly, however, by the medical faculty. Many theories and systems, of the most wild and fanciful description, sprung up in various countries of Europe; and some of the greatest of our philosophers lent a willing ear to these marvellous delusions. The discoveries in physical science gave a heavy blow to all these learned reveries. About the beginning of the last century, Hoffmann and Stahl commenced their physiological inquiries concerning the principle of life, deriving great advantages from the improvements effected in the physical knowledge of the previous century. Hoffmann conceived that the principle of life or vitality could not be separated from matter, but was one of its essential properties; that life was a series of mutual actions and re-actions between the fluids and the solids of the body; and that all the operations of the body and the mind are the result of this regular and harmonious action. Stahl's hypothesis was of a different cast. He thought that an intelligent soul guided the material forces or powers of the body. The whole structure of the body is a passive instrument, and requires the soul or living agent to impress its power upon it. The soul is the active and foreseeing principle which governs by special laws all those phenomena of human life and action which may be considered as independent of the direct in-

fluence of volition. This faculty of the will is independent, and needs no assistance from anything else. There are two sets of organs on which the soul acts for the sustenance of life; sense and motion. Sensation is modified in two ways; the one in relation to external objects made known to us through the organs of sense, and the other has an exclusive reference to our internal feelings or ideas. "The soul gives to its organs the disposition that is favourable to the sensations it wishes to receive, by virtue of the judgment that it exerts respecting these sensations, before it has experienced them. This judgment is exerted on the relations between the objects that excite these impressions and the actual state of the body; and it is the intuitive knowledge of these relations that determines, in all their infinitely diversified shades, the pleasure or pain which the animal experiences from the objects that surround it."

The speculations of Haller aimed at establishing the position that muscular power was entirely different from the power of feeling, or what we term sensibility. De Whytt and Dr. Cullen opposed this doctrine; but our space will not allow our stating the grounds of this opposition. Dr. Darwin speculated deeply on physiological topics; and his views generally, though decidedly material, were founded upon a more extended examination of mental phenomena than many of his predecessors had referred to. He maintains that all human actions are resolvable into four *sensorial powers*; irritation, sensation, volition, and association. All

our muscular motions, and all our ideas, arise from the power of irritability, and are brought within the sphere of causation from sensation, volition, and habit.

From the commencement of the present century, physiological writers have been numerous, both in Great Britain and on the Continent. Their writings have generally been characterised by great ability; combining an acute and accurate observation of facts, with considerable theoretical dexterity in their generalization.

Bichat's system is worthy of notice, not only for its own sake, but on account of the influence it has had on other speculators of distinction. He describes the living principle to be the result of unknown and unknowable powers; but divides it into two parts, the *animal* and *organic* life.* Each of these is composed of two orders of functions, succeeding each other, and possessed of a mutual relationship. In animal life, the first functional

* "Compare together two individuals, one taken from each of these kingdoms; one exists only within itself, and has no other relation to external objects save those of nutrition. It is born, grows, and perishes, attached to the soil which receives its germ. The other joins to this internal life, an external existence, out of which numerous relations arise between it and surrounding objects: and this existence is united to other beings, and approaches near to, or removes it from them, in accordance with its wants or fears." * * * "I call the functions of the former class, taken altogether, the *organic* life, because all organised beings, whether vegetable or animal, enjoy it in a greater or less degree, and because organic structure is the only condition necessary for its exercise. The assembled functions of the second class form the *animal life*, so named, because it is the exclusive attribute of the animal kingdom." (Bichat, "Physiologie.")

order arises from the exterior of the body to the brain; and the second, from the brain to powers of locomotion. Thus all objects affect successively, the external senses, the nerves, and the brain. The office of the first is to receive, of the second to convey, and of the last to recognise or perceive, which constitutes a *sensation*. All volition centres in the brain. All vital properties may be reduced to two; feeling or sensibility, and moving or contractility. From the former flow all sensations, perceptions, pleasures, and pains. The perfection of every animated being is in proportion to the extent of its sensibility.

Cuvier's system is founded on the speculations of Hunter. The former makes a pointed distinction between the *instinct* of animals and the *reason* of man.*

Mr. Hunter's theory of the living principle is, that it is some agent or other added, by the creative power of God, to the organized structure of man, to guide and direct it to the final purposes for which it is designed. Man is endowed with an intellectual power or faculty, independent of the

* " Cette pensée qui se considère elle-même, cette intelligence qui se voit et qui s'étudie, cette connaissance qui se connaît, forment évidemment un ordre de phénomènes déterminés d'une nature tranchée, et auxquels nul animal ne saurait atteindre. C'est là, si l'on peut ainsi dire, le monde purement intellectuel, et ce monde n'appartient qu'à l'homme. En un mot, les animaux sentent, connaissent, pensent; mais l'homme est le seul de tous les êtres créés à qui le pouvoir ait été donné de sentir qu'il sent, de connaître qu'il connaît, et de penser qu'il pense." (Résumé Analytique des Observations de Frédéric Cuvier sur l'Instinct et l'Intelligence des Animaux. Par P. Flourens. p. 55.)

mere animal life which he has in common with other animated creatures. The late Dr. Abernethy adopts this doctrine, and has publicly defended it in his "Enquiry;" a work of considerable merit.* He says, "Thus my mind rests at peace in thinking on the subject of life, as it has been taught by Mr. Hunter; and I am visionary enough to imagine, that if these opinions should become so established as to be generally admitted by philosophers,—that if they once saw reason to believe that life was something of an invisible and active nature superadded to organization,—they would then see equal reason to believe that mind might be superadded, as life is, to structure. They would then indeed still farther perceive how mind and matter might reciprocally operate on each other by means of an intervening substance. Thus even would physiological researches enforce the belief which I may say is natural to man; that in addition to his bodily frame, he possesses a sensitive, intelligent, and independent mind; an opinion which tends in an eminent degree to produce virtuous, honourable, and useful actions."†

A short time after these opinions were promulgated, Dr. Lawrence published his "Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology," 1816, in which he advances doctrines diametrically opposed to those of Hunter and Abernethy. This led to a public controversy, which created some

* "An Enquiry into the Probability and Rationality of Mr. Hunter's Theory of Life," London, 1814.

† "Enquiry," &c. p. 94.

sensation at the time. Lawrence's opinions are decidedly material. He says, "The *cerebral functions*, which are much more numerous and diversified in the higher orders of the Mammalia, than in any of the preceding divisions of the animal kingdom, receive their last development in man; where they produce all the phenomena of intellect, all those wonderful processes of thought, known under the names of memory, reflection, association, judgment, reasoning, imagination; which so far transcend any analogous appearance in animals, that we *almost* feel a repugnance to refer them to the same principle. If therefore we were to follow strictly the great series of living bodies through its whole extent, we should see its vital properties gradually increased in number and energy from the last of plants, the mosses or the algæ, to the first of animals, man." Here we have the old material hypothesis again revived; an hypothesis as old as philosophy itself. It has been attacked and refuted a thousand times over, but Mr. Lawrence approaches the question as if nothing had ever been said on the matter. His observations assume the aspect of a first discovery.*

* "Mr. Lawrence, it will instantly be recollected by every reader, whatever other merit may belong to him, has not that of being the inventor of these doctrines. They are as old as any on record, and have been advanced and confuted, and revived and driven into obscurity, again and again. In the present instance, Mr. Lawrence has copied them, and even the terms in which he has expressed them, from the school of modern French philosophy. Indeed, this is not the first occasion on which he has consented to become a mere copyist, and for the purpose of propagating these worn-out but mischievous opinions; he is understood

The "Sketches on the Philosophy of Life," 1819, by Sir T. C. Morgan, advance the same material opinions as those entertained by Dr. Lawrence, only the Baronet does not develop them with so much propriety and clearness. A line or two may be quoted from him, fully significant of the general tenor of his speculations. "Essentially linked with the power of locomotion, relative sensibility is distributed to the different animals in an exact proportion to the wants of their organization; being resident in a tissue, whose development is regulated in the various species, by the sphere of activity necessary to their preservation." * * * "There is in all animals a preponderance of some viscus (in the brain) which gives it a lead in the organization." * * * "The proposition of a Deity, without parts or dimensions, approaches to absolute Atheism." * * * "The distinction between material and spiritual beings, is made a watch-word for fanaticism and persecution."*

One of the most able and candid writers on Physiology of our own day is Dr. Pritchard, whose treatise on the *vital principle* is worthy of an especial and careful perusal. He maintains the

to be the writer of several articles on life, and other subjects connected with it, in the interminable Encyclopedia of Dr. Rees, in which the same principles are maintained, and in which Mr. Rennell has discovered, that he has translated whole sections from M. Bichat, without the slightest acknowledgment; and we have traced him in like manner, still more frequently transcribing into his own pages materials of the same description from the free-thinking physiologists of Germany." (Quarterly Review for July, 1819.)

* "Sketches," &c. pp. 276, 365.

distinct existence of mind, and shews, in a variety of instances, that its connection with the nervous influence is very circumscribed and partial. He makes the following remarks at the close of his work.

“ If the observations offered in the present section are well founded, it must be allowed that philosophers have generally gone too far, either on one side or on the other, in their speculations on the mind, and in the instruments by which its phenomena are brought about. Some have represented it as more independent of the body than it really is; while the greater number, including many writers on the physiology of the nervous system, have been mistaken in viewing the brain as the agent in all the intellectual and other mental processes, merely from having found reason to conclude that impressions and ideas require the co-operation of its organic structure. The higher powers of the mind, those in which the will sits in operation; those in which the mind is active rather than is acted upon, as when it reflects, reasons, deliberates, judges, or pronounces respecting true or false, right or wrong, or creates a world of its own in imagination—all these faculties, or modes of mental exertion, as well as the simple operation of the will itself, on which depends our moral responsibility, are entirely exempt from the evidence of any connexion with instrumental processes; or, at least, of immediate dependence upon the organized structure of the

||

20

brain; they are, as far as we know, modes of operation of the immaterial mind or soul. But, in order that they may produce results which are cognizable by our senses, they require the subsequent aid of corporal organs."*

Dr. Carpenter's work, "Human Physiology," is also an important one in support of the spirituality of the mind. Nothing can be more satisfactory than his arguments and illustrations as to the distinct existence and manifestations of the thinking principle.

The reader will find much interesting discussion on several leading points relating to this subject, in Messrs. Todd and Bowman's "Physiology." They come to the conclusion, that the process of thought is necessarily and constantly connected with the convolutions of the brain; but in what way, or by what means, nothing is proved. They observe: "Thus anatomy leads to the conclusion that the operations of the mind are associated with the convolutions. These parts, in the language of Cuvier, are the sole receptacle in which the various sensations may be, as it were, consummated, and become perceptible to the animal. It is in these that all sensations take a distinct form, and leave lasting traces of their impression; they serve as a seat to memory, a property by means of which the animal is furnished with materials for his judgments. When the membranes of the brain are in

* "A Review of the Doctrine of a Vital Principle," pp. 190, 191.

a state of inflammation, disturbance of the mental faculties is an invariable accompaniment, to an extent proportional to the degree of cerebral irritation; and more especially so when the inflammation is seated in the pia mater* of the convolutions. It is plain that, in such a case, the delirium arises from the altered state of the circulation in the grey matter of the convolutions, the blood-vessels of which are immediately derived from those of the pia mater, so that the one cannot be affected without the other likewise suffering. We learn from the most trustworthy reports of the dissections of the brains of lunatics, that there is invariably found more or less disease of the vesicular surface, and of the pia mater and arachnoid in connection with it, denoted by opacity or thickening of the latter, with altered colour or consistence of the former. From these premises it may be laid down as a just conclusion, that the convolutions of the brain are *the centre of intellectual action*: or more strictly, that this centre consists in that vast sheet of vesicular matter which crowns the convoluted surface of the hemispheres. Every idea of the mind is associated with a corresponding change in some part or parts of this vesicular surface. * * * The action of the convoluted surface of the brain, and of the fibres connected with it, is altogether of the mental kind. The physical changes in these parts give rise to a corresponding manifestation of ideas; nor is it likely that

* The covering membranes.

any thought, however simple, is unaccompanied by change in this centre."*

Several other works on Physiology have recently made their appearance in London, possessing considerable merit, but comparatively limited in their range relative to metaphysical purposes. They all view man through the organs of sensation ; seldom lose sight of the body in contemplating the powers and faculties of the mind ; and have an invariable tendency to materialize, to a certain extent, our thoughts and opinions on human nature. Nothing can be further from the wish of most of these writers, than to impart to their investigations any influence which could be considered decidedly inimical to the true interests and happiness of man. The imperfection which, we conceive, belongs to these respective works, is fairly attributable to the instruments which the writers have to use, and the philosophical method they pursue, to obtain a desirable physical end or purpose ; the health and well-being of the body.†

As we very clearly perceive, from the foregoing observations in this Chapter, physiologists are divided into two principal classes ; the materialists and the spiritualists : those who consider mind, in all its aspects or developments, to be a mere pro-

* Physiology, Vol. I. p. 364.

† The following are some of the treatises here alluded to :—Meryon's "Physical and Intellectual Constitution of Man ;" Messrs. Yarnold and Bushman, "On the Philosophy of Reason and Instinct ;" Dr. Moore, "On the Power of the Soul over the Body," "The Use of the Body in relation to the Mind," and "Man and his Motives ;" Newnham, "On the Reciprocal Influence of Body and Mind ;" Renou's "Delineations, Physical, Intellectual, and Moral."

perty of matter; and those who view it as an immaterial creation superadded to the functions of animal life. There are, however, many intermediate classes, whose creed arises from a blending of the material and thinking principles in various indefinite and irregular proportions. These run into each other by imperceptible degrees; and can only be formally or conditionally classified under the two chief and extreme orders of physiological speculators.

It may be affirmed, with some degree of confidence, that all physical inquiries into the nature and laws of the vital principle, have a strong materializing tendency. This arises from the very nature of things. The physiologist is perpetually dealing with secondary causes. The great mass of physiological writers are of the medical profession; and their daily and hourly thoughts are directed to the operations of mind viewed in conjunction with diseased functions of the body. They are never in a situation to consider mind in its healthful state, in a sound and vigorous constitution. The latter condition is the exception, and the former is the rule. This gives a peculiar colouring to all their speculations and statements of facts. Of all classes of professional men, physicians are the least able, from the mere mechanical routine of their occupation, to form just and comprehensive conclusions in reference to mental phenomena as they are developed in large masses of men. Minute details are the staple articles of their mental life. And hence it is,

that, in perusing physiological treatises written by medical men, where there is even no wish to depart, in point of principle, from the standards of spiritual orthodoxy, we find that they seldom raise their minds above matters of professional detail, or grasp and unfold those general principles of intellectual thought, which form the every-day guide and rule of action of the bulk of mankind. Such writers, whatever their acquirements and abilities may be, are borne down by the overwhelming influences of the dissecting-room, or the unhealthy mental atmosphere of the hospital. They have always some strange and anomalous cases to state, arising out of functional derangements of body or mind; and the more *outré* and marvellous they are, the more *éclat* is expected from their formal publication. As pathological data, these are both interesting and important; but they have no more to do with the unfettered and healthful investigations of mind, than the mutterings of the maniac have to do with the conclusions of the rational understanding.

This constitutional bias of the medical mind in favour of material opinions, may be also easily accounted for from the nature of the elementary instruction it receives. A young man quits school, with perhaps a good classical education, and a limited knowledge of mathematics; and at the age of sixteen or seventeen goes into a surgeon's establishment, where he devotes himself assiduously to the preparation of his master's prescriptions; and, during his leisure hours, has to acquire a

knowledge of anatomy, chemistry, and other essential studies connected with his profession. He is daily thinking of matter and its properties. His mind can never get beyond this material boundary. All his future prospects depend upon the quantity and accuracy of his physical acquirements; on the living and dead attributes of the human frame, and the chemical action of bodies. His reading must be solely confined to the perusal of Hippocrates, Galen, Boerhaave, Hunter, Abernethy, and other illustrious cultivators of the healing art. Were he to take a fancy to think or read anything about mind, *as mind*, he would stand a fair chance of being rejected at Apothecaries' Hall, and be considered by his master as a dull and stupid pupil. A few years roll on; and, under favourable auspices, he passes his examination as a Surgeon; obtains a diploma at the Royal College; establishes a good practice; and at the age, say of thirty-five or forty, has a few hours a-day to devote to discursive reading as he travels in his carriage from one patient to another. It may readily be considered, especially by those who have a competent knowledge of what studies on mental philosophy really are, how unfitted, from long established habits, a mind thus trained must be, to enter upon investigations of a purely intellectual character. Success in such a field of inquiry, under circumstances like these, could be only obtained in spite of all the established laws of matter and mind.

And does not a history of physiological and metaphysical speculations fully bear out the general correctness of this representation? It is a curious and interesting fact, that notwithstanding all the advantages which physiology has derived from the improvements of chemical science, and human and comparative anatomy, it has not thrown any light whatever upon a single faculty of the mind, or enabled us to ascertain its laws of action with more accuracy and precision than men were able to do two thousand years ago. What has the discovery of what are called the *sympathetic*, the *sensitive*, and the *motor* nerves done for mental philosophy? Does it throw the slightest ray of light upon the great principles of metaphysical science? Certainly not. And were the observations of the physiologist multiplied a thousand-fold, both in number and minuteness, he would fail to draw any conclusion from his facts which could bear upon the operations of mind. In fact, he cultivates a comparatively sterile and barren soil; he moves in a wrong direction. Mind can only be known by an inward operation; not from the scalping-knife, the retort, or the microscope. It sets at nought all these material attempts to penetrate into its secrets. We have the results of physiology before us. We cannot lay our finger upon a single metaphysical publication by a professed physiologist, from the earliest dawn of philosophy to the present hour, with the exception of Locke's Essay, (and Locke was only a medical and

physiological amateur), which is worthy of any degree of attention, or which displays any lofty specimens of theoretical or ratiocinative power. Every thing, under the influence of such pens, dwindles either into common-place anatomical and medical twaddle, or into fanciful and untenable theories. This is not a question as to the comparative intellectual talents of certain classes of men ; but solely as to the field of their observations and inquiries. It is just as vain and hopeless a task to attempt to explain intellectual phenomena by minute examinations into the laws of chemical, electrical, or mesmeric agencies, as it is to calculate the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites by the same method. The philosophical *method* of investigation is precisely the same in both cases, and its application is completely nugatory beyond the sphere of what is tangible and material.

We have no wish whatever to speak lightly of physiological investigations ; they are laudable and highly important in their own sphere. Their real bearings, however, on mental science, are but few and unimportant. Physiology is, and ever must be, strictly a branch of medical knowledge ; it relates to the body, and only to the mind in its more palpable and grosser feelings or attributes. No man has ever ventured to apply any physiological hypothesis to the solution or explanation of mental operations, as these develop themselves in the higher functions of thought, in morals, social or political philosophy, or in theology, without ex-

citing the risibility of mankind. All such efforts are repudiated the moment they are propounded. And here it is that every mental theory founded on a miscellaneous collection of physical facts and observations, displays its weakness and incompetency to solve the great problems connected with human existence, happiness, and improvement.

MESMERISM.

Mesmerism is another physiological offshoot, which has, particularly within the last ten years, excited a great deal of attention among scientific persons in all the countries of Europe. Its bearings on doctrines and theories relative to the nature and faculties of mind, are not very direct or important; but still they are of such a character as to entitle the subject to a brief notice in a history of speculative opinions. All mesmeric phenomena rest upon a single principle, *the effect of one body or mind upon another body or mind*. The mysteries connected with the subject are numerous, and as yet inexplicable; but certain facts seem to be now generally admitted by a number of professional gentlemen, who have devoted themselves to a candid examination of the subject. That a great deal of quackery and deception has been connected with it, particularly within the last few years, is undeniable; but still there is a substratum of facts on which the system rests, which, when viewed in relation to medical and intellectual phi-

losophy, is worthy of the fair and dispassionate consideration of every philosophical inquirer.

Facts connected with mesmeric speculations have been noticed from the earliest periods of history. The influence of the *hand* over diseases of the body is mentioned by many Greek and Roman authors; and even at the present hour forms a branch of medical practice in several countries. The proverbial wisdom of Solon deigned not to reject humble knowledge of this kind; for in some verses ascribed to him, which have been translated by Stanley,* the Grecian lawgiver says,

“The smallest hurts sometimes increase and rage
More than all art of physic can assuage;
Sometimes the fury of the worst disease,
The hand, by gentle stroking, will appease.”

We are told that Asclepiades, who acquired great reputation at Rome as a physician, recommended frictions, in certain chronic affections, to be continued until the patient falls fast asleep. Tacitus and Suetonius mention two magnetic cures, performed by the Emperor Vespasian at Alexandria.† The Chaldean priests, the Indian Brahmins, and the Persi, practised the same mode of curing certain diseases; and the Jesuit missionaries tell us that bodily ailments are removed by the imposition of

* History of Philosophy, 1666.

† Tacit. Hist. 4. 81; Suet. in Vespas. 7, §§ 5. 6.

hands, throughout the whole of the Chinese Empire.*

During the earlier part of the Middle Ages, speculations on the influences of material bodies on mind were pursued with considerable ardour, in some localities. Inquiries were extended to the powers of the will, and the effects of metallic substances on the frame; and thus the sphere of observation became wider and more varied. In St. Augustine's work, "*De Civitate Dei*," two cases are recorded, illustrative of the surprising effects of concentrated volition; one of a man who could perspire whenever he chose; and the other of a Priest, named Restitutus, who could throw himself into a state of complete insensibility, and appear as if entirely deprived of life, solely from an exercise of his will. Avicenna, the Arabian philosopher, in his *De Animalibus*, affirms that he knew a man, who could paralyse his limbs at pleasure, by a simple act of volition.†

In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, animal magnetism and mesmeric inquiries were zealously pursued, both on the Continent and in Great Britain. The names of Pomponatius, Rodolphus Goelenius, Athanasius Kircher, Van

* See Sprengel's, "*Geschichte der Medicin*," and Snorro Sturluson's *History of the Scandinavian Kings*.

† Dr. J. C. Passavant, "*Untersuchungen über den Lebens-magnetismus und das Hellsche*," Frankfort, 1821; Brandis, "*Ueber Psychische Heilmittel und Magnetismus*," Copenhagen, 1818; and Delrio, "*Disquisit. Magicæ*," Mogunt. 1606, tom. 1, p. 66.

Helmont, Sir Kenelm Digby, William Maxwell, J. G. Burgraaue, Sebastian Wirdig, Joannes Bohnius, Jul. Cæs. Vaninius, C. Agrippa, Christopher Irving, N. Papin, Fludd, &c., are well known in connection with the history of this class of opinions.*

About the middle of the seventeenth century, some sensation was created in London by one Levret, a gardener, Valentine Greentrakes an Irish gentleman, and Dr. Streper, who severally pretended to exercise considerable mesmeric action over persons afflicted with certain diseases.† In the last century the subject assumed a more definite and systematic form, under the hand of Mesmer, who has given his name to this branch of human observation and inquiry. Fred. Anth. Mesmer was a native of Switzerland, and born in 1734. He studied physic at Vienna, and

* Petrus Pomponatius, "De Incantationibus," Basil, 1567; Rod. Goclenii, "Tract de Manget. vuln. curat." Marburgi, 1608, et Francof. 1613; Athan. Kircher, "Magnes, sive de Arte Magnetica," Coloniae, 1643, et Romæ, 1654; "Magneticum Naturæ Regnum, &c.," Amst. 1667; Van Helmont, "De Magnet. Vuln. Curatione," Paris, 1621; K. Digby, "Of the Cure of Wounds by the Power of Sympathy," London, 1660; Gul. Maxwell, "Medicinæ Magneticæ libri tres, &c.," Frankf. 1679; J. G. Burgraaue, "Biolychnium, seu lucerna vitæ, cui accessit Cura Morborum Magnetica," 1629; Sebastian Wirdig, "Nova Medicina Spirituum," Hamb. 1673; Bohnius, "De Spirituum Animalium Medela," Hamb. 1688; Jul. Cæs. Vaninius, "De Admir. Naturæ arcan.," C. Agrippa ab Nettesheym, "De Occulta Philosophia."

† See Pechlinus in his work, entitled, "Observationum Physico-Medicarum libri tres," Hamb. 1691, where an account is given of Greentrakes; also a work written by himself, called, "A Brief Account of Mr. Valentine Greentrakes," London, 1666.

for some years settled there; but having written a treatise "On the Influence of the Planets on the Human Body," it excited so much ridicule among his professional brethren, that he was determined to leave the capital forthwith; but through the influence of some kind friends he was constrained to remain for the present. Having formed an acquaintance with the Jesuit, Maximilian Helb, a native of Hungary, and a man of talent and learning, Mesmer resorted to the use of the *magnet* in the cure of diseases; and, at Paris, in 1770, published his "Mémoire sur la Découverte du Magnétisme Animal." This gave rise to the *Animal Magnetism*, with the history of which almost every reader is, in some measure, familiar. A great sensation was excited in Paris, among the members of the medical profession particularly, which gave rise to various and conflicting opinions. A public commission was appointed, composed of the most distinguished men of the capital, to test the merits of Mesmer's system; and after a long inquiry, his theory was pronounced to be unsatisfactory and delusive.*

* The following statements will point out the specific objects and nature of this Report:—

1. Le fluide, que les commissaires nomment fluide magnétique animal, n'existe pas, car il échappe à tous les sens.

2. Ce fluide échappant à tous les sens, son existence ne peut être démontré que par les effets curatifs dans le traitement des maladies, ou par les effets momentanés sur l'économie animale. Il faut exclure de ces deux preuves le traitement des maladies, parcequ'il ne peut fournir que des résultats toujours incertains et souvent trompeurs.

3. Les véritables preuves, les preuves purement physiques de l'existence de ce fluide, sont les effets momentanés sur le corps animal.

After this decision, the subject seems to have lost much of its interest. We hear little of its advocates, until it was again revived by the Academy of Medicine at Paris, in 1825. A Report was then made containing thirty distinct statements, the following are worthy of especial notice.

“We have constantly seen ordinary sleep, which is the repose of the organs of the senses, of the intellectual faculties, and of the voluntary movements, precede and terminate the state of somnambulism.”

“Whilst they are in this state of somnambulism, the magnetised persons we have observed retain the exercise of the faculties which they have whilst awake. Their memory even appears to be more faithful and more extensive, since they remember what has passed during all the time and on every occasion that they have been in the state of somnambulism.”

“We have seen two somnambulists distinguish with their eyes shut, the objects placed before them; they have told, without touching them, the

Pour s'assurer de ces effets, les commissaires ont fait des épreuves, (1.) Sur eux-mêmes; (2.) sur sept malades; (3.) sur quatre personnes; (4.) sur une société assemblée chez M. Franklin; (5.) sur des malades assemblés chez M. Jumelin; (6.) avec un arbre magnétisé; (7.) enfin sur différens sujets.

4. De ces expériences, les commissaires ont conclu, que l'imagination fait tout, que le Magnétisme est nul. Imagination, imitation, attouchement, telles sont les vraies causes des effets attribués au Magnétisme Animal.

5. Les procédés du Magnétisme étant dangereux, il suit que tout traitement public où les moyens du Magnétisme seroient employés, ne peut avoir à la longue que des effets funestes.

colour and value of the cards; they have read words traced with the hand, or some lines of books opened by mere chance. This phenomenon took place even when the opening of the eyelids was accurately closed by means of the fingers."

"We met in two somnambulists the power of foreseeing acts of the organism more or less distant, more or less complicated. One of them announced several days, nay, several months beforehand, the day, the hour, and the minute when epileptic fits would come on and return; the other declared the time of the cure. Their previsions were realised with remarkable exactness. They seemed to us to apply only to acts or lesions of their organism."

"The commission has not been able to verify, for the want of opportunity, other powers which magnetisers have declared to exist in somnambulists; but it has collected and communicated facts sufficiently important to induce it to think that *the Academy should encourage the researches on Magnetism, as a very curious branch of psychology and natural history.*"

After this Report was made, experiments in mesmerism were simultaneously instituted in various parts of England, France, and America, without any pre-concerted arrangement, and with nearly similar results. Mr. Brooks of Manchester entered zealously into the subject, and made some important discoveries; and Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Prideaux, Captain Valliant, and Dr. Elliotson prosecuted the inquiry with great ardour. A distinguished French mesmerist was introduced to

University College, London, under the patronage of Dr. Elliotson; and this circumstance brought the new science prominently before the public, and excited general discussion in every quarter. Lectures were delivered in almost every town in England; and even the dignitaries of the Church extended their fostering care to the infant science.* Every ordinary reader is fully aware of the share of public attention which has been directed, within these four or five years, to the subject; of the various bitter rivalships and contentions it has created; and of the discordant opinions it has evoked. To these matters, however, we cannot possibly make any direct allusion. So far as the science of mind is concerned, we shall offer a few general and concluding observations on the nature of mesmeric phenomena, considered as a system of philosophy.

Within these few years, several writers and patrons of mesmerism have viewed the subject as very important in relation to the abstract nature of mind. They have considered it as demonstrative of the *immateriality* of its nature, and consequently of its *immortality*. They have encouraged and fostered it, with a hope of banishing for ever all the various shades of the doctrines of materialism, and of placing the phenomena of body and mind, whether jointly or separately developed, upon a

* Mr. Brooks, of Manchester, attended the Bishop of Oxford for several weeks, to initiate him into the mysteries of the science; and the learned Prelate invited numerous parties of his friends to witness the experiments.

solid foundation. These advocates of the new science argue, that all mesmeric phenomena demonstrate this general fact, *that the mind receives impressions from other minds*, as well as from external objects through the medium of our organs of sensation. The mesmeric individual sees without eyes, hears without ears, and tastes without the aid of the palate. These facts show that the mind can operate, and display the higher qualities of its nature, without the assistance of corporeal organs. How could a mind communicate with other minds; be influenced by the mere will of another;—how interpret the thoughts, desires, ideas of those around, by the mere affection of a fibre or a nerve? The thing is impossible. Whatever does this, cannot be a material object,—cannot be matter in any shape or form. It is the result of mind, soul, spirit; not an object to see, weigh in a balance, or handle; which terminates its existence with the body; but something immaterial, invisible, and immortal. On the doctrine that mind and body are two different substances, many important questions hinge; and on this ground, it is contended, it is of the greatest moment that we should hail every philosophical inquiry with delight, which is calculated, however remotely, to throw light upon subjects of such vital importance to human interests, feelings, and happiness.*

* “In the higher degrees of *animal magnetism* we may find a complete practical refutation of all the material theories of the human mind, an impressive proof of the independence of the soul, and the strongest grounds for presuming its immortality; since it has been demonstrated

Again, it may be remarked, that at the present moment many advocates for mesmeric action entertain more rational views of its nature and uses than generally prevailed a short time since, during the fit of feverish excitement which it created throughout Europe. On the important and curious doctrine of *clairvoyance*, there is now a great change of opinion; and so far as it can be embodied from the mass of mesmeric philosophers, it seems to proclaim that the doctrine is grounded on sheer folly and delusion. Dr. Braid, of Manchester, a zealous mesmerist, thus expresses himself on this point in the *Medical Times* for January, 1844. "One of the most interesting and important phenomena connected with hypnotism, is that extraordinary activity of the imagination, whereby ideas excited in the minds, whether from recalled past impressions, or by oral suggestion, or otherwise, are instantly invested with all the attributes of reality. From this cause patients make very striking remarks, not from any desire to deceive others, but because they are self-deceived; the extreme vividness of their ideas leading them, at

beyond the possibility of rational doubt, that, in its manifestations, it is not confined to any one particular portion of the corporeal organism, and that it is capable of exercising its functions without the use of any of those material organs, by means of which it usually maintains a correspondence with the external world."—(Report on the experiments of Animal Magnetism, by J. C. Colquhoun, Esq., Edinburgh, 1833.)

"In eo tamen Wienholt adsentior, et his phenomenis ali immortalitatis spem ac augeri; cum nullum supersit dubium, posse nos sentire ac percipere sine ullo organorum externorum commercio."—(Sprengel, Inst. Med. p. 311.)

the moment, to believe as real what are only the figments of fancy. Thus, name any person, place, or thing, and instantly they will imagine they *see* or *hear* them, and will probably enter into elaborate descriptions regarding them. I have thus astonished many persons by descriptions which patients have given of various circumstances and places; but, in the end, I have convinced them that it was only shrewd guessing, or imaginary descriptions. *I have never yet seen any decided case of clairvoyance*; every attempt of the sort resulting in the conviction, that what at first *appeared* to be so, was nothing but guessing, an act of memory, and describing the figments of fancy as real; or from extreme exaltation of some of the senses enabling the patients to discover by smell, touch, or hearing, heat and cold, what we naturally judge by the sight."

Thus the current of opinion, in England at least, is decidedly in favour, at the present moment, of the notion, that all mesmeric phenomena are only more striking exemplifications of the old doctrine of *sympathy*; a doctrine as antiquated as philosophy itself, and which has been theorised upon in a variety of ways. The state of facts and opinions is, however, in such a position, that it would be gross dogmatism to offer any decided judgment upon their nature and bearings in reference to the important study of mental science. Our decisions must be the result of further and careful inquiry.

On a subject of this nature, I shall make no apology for introducing a few observations from

the pen of the late Mr. Dugald Stewart, as they are marked with that dispassionate candour and soundness of judgment, which commonly characterise all his mental disquisitions. "Among all the phenomena, however," says Mr. Stewart, "to which the subject of imitation has led our attention, none are, perhaps, so wonderful as those which have been recently brought to light, in consequence of the philosophical inquiries occasioned by the medical pretensions of Mesmer and his associates. That these pretensions involved much of ignorance, or of imposture, or of both, in their authors, has, I think, been fully demonstrated in the very able report of the French Academicians; but does it follow from this, that the *facts* witnessed and authenticated by these Academicians should share in the disgrace incurred by the empirics who disguised or misrepresented them? For my own part, it appears to me, that the general conclusions established by Mesmer's practice, with respect to the physical effects of the principle of imitation and of the faculty of imagination, (more particularly in cases where they co-operate together,) are incomparably more curious, than if he had actually demonstrated the existence of his boasted fluid. Nor can I see any good reason why a physician, who admits the efficacy of the *moral* agents employed by Mesmer, should, in the exercise of his profession, scruple to copy whatever processes are necessary for subjecting them to his command; any more than he would hesitate about employing a new *physical* agent, such as electricity

or galvanism. The arguments to the contrary, alleged by the Commissioners, only show that the influence of imagination and of imitation is susceptible of a great abuse in ignorant or in wicked hands ;—and may not the same thing be said of all the most valuable remedies we possess ? Nay, are not the mischievous consequences which have actually been occasioned by the pretenders to *animal magnetism*, the strongest of all encouragements to attempt such an examination of the principles upon which the effects really depend, as may give to scientific practitioners the management of agents so peculiarly efficacious and overbearing ? Is not this mode of reasoning perfectly analogous to that upon which medical inquiries are accustomed to proceed, when they discover any new substance possessed of *poisonous* qualities ? Is not this considered as a strong presumption, at least that it is capable of being converted into a vigorous remedy, if its appropriate and specific disorder could only be traced ; and has it not often happened, that the prosecution of this idea has multiplied the resources of the healing art ?”*

* * See Note M. at the End of this Volume.

* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. 3, pp. 221. 222.

CHAPTER IX.

PHRENOLOGY.

PHRENOLOGY is, properly speaking, only a branch of physiology; but it has of late years been so prominently brought before public attention, has excited so much discussion and controversy, and professes, moreover, to offer such a solution of great metaphysical problems, that a separate notice of it seems especially called for in a work of this nature. We regret, however, that our limits will not permit our entering so fully into the subject as we could wish; but we shall endeavour to place the most prominent and important points of the science before the reader's attention.

The phrenologists, like some of their other physiological brethren, lay claim to antiquity for their speculations. Among the Grecian philosophers, conjectures on the nature and mental offices of the brain were not unknown. It is said, that Aristotle taught, that the anterior ventricle of the brain was the peculiar residence of *common-sense*;

the second ventricle, the seat of *imagination*, *judgment*, and *reflection*; and the third ventricle was sacred to *memory*. Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa in the reign of Theodosius, substantially promulgated the same doctrine, and maintained that all sensations had their seat in the anterior ventricles of the cranium, that memory resided in the middle ventricles, and the understanding in the posterior ones. We are told by Baptista Porta, that Adamantus, a noted Greek physician, who flourished about the fifth century, speculated to a considerable extent on the mental functions of the brain. Rhazes, an Arabian physician, who lived in the middle of the ninth century, was a phrenologist of some skill. He considered a head of a moderate size and of proportional rotundity, compressed a little at each ear, as possessing the most perfect indications of intellectual power.* Bernard Gordon, a Scotchman, wrote a work in 1296, entitled, "*Affectus præter Naturam Curandi Methodus*," in which the same views are developed on the structure of the brain. He says, *common-sense* resides in the anterior part of the first ventricle of this organ, and that its province is to take notice of the various forms or images received through the different senses, and to express a judgment upon them. In the posterior part of the same ventricle lies *Phantasia*, which preserves, as in a storehouse, the images which the senses furnish. *Imaginativa* occupies the an-

* Baptista Porta, "*De Humana Physiognomia*," Vico, 1596.

terior departments of the second ventricle; and its office is to arrange and consolidate our ideas or perceptions. The faculty named *Æstimatoria* lies in the posterior portion of the same ventricle, and its especial function is to deal with all those instinctive moral feelings and emotions necessary for the maintenance of the social and political institutions of mankind. In the third ventricle we find *Memory*, without which all the other faculties would be useless. The author also wrote another work, called "*Lilium Medicinæ*," in 1305, in which many curious observations will be found, bearing on phrenological opinions. What is remarkable, however, in reference to this writer is, that he conceived all his three primary organs or ventricles as completely material and corruptible, and as possessing no power of themselves in making us acquainted with an external world. Another higher and heavenly power, called *intellect*, is necessary to the operations of thought; the power which *makes use of the organs*, but is altogether independent of them. Gordon is, therefore, a decided phrenological spiritualist.

About the same period, Albertus Magnus speculated on the mental functions of the brain; and it is said, that he delineated upon the figure of a head all the several parts in which the different faculties of the mind resided. In 1491, Peter Montagnana published a work on the same subject, which is highly spoken of by some phrenologists.

Andrew Vesalius or Wessel, a native and physician of Brussels, published his "*De Humani*

Corporis Fabrica," at Basle, in 1542. In this work, the author maintains, that the air we breathe, penetrating through the eustachian tubes, is, by a rarified process, rendered fit for the brain, and enters into the first and second ventricles, and forms the *animal spirits*. These pass on into the third ventricle, and into the ventricle of the cerebellum, from which a portion of them is transmitted into the medulla oblongata, and into the nerves springing from it. He refers to the opinions of Aristotle on the subject, and to those of Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Albertus.*

In the year 1562, Lodovico Dolce, a Venetian author, in a work entitled, "Dialogo di M. Lodovico Dolce, nel quale si ragiona del modo di accrescere e conservar la memoria," revived the doctrines of Gordon on the nature of the brain and the mental faculties. Dolce gives a sketch of a head much after the same fashion as Dr. Gall has given.

Towards the latter part of the seventeenth century, Dr. Willis, of Oxford, published a work on the nature of the animal spirits, and the uses of the brain. He maintains that the most active and volatile particles of the blood rise towards the head. This arises chiefly from the anatomical structure of man. The brain he divides into two parts. These are again subdivided into separate organs; and he then proceeds to promulgate several speculative notions on the nature of the convolutions of

* *De Humani Corporis Fabrica*, lib. 7, c. 6, "Ventricularum Usus."

the brain, and their connection with certain mental phenomena.

In the year 1810, Drs. Gall and Spurzheim published in conjunction the first volume of their system, under the following title, "*Anatomie et Physiologie du Système nerveux en général, et du Cerveau en particulier, avec des observations sur la possibilité de reconnaître plusieurs dispositions intellectuelles et morales de l'Homme et des Animaux par la Configuration de leurs têtes.*" The second volume of this work appeared in 1812. Dr. Spurzheim published also another in 1815, called "*The Physiognomical System of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, founded on Anatomical and Physiological examinations of the nervous system in general, and of the brain in particular, and indicating the dispositions and manifestations of the mind.*" These publications excited considerable attention throughout Europe, and also in America; and from this period to the present day, phrenology has assumed the position of a legitimate subject of philosophical inquiry.

The fundamental principle of all phrenological speculations is, that the nature of man, like every other part of animated creation, is of a fixed and determinate character; and the faculties with which he is endowed are fitted for specific purposes, and are, properly speaking, *innate*, or constitutional. There is nothing about his physical or mental powers of an accidental or adventitious nature; every thing is the result of the peculiar organization with which he has been endowed. The brain is

the source of animal and mental action ; and is mapped out, as most general readers are aware, into the following divisions.

1st, The organ of *Amativeness*. 2nd, *Philoprogenitiveness*, or love of offspring. 3rd, *Inhabitiveness*, or the propensity displayed by some animals to live in high or elevated situations. 4th, The organ of *Adhesiveness*, or the desire to attach ourselves to persons or objects. 5th, *Combaticiveness*, or the inclination to fight, and be embroiled in contentions. 6th, *Destructiveness*, or the desire of destroying life. 7th, *Constructiveness*, or a disposition to apply oneself to the mechanical arts. 8th, *Covetiveness*, or the desire to covet, to amass, or acquire. 9th, The organ of *Secretiveness*, to conceal. 10th, *Self-esteem*, or *Self-love*. 11th, *Love of Approbation*, or the pleasure we derive from the commendations we receive from others. 12th, Organ of *Cautiousness*. 13th, *Benevolence*, or meekness and gentleness of disposition. 14th, The organ of *Veneration*, by which we worship the Deity, and material objects. 15th, *Hope*. 16th, *Ideality*, or the poetical disposition. 17th, The faculty of *Conscientiousness*, or of justice and equality. 18th, *Determinativeness*, or firmness of character or purpose. 19th, *Individuality*, or the power we possess of knowing external things. 20th, The organ of *Form*, by which we take cognizance of the forms of external objects. 21st, *Size*, that power which seizes hold of dimensions. 22nd, *Weight*, that power by which we estimate weight, density, resistance, &c. 23rd, *Colour*, the

faculty of perceiving colours. 24th, *Space*, or *Locality*, the power of local memory. 25th, *Order*, or a love of methodical arrangements. 26th, *Time*, or the faculty which enters into speculations on duration. 27th, *Number*, or the power of calculation. 28th, *Tune*, or the perception of musical tone. 29th, *Language*, the faculty by which we learn artificial signs. 30th, *Comparison*, the organ by which we recognise differences, analogies, similitudes, &c. 31st, *Causality*, that power which directs our attention to the causes of things. 32nd, *Wit*, the organ of jesting, raillery, mocking, &c. 33rd, *Imitation*, power of imitating sounds, gestures, manners, &c. These are the several phrenological organs laid down by Drs. Gall and Spurzheim; but to this catalogue Mr. Combe has added other two. 34th, The organ of *Wonder*, or that which relates to the marvellous, supernatural, &c. And 35th, The organ of *Eventuality*, or that which takes cognizance of changes, events, and active phenomena.

It is laid down by phrenologists that all the thirty-five organs are possessed by every person of a sane understanding; but that they may exist in a greater or less perfection in various individuals. This irregularity in organic structure is the primary foundation of variations of intellectual endowments and moral qualities. Hence it is argued, that a doctrine of this kind is of immense importance in an educational point of view, by suggesting to parents and teachers those organic formations which, when brought under the influence of proper

culture, are calculated to further the purposes of certain modes and branches of tuition, and to give the youthful faculties such a general direction as will ultimately lead them to the effective development of their intellectual and moral powers. Even the improvement of the different races of mankind, comes within the sphere of the philanthropic views of the phrenologists. Dr. Spurzheim says, "It is certainly a pity that, in this respect, we take more care of the races of our sheep, pigs, dogs, and horses, than of our own offspring."

It is almost needless to say, that a system of this kind, so open to attack and ridicule, has excited a good deal of angry and acrimonious discussion. It is not, however, our intention to enter into a minute examination of the controversy, or to make any personal allusions either to the promoters or opponents of the science. As we consider it only in the light of a branch of physiology, and as having no valid claims whatever to a system of mental philosophy, we shall make a few general observations with a view of substantiating this opinion; without, however, claiming for them any weight or importance whatever, on the score of originality.

Speaking with all due candour, it does appear to us that the phrenologists only look to one side in their arguments and facts. The statements of facts which they furnish are, taken as a whole, liable to great suspicion on the ground of partiality and one-sidedness, and the same remark is applicable to their general mode of argumentation. They collect with scrupulous care, and indefatigable

industry, all facts and observations which are calculated to strengthen their theory; but they obstinately shut their eyes to those of an opposite tendency. A thousand facts may be brought to bear on one point; but if ten thousand be left behind, which either stand counter to, or are inexplicable upon, the assumed hypothesis, it is certainly trifling with the judgment of mankind, to speak dogmatically on the subject. "It is not enough," says Dr. Pritchard, "to have a few chosen coincidences brought forward by zealous partizans; who go about in search of facts to support their doctrine, and pass by, or really cannot perceive, the evidence that ought to be placed in the opposite scale. The principles of the system ought to be applicable in every instance. The phrenologists, however, aware of numerous and striking exceptions, elude their evidence by asserting that when a certain portion of the cranium and of the brain is greatly developed, while the faculty there lodged has never been remarkably distinguished, it nevertheless existed naturally, though the innate talent, for want of proper cultivation, has never been displayed; the predominant organic power was never discovered by the owner, though, according to the principles of the doctrine, with this organic power a proportional impulse to exertion, or an instinctive energy is combined, which communicates of itself a strong and irresistible tendency to particular pursuits. When, again, a strongly marked propensity, or a decided talent has been manifested, without any corresponding

amplitude of structure, it is in like manner pleaded that, by sedulous exercise and culture, a natural deficiency has been overcome. Thus the phrenologist avails himself of a double method of elusion; his position, like the cave of Philoctetes, affords him an escape on either side; and in one direction or another he contrives to baffle all the address of his opponents.”*

Leaving, however, the doubts which hang over the authenticity and impartiality of phrenological facts, and the inconsistencies involved in the popular mode of arguing on the subject, we shall now make an observation or two on the classification of organs which the phrenologists have adopted.

It has often been remarked, and the remark has never been rebutted by phrenologists, that their classification of organs is redundant in some parts, and very deficient in others. As an instance of the first imperfection, we have *form* and *size* as two different organs; whereas they both have an exclusive reference to *extension* or *space*. *Form* and *size* are severally comparative terms, and, metaphysically considered, are perfectly convertible words. Again, the offices which the organ of *Destructiveness* performs, can scarcely be conceived apart from those which are ascribed to *Combativeness*. The only difference, Combe says, is, that *Destructiveness* learns “to kill for food;” a distinction which induced a critic in the Quarterly Review to remark, that he thought the cele-

* “Treatise on Insanity,” p. 476.

brated phrenologist was bound to create another organ to *dig, or roast, or boil food*.*

The confusion between *attention* and the organ of *concentrativeness*, is striking in all the phrenological publications we have met with. The former power is not considered a separate or independent faculty, but is merely a vigorous effort made by an organ towards obtaining the objects it requires. Yet we are told that when two faculties are simultaneously called into action, the organ of *concentrativeness* is required to keep them tenaciously to their duty. If *attention* belongs to, or is in a certain relation with, all the organs, why need we another, called *concentrativeness*, to perform its offices, and effect all its ends and purposes? This is not in accordance with the canons of true philosophy.

On the deficiency side of the question we have a wide field for comment. If the classification of phrenological organs be considered relative to *objects*, it is one thing; and if relatively to *mental operations*, it is another. According to the general doctrine of phrenology, *memory, reasoning, and judgment*, are not distinct and independent faculties; but every organ has its own mode or power of remembering, reasoning, and judging. Now here there is, so to speak, a constellation of perplexities and obscurities. There is no theory of mind with which we are acquainted so redolent of absurdity and contradiction as this. We stand

* See Combe, p. 9; and Quarterly Review, September, 1836.

aghast at the amount of public credulity on the one hand, and philosophical charlatanism on the other, which could attempt to foist a system of this kind upon a thinking and reflective people. If we take then the position, that the classification of phrenologists must rest upon *objects*, we are compelled to have an organ for every individual thing. The organ of language, for example, is said to be divisible, and may be separated into as many organic compartments as there are languages among mankind. And this division does not stop here; for there are subdivisions depending upon the construction of language itself. There is a section of the organ appropriated to the retention of *proper names*, and a part for *general terms*; then why should there not be an organ portioned out for separate letters, syllables, consonants, and vowels? The one seems as reasonable as the other. The absurdity of this classification, when thus carried out to its legitimate and ultimate results, must be apparent even to the most desperate lover of systems. Instead of *thirty-five*, countless millions of organs would be required to carry out effectively the theory of phrenology.*

* "Not to enlarge upon the determination, enumeration, and classification of the independent faculties furnished by Phrenologists, it is quite obvious that those which they have adopted are by no means very intelligible; they have, in fact, all the vices of which they are susceptible. In one place they are redundant, in another inadequate; the consequence is levelled with the principle, and the principle is merged in the consequence; again, the consequence is detached from its principle, while a little further on, it is altogether rejected; thus breaking down the analogical process which subsists among facts and ideas. If instead of con-

By making the faculties of memory and reasoning separate attributes of each organ, the phrenologists have not only introduced numerous elements of discord into their system, but have, in reality, struck a vital blow at its very existence. A *foreign* influence or power is here introduced to the organization of the several functions. It is now not the mere organs themselves, but something which is called memory or judgment, which exercises its power over them, or in necessary conjunction with them. This is an entire departure from the fundamental principles of the science; for we are told that the organs themselves are the true and veritable instruments or indications of our thoughts and ideas; and yet it turns out after all, that this is not the case, inasmuch as we really owe everything to other separate agencies, whose office it is either to preside over each organ separately, or to dance attendance on all the thirty-five organic functions whenever and wherever their services are demanded. This is one of the palpable and striking contradictions of the phrenological hypothesis.

The division of the brain into two distinct hemispheres, with a complete set of organs in each part, is another formidable impediment in the way of an

fining our view to the nine propensities, we examine the twenty or thirty organs which the Phrenologists distinguish, what shall we find then? We shall make apparent, in a thousand phases, the profound chaos which reigns throughout this arrangement; an arrangement more worthy of chance itself, than of any serious reflection."—(M. Tissot, *Anthropologie*, Vol. 2, p. 217.)

acquiescence in the phrenological theory. A single action from double powers or organs is a perplexing consideration. True, the Phrenologists have instituted a comparison between the double functions of the cranium, and the faculties of vision and hearing, which are the result of two distinct instruments of sensation; but the argument derived from this source, which is altogether of an analogical character, is not strictly admissible. Many phenomena connected with seeing and hearing destroy the analogy instituted between the double set of organs and these two sources of sensation. There must be a perfect correspondence between the impressions on both eyes, or on both ears, to effect correct vision or hearing. If either eye or ear is at variance with the other, the unity of perception is destroyed. Besides, the duality of the organs of seeing and hearing is manifestly for another purpose, namely, to extend the field of vision in the one case, and to collect sound from different quarters in the other. But the phrenologist furnishes us with no reasons for his two sets of organs. *Unity* of action in his organs is an essential article in his creed; and, therefore, the analogy between the organs of sense and the mind is not applicable to his purpose.*

* "Ed appunto pensando al modo del distinguere e ordinare le umane facoltà, io temo forte non sia suscettiva di temperamenti l'ordinazione che i frenologi (da ogni filosofia alienati) ne fanno. Concedere un organo ai luoghi, un altro alle forme; uno alla voglia del distruggere, uno del combattere; quattro diversi all'amor del generare, all'amore, all'affetto, alla benevolenza; e l'eventualità separare dalla speranza, dal tempo, dall'ordine: non mi sembra conforme alle vie della natura che sempre

On this point it may also be remarked, that the whole science of phrenology is made to hinge upon vague analogies. There can be no doubt that analogy is a legitimate and valid instrument in all science and reasoning; but it must not be made to do every thing. There are limits to its use, and necessary rules by which its application is to be regulated. There are some excellent observations on this subject in the article *Phrenology*, in the last edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*; and we shall make no apology for quoting them here.

"Analogy, in reasoning concerning the unknown operations of nature, is, at best, but slippery ground; and when unsupported by any kind of evidence, cannot lead to certain knowledge, far less constitute the basis of an extensive system. The utility of analogical deductions, as to what takes place in one department of nature, from our knowledge of what occurs in another, consists chiefly in their affording indications of what may possibly happen, and thus directing and stimulating our inquiries to the discovery of truth by the legitimate road of observation and experi-

da semplici origini trae successioni svariate, ma tutte tra sè dipendenti. La frenologia quando sarà scienza vera, coordinerà le facoltà umane in modo conforme all'intima natura loro, molte ridurrà a una principale, e mostrerà la dipendenza degli organi che denotano quelle dall'organo che serve a queste, scoprirà gli organi che sono come passaggio dall'una all'altra facoltà; dopo esperienze minute e accuratamente notate (e non già, come finora, fatte a memoria e accumulate in confuso) segnerà gli uffizii veri di ciascun organo, e i limiti della facoltà che all'organo corrisponde." — (Tommasco. *Studii Filosofici*, Vol. 1. Lettere a Davide Richard, p. 170, Venezia, 1840.)

ment. But to assume the existence of any such analogy as equivalent to a positive proof, resulting from the evidence of direct observation, is a gross violation of logic. Yet it is upon assumptions of this kind that Drs. Gall and Spurzheim have ventured to found all the leading propositions of their doctrine. In the secretions of the body, they observe, the preparation of different fluids is consigned to different glands, having different appropriate functions; and they consider this analogy as a demonstrative proof of what happens in the operations of thought and the phenomena of the passions, which, because they differ as much in their nature as milk does from gall, must, accordingly, be the result of actions in different portions of the brain; which portions are, therefore, to be regarded as so many different organs, rather than parts of one organ. Even where all the analogies are favourable to one side of a question, such a loose mode of reasoning would be entitled to little confidence; but how fallacious must it not prove, when analogies can be pointed out which apply in the opposite direction. Does not the same stomach digest very different and even opposite kinds of aliment? Yet we do not find that one portion of that organ is destined for the digestion of meat, and another for the digestion of vegetable matter; although the operations required for the conversion of such different ingredients into the same chyle, cannot possibly be the same. Nerves perform the double purposes of volition and sensation; but

the different bundles of fibres which convey each impression, the one to the muscles, the other to the sensorium, are wrapped up in the same sheath, and are so intimately intermixed during their course as to constitute a single cord. The same organ serves for the hearing of acute and of grave sounds. The whole retina, and not merely different portions of its surface, receives impressions of different kinds of colours; there is not one organ for the perception of blue, and another for the perception of red rays. Guided by such analogies as these, might we not be equally justified in concluding, that the same part of the brain may serve for the memory of words, as for the memory of things; and that the same portion of that organ which enables us to conceive the idea of figure, may also suggest to us that of size?"

It is contended, and with great probability, that the mere external protuberances of the brain are, in most cases, a source of delusion; and this arises chiefly from the variation in the thickness of the *frontal sinus* in most individuals. Phrenologists have been much puzzled and bewildered by this discovery; and Gall and Spurzheim seem themselves to have looked upon it as a formidable obstacle to the systematic and harmonious adjustment of their system. The frontal bone of the skull, stretching along the base of the forehead, varies in magnitude to such an extent, as to render it almost impossible to determine the development or elevation of the brain in the adjacent region. This must render

all mere manipulations of the brain an enterprise of uncertainty and conjecture.*

In the mapping out of the brain there is a great want of definiteness among the various organs. The line of demarcation has never been pointed

* "A fundamental doubt hangs over every determination of function, which results from a comparison of the size of the supposed organ or region in different cases. If it be true, that the grey matter only is the source of power, and that the white is merely a conductor, we have no right to assume that the total size of the organ affords a measure of its power, until it has been shown that the thickness of the cortical substance can be judged by the size of the brain, or of any part of it. Certainly there is a considerable variation in this respect among different individuals, and it is yet to be proved that the relation is constant in different parts of the same individual brain. Until this is substantiated, all inferences drawn from correspondence between the prominence of a certain part of the brain, and the intensity of a particular function, are invalid; that is, if the general doctrine of the relative functions of grey and white matter be true. Further, there is, unfortunately, a considerable uncertainty attending all phrenological observations which are made upon the cranium rather than upon the brain; this we have seen from the discrepancy between the statements of Gall and the facts ascertained respecting the comparative weight of the cerebellum in castrated and entire horses. It appears to the author, too, that comparative anatomy and psychology are very far from supporting the system, when their evidence is fairly weighed. It is a very curious circumstance, that the difference in the antero-posterior diameter, between the brain of man and that of the lower mammalia, principally arises from the shortness of the posterior lobes in the latter, these being seldom long enough to cover the cerebellum. Yet it is in these posterior lobes that the animal propensities are regarded by phrenologists as having their seat. On the other hand, the anterior lobes, in which the intellectual faculties are considered as residing, bear, in many animals, a much larger proportion to the whole bulk of the brain, than they do in man. Again, comparative anatomy and experiment alike sanction the conclusion, that the purely instinctive propensities have not their seat in the cerebrum. These examples, and many similar ones, that might easily be added, collectively show the uncertainty, to say the least, of the inferences that are by many regarded as firmly established."—(Dr. Carpenter.)

out between timidity and courage, between destructiveness and constructiveness, nor between the organs employed in mechanical pursuits and those required by the poet. Here confusion reigns supreme.

One important bulwark of the phrenological structure has been recently broken down by the sheer force of more impartial and extended observations; namely, that bulk of brain is now no longer considered as a measure of intellectual power or capacity. This, in fact, prostrates the whole system, and lays it in the dust. As long as there was something to weigh to a grain, or measure to a hair's-breadth, the phrenologists had some hold of men's minds; there was a material tangibility imparted to the theory; and a ready appeal could always be made to the evidence of the senses. But this gone, all is gone. It is quite hopeless to take shelter in mere *quality* of brain. It is subject to a thousand conjectures and assumptions. It has no stability in it; it refuses to be subjected to the senses; it has no criterion for the judgment to fix upon, nor any means of directing the understanding into a rational and satisfactory channel of conviction. To be reduced to the declaration that a man's mind depends upon the *quality* of his brain, is but to give utterance to a very antiquated and trite expression, little in accordance with the lofty pretensions of philosophy, and ill-calculated to hand down the names of those who use it to the applause of posterity.

On this head we shall quote a remark or two from the pen of M. Peisse, a French writer of re-

putation. In combating the system of Gall, he instances a young Indian girl who possessed an organic development of an uncommon size, without any mental peculiarity. "I cannot perceive," says M. Peisse, "on the principles you lay down, how this difficulty can be surmounted. You would not believe on the one hand, that a healthy mind could dwell in a brain so monstrously deformed, without making a surrender of your fundamental principle, which expressly maintains that certain mental qualifications depend upon fixed physiological conditions which you have yourselves determined. On the other hand, you cannot consistently allege that the malformations of the cranium have not exercised some influence upon the constitution of the brain, without taking away from your system the only basis—the only guarantee it possesses, namely, *craniotomy*. If indeed you concede, that, in this instance, disease or original disposition has been productive of such considerable deviations upon the cranium without affecting the brain, then all your classifications, distinctions, and organic localities are at once destroyed; for they depend upon a prior supposition of the perfect and continuous correspondence of the cranium with the brain. Were this harmony or correspondence destroyed, what becomes then of all your observations upon the statues of the ancients, on the heads of living men and animals? They are all vain, vague, and illusory Two propositions are deducible from this: first, either that the complete integrity of the intellectual and moral faculties can subsist with a monstrous brain; or,

secondly, that the cranium can be monstrous without the brain participating in its malformation. If you admit either of these propositions, the organology of Dr. Gall is reduced to a nonentity."

The charge of materialism has been often brought against phrenology; but of late years some writers, who have been inimical to the science, have treated this accusation with a good deal of tenderness. The motives for this seem rather inexplicable. That phrenology itself lies fairly open to the charge, is undoubted; and it seems hardly fair towards the interests of truth generally, to let it escape upon such easy and indulgent terms; particularly when it is considered that abstract materialism is the most irrational of all systems of philosophy, and the most inimical to the true interests and happiness of man. It must always be borne in mind, that the materialism to which phrenology necessarily leads, is of an absolute and pernicious description. It is different in many essential particulars from other branches of physiology, because the subject of investigation being direct, and limited to the separate organs of the brain, the mind naturally draws the conclusion, without any further consideration of the subject, that an act of thought is a mere attribute of organised matter. When this once lays hold on the mind, particularly of young persons, it is very difficult to be eradicated; and in the generality of cases, where this opinion is early imbibed, a return to a more rational and spiritual mode of thinking is rarely witnessed. That some able and disinterested cul-

tivators of general knowledge should have embraced phrenological doctrines with no view to promote the cause of materialism, is undoubtedly true; but this forms no conclusive argument for their own discretion, or the success of their chivalrous enterprise. The establishment of the Phrenological Society of London was, philosophically speaking, a humiliating sight; because it there presented a number of gentlemen of education and abilities, attempting to do that which it was impossible to do. There was a tacit compromise of truth and sincerity in its very formation. It was an attempt to unite light with darkness, folly with wisdom, and religion with atheism. And the truth of this was soon made manifest by the sudden and complete disruption of the whole Society. It may be considered as one of the philosophical wonders of the middle of the nineteenth century, for a number of philosophers to assemble together, with a tacit understanding that they were not to *draw an inference* from a principle, which any unlettered ploughboy of ten years of age would readily draw, and would feel satisfied with the conclusion to the end of his life. No opinion or sentiment, tainted in the slightest degree with materialism, was to be allowed to escape the lips of any of the members. What strange and innocent simplicity! "Can a man take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned?" Dr. Engledue, however, soon rent this thin web of self-security and self-deception, by the mere breath of his nostrils. He told the members openly, that they "either cannot follow out the consequences

of their own doctrine, or they have not the courage or the honesty to avow them." This unpalatable announcement fell upon the ears of the members with apparent astonishment. The crisis was at hand. Immediate flight, which could only be made at the expence either of sincerity or logical acuteness, was resolved upon; and thus this notable phrenological confederation came to a sudden and untimely death.*

It has often been urged against the system of phrenology, that, in the higher walks of philosophy, it appears to be a shallow and miserably defective theory. It not only levels man to the animal creation, but it is totally inadequate to grapple with those general questions which have been inte-

* See Dr. Engleue's "Address," &c., 1848, with a letter to him from Dr. Elliotson, highly laudatory of his courage, and of the soundness of his opinions. The following passages from Dr. Engleue show that he did not mince the matter before the Society, and was determined that in future there should be no mistake upon the nature and tendency of phrenology.

"*We contend that mind has but an imaginary existence—that we have to consider matter only. What is organised matter? Merely a collection of atoms, possessing certain properties, and assuming different and determinate forms. What is brain? Merely one variety of organised matter. What do we mean by cerebration? The function of the brain—one of the manifestations of animal life, resulting from a peculiar combination of matter. The varied changes of form which this matter assumes, give rise to the numerous manifestations of cerebration in the different tribes of beings; and the varied changes of cerebration in the same being originate in molecular alterations—merely other expressions of a new condition.*" . . . "It is this conjectural doctrine—this belief in the individual essence of mind—this love of the marvellous—this thirsting after something mysterious, which is retarding the progress of cerebral physiology, and, in the same ratio, the happiness of man. It is this clinging to old opinions—this disinclination to shake off old garments, which is the cause of so much doubt concerning a question so self-evident. We oppose this system by the antagonism of Reason and

resting topics of inquiry and interest to him, from his earliest existence to the present hour. On all the most profound inquiries of human nature, it cannot speak a word that is either intelligible or consistent. Were there not a system of intellectual science already in existence, derived from the individual consciousness alone, the organs of the phrenologists could never have been made to indicate any thing about the mind or character of man; so that, when it is referred back to its own intrinsic merits, it cannot furnish a single idea upon the subject of which it professes to treat. It is a beggarly collection of unmeaning words and crude conceptions.*

We are willing to allow that as a branch of physiology, it has a fair claim to attention; but beyond this it cannot go. Its cultivation of late years has unquestionably been productive of benefit in a medical point of view; and we think there are clear indications, from the general feeling in almost all countries at the present moment respecting it, that the scientific public will restrict it to this its legitimate offices and pretensions.

Nature. It is impossible any longer to countenance the opinion. It must be rooted up. It is like a malignant disease, which can only be cured by extermination. Let it be boldly stated, because it is true, that, as philosophers, we have to deal simply and *exclusively with matter*. Man neither possesses, nor does he need the possession of, any other stimulus than that which is given to the simplest of organised beings. From the lowest and simplest of organised beings, to the highest and most complicated, there is nothing more than a gradual addition of parts, accompanied by concentration."—(Address, &c. pp. 8, 10, 11.)

* This is, in fact, admitted by the phrenologists themselves, for the *Phrenological Journal* tells us, "We must know from our own consciousness the distinction between thoughts and feelings, *before* we can trace their connection with particular parts of the brain."

NOTES
AND
ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTE A.—Page 46.

"All *mathematical* demonstration is built upon the notion, that where quantities or diagrams resemble each other, the relations which are true with respect to one of each kind, will be true with respect to all others of a like kind; only *because there is nothing to make a difference among them*. So, if in all *past time* such 'secret powers' could be shown necessarily connected with such *sensible qualities*; yet, in future it could not be proved to continue so, *unless supported by the axiom that like causes exhibit like effects, for that differences cannot arise of themselves*.

"To represent the relation of cause and effect as A *followed* by B, is a *false* view of the matter; cause and effect might be represented rather as $A \times B = C$, therefore C is *included* in the mixture of the objects called *cause*. If C arise once from the junction of any two bodies, C must, upon every like conjunction, be the result; because there is no alteration in the proportion of the quantities to make a difference; C is really *included* in the mixture of A and B, although to our senses we are forced to note down, as it were, the sum arising from their union *after the observance of their coalescence*.

"In like manner the results of all mathematical combinations are included in their statements. Yet we are obliged to take notice of them separately and subsequently, owing to the imperfections of our senses in not observing them with sufficient quickness, and *time* being requisite to bring them out to full view, and make them apparent in some distinct shape. Indeed, my whole notion of the relation of cause and effect is aptly imagined by the nature of the

necessary results included in the juxta-position of quantities. But as long as cause shall be considered only as an *antecedent*, the future can never be proved to be included in the past, which yet is truly the case. For when it comes to be observed, that cause means, and really is, the creation of new qualities, (arising from new conjunctions in matter or mind), then it is perceived that the future is *involved* in the past; for when existing objects are the same, they must put on similar qualities, otherwise *contrary qualities* or *differences* would arise of themselves, and *begin* their own existences, which is impossible, and conveys a contradiction in terms. All that experience has to do is to show us, by what passes within ourselves, that there is a contradiction in the supposition of qualities *beginning their own existence*, and a contradiction is never admitted in the relation of ideas that present themselves.”—(Lady Mary Shepherd’s “Essay on Cause and Effect,” pp. 141—143.)

NOTE B.—Page 102.

We beg to make an observation or two on Dr. Davies’ “Estimate of the Human Mind,” in addition to those we have already given in the text. We only became acquainted with this really excellent work when our pages were passing through the press, and this was the reason of our comparatively brief notice of it. In referring to it again, we especially call the reader’s attention to the author’s introduction, which is most ably written, and abounds with useful truths and noble sentiments on the science of mind generally. In the first book, on the limits of reason in matters of revealed truth, many profound and philosophic views will be found on the great principles of human nature, and on the ends and purposes to which they directly lead. All the other portions of the treatise are likewise very interesting, and display the enlightened spirit of the Christian philosopher in every page.

Mrs. Loudon, The Light of Mental Science, 1845. This is a sensible little publication, written expressly to promote education. The metaphysician will find many observations in it, suggestive of reflections on his favourite science.—*A. L. Wigan* (M. D.), The Duality of the Mind proved by the Structure, Functions, and Diseases of the Brain, 1846. The author is not a phrenologist, but he believes

that each hemisphere of the brain is a perfect and independent mind, capable of exercising all the phenomena of thought, and moral and religious feeling and emotion. The Doctor tells us nevertheless, that "Thought is a secretion of the brain !!"

Dr. Hughes Fraser Halle, *Critical Letters*;—*Exact Philosophy*, London, 1848. We have become acquainted, at the moment of going to press, with the "Exact Philosophy" of this gentleman. Its leading objects, independently of critical and controversial matter, are, 1st, To show that all logical errors arise from inexact ideas or conceptions; 2nd, That the principles laid down by Mr. Stuart Mill, and other writers of the same school, are decidedly erroneous; and 3rd, That the general tendency of what is termed *positive science*, both Continental and British, is inimical to the interests of really sound philosophy, morals, and religious principle. Dr. Halle is a most uncompromising spiritualist. We have just a moment to spare to say thus much of his treatise; and to recommend its perusal to all who feel a peculiar interest in those parts of mental science which more immediately relate to the nature and process of the ratiocinative faculties, and to the abstract conclusions of the judgment.

On the following works we have not been able to make any individual comment; and, consequently, merely submit them to the reader's attention.

Thomas Wirgman, *Grammar of the Five Senses*;—*Principles of the Kantian Philosophy*, 1824;—*Deverification of the New Testament*, 1830;—*Essay On Man*;—*Science of Philosophy*.—*James Douglas*, *On the Philosophy of the Mind*, 1839.—*Eleonora Fernandez*, *The Economy of the Human Mind*, London, 8vo.—*James Meickle*, *Metaphysical Maxims*.—*Mr. Walsh*, *Lectures on the Human Mind*.—*J. Robertson*, *Life and Mind*.—*M. A. Mitchell*, *Essay on Capacity and Genius*, 1816.—*Sir C. Bell*, *A Treatise on the Five Senses*.—*J. Jarrold*, *Instinct and Reason Investigated*.—*J. T. Crybbace*, *Essay on Moral Freedom*.—*G. Vincent*, *Moral System, or Laws of Human Nature*.—*J. Sellon*, *New Philosophical Theory*.—*Rashley*, *Voice of Reason*.—*G. Field*, *Tritogenia, or Universal Philosophy*.—*Cory (J. P.)*, *Metaphysical Inquirer*, 1845;—*A Way Out of Metaphysics*, 1839;—*Metaphysical Rambles*.

NOTE C.—Page 136.

“Ainsi que le spinozisme et l'idéalisme de Fichte, la philosophie de M. de Schelling est fondée sur un besoin logique considéré à tort comme une loi de la raison, et sur une hypothèse que rien ne justifie, et qui a contre elle la conscience universelle et l'expérience la plus intime et la plus certaine.

“C'étaient des réminiscences orientales, jointes à l'exagération du cartésianisme et au besoin logique de tout réduire à un principe unique, qui avait enfanté le panthéisme de Spinoza. Fichte fut conduit au sien, sorte de spinozisme renversé, panthéisme moral, par l'ambition d'établir l'idéalisme critique sur un fondement plus solide, et par de fausses maximes sur la nature de la science et la faculté de connaître. M. de Schelling, nourri mais non satisfait des doctrines de Kant et de Fichte, et leur préférant secrètement les idées néoplatoniciennes renouvelées par Bruno et plus analogues à son génie, plus hardi que profond, plein d'ailleurs de savoir et d'imagination, plus poète que philosophe, accorda par supposition et par une décision arbitraire, à la raison une autorité souveraine et la faculté de tout connaître, ou plutôt la possession virtuelle de la vérité éternelle et absolue; concluant du besoin logique de l'unité du savoir à l'unité réelle et objective des choses, il érigea en principe, non-seulement l'unité de tout, mais encore l'identité de la connaissance et de la réalité, de l'intuition et de son objet, de la pensée et de l'être. Il ne se contenta pas de dire avec Spinoza, *que tout étoit un et que cet un étoit Dieu, avec deux attributs, la pensée et la matière*; avec Fichte, *que la connaissance étoit un, fondée sur un principe unique, sur un acte primitif du moi*; avec Jacobi, *qu'il y a harmonie entre les manifestations constantes de la raison et la nature des choses*: il proclama, pour mieux assurer la certitude du jugement, *l'identité de l'acte de connaissance et de la création*, de la pensée et de l'univers, déclarant que le principe du savoir étoit aussi le principe de l'existence, et faisant de la conscience de cette idéalité, au moyen de l'intuition intellectuelle, la fin, la condition et l'essence de toute philosophie.

“Assimilant de prime abord l'intelligence humaine à l'intelligence Divine, dont les idées se réalisent nécessairement, et sont parfaitement

identiques avec les choses qui en sont l'expression, au lieu de rechercher ce qu'est la raison, ce qu'elle peut être, la raison peut examiner sa portée et sa nature, sans révoquer en doute son autorité,—il la définit péremptoirement selon l'idéal logique qu'il s'est fait du savoir, dont il la suppose d'inspiration l'infailible instrument et le dépôt complet. Il ne s'agit plus seulement d'idées innées, ou d'idées qui se forment spontanément à la suite du développement de l'intelligence, de sentiments et de convictions rationnelles, qui sont l'expression de germes divins déposés au fond de l'âme, de ce trésor de vérité que recèle notre nature raisonnable, et que la pensée, fécondée par la vie, l'expérience, doit mettre au jour : la raison est plus que cela, infiniment plus. 'La raison,' dit M. de Schelling, 'est une, et il n'y a pas de degrés d'intelligence. Elle ne peut affirmer rien de relatif ou de fini ; elle ne peut affirmer aucune différence entre les choses. *L'affirmation de l'unité et de la totalité est son essence même.* La raison n'est pas un organe ou une faculté que nous possédons : *elle nous possède. Elle est savoir de Dieu, et sa connaissance est la connaissance infinie que Dieu a de lui-même dans l'éternelle affirmation de soi.* La raison est donc elle-même Dieu : elle n'a pas l'idée de Dieu, elle est cette idée même.'

"Ainsi, dans ce système, la raison est faite Dieu ; Dieu et le monde sont identifiés avec la raison. L'univers est le savoir divin réalisé, et la raison est en soi le savoir divin lui-même. Et sur quoi repose cette audacieuse prétention ? Sur une *illusion*, sur un *paralogisme*, sur une *exagération*, sur une *hypothèse téméraire*.

"Elle repose sur une illusion d'abord, résultant de la confusion d'un besoin de l'entendement avec une loi de la raison. En effet, cette affirmation de l'unité et de la totalité absolue que l'on déclare être l'essence même de la raison, n'est autre chose que le besoin de la généralisation logique poussé à l'extrême, et érigé en une loi réelle de la raison et des choses. Parce que l'entendement a l'habitude de généraliser les idées, et de les réduire à la plus haute unité possible, en faisant abstraction de toutes les différences et de toute réalité spécifique ;—parce que, en remontant des effets présents à leurs causes prochaines, et de celles-ci aux causes éloignées, le raisonnement ne peut s'arrêter qu'à un principe suprême, absolu ;—parce que, ensuite, en divisant logiquement cette idée, faussement considérée comme la plus réelle et la plus concrète, tandis qu'elle n'est que la plus générale, et en redescend-

ant de ce principe suprême à ses conséquences, on se persuade que tout est renfermé dans cette idée, comme les parties le sont dans un tout réel, et dans ce premier principe, comme une plante est virtuellement contenue dans son germe,—on en conclut que cette idée est la totalité des choses, tandis qu'elle en est née, et qu'elle n'en représente que le caractère le plus général, et que ce principe logique suprême est la cause réelle de toutes les conséquences qu'on en peut déduire, tandis qu'il n'en est que la raison et l'explication.

“ L'identique absolu de M. de Schelling comme l'unité absolue de Plotin, est un être de raison, un produit logique, qui se met faussement à la place de l'être primitif, de l'*ens realissimum* des scolastiques, source de toute existence, ensemble virtuel de toutes les déterminations possibles, mais non encore actuellement déterminé; c'est l'indéterminé absolu, un être sans attributs réels, un véritable non-être.

“ C'est là un *paralogisme*, comme dirait Kant, un faux raisonnement fondé sur la confusion du général logique avec l'universel, de l'unité logique avec l'unité réelle, du principe suprême de la connaissance avec le principe souverain des choses.

“ Le système repose ensuite sur l'exagération, ou plutôt sur l'altération d'un principe vrai, et que suppose toute philosophie positive, du principe de l'harmonie préétablie de la raison et de la nature, ou de l'autorité de la raison comme nature intelligente, fondement du rationalisme de Platon, comme de celui de la Bible et de Jacobi. De cette foi en la nature raisonnable de l'homme, considérée comme marquée du sceau de l'intelligence divine, ne résulte pas son identité absolue avec cette intelligence, avec l'entendement archétype, non plus que l'unité ou l'identité parfaite de ses produits avec les choses. L'autorité de la raison s'exerçant légitimement, et se manifestant avec constance et clarté, n'en implique pas l'absolue souveraineté, et s'il est permis, s'il est nécessaire d'attribuer de la réalité à ses lois et à ses intuitions, il ne s'ensuit pas que la connaissance rationnelle, dans ses conditions actuelles, puisse embrasser la vérité tout entière, telle que Dieu la voit. Encore moins les procédés logiques au moyen desquels la raison humaine arrive à la connaissance, peuvent-ils être considérés comme nécessaires à toute intelligence. Dieu ne raisonne pas, il voit; et c'est en vain que l'intuition intellectuelle de M. de Schelling cherche

à s'égaliser à l'intuition divine : elle n'est qu'une illusion, car ce qu'il donne pour telle, est évidemment un produit du raisonnement, d'une dialectique tout humaine."—(Willm's Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande, tome 3, p. 374, Paris, 1847.)

NOTE D.—Page 179.

The following list of German philosophical authors and their respective publications, since the end of the last century, is not to be considered as a full and perfect one ; but it will prove, perhaps, sufficiently ample both to guide the general student in his researches into German speculation, and to give an idea of the extent to which it has been carried within the last fifty years.

Ahron, Religionsphilosophie, 1841.—*Apelt*, Ernest Reinhold und die Kantische philosophie, 1834.—*Archin*, Königsberger, für Philosophie, Theologie, Sprachkunde und Geschichte, &c., 1811.—*Aschenbrenner* (*Prof. M.*), Lehrbuch der Metaphysik, Landshut, 1829.—*Ast* (*Fr.*), Hauptmomente der Geschichte der Philosophie, München, 1829.

Baader, Societätsphilosophie, 1837 ;—Die Incompetenz der Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1837.—*Balzac* (*P.*), Philosophische Studien, 1837.—*Bardili* (*W.*), Beiträge zur Beurtheilung des gegenwärtigen Zustandes der Vernunftlehre, 1803 ;—Philosoph. Elementarlehre, &c.—*Bauer*, Kritik der Geschichte der Synoptiker, 1841.—*Baur*, Socrates und Christus, 1837.—*Bayer* (*Dr. Carl*), Zu Fichte's Gedächtniss, Leipzig, 1836.—*Bayrhafter* (*Dr. K.T.*), Naturphilosophie, 1840 ;—Die Grundprobleme der Metaphysik, &c., Marburg, 1836.—*Beneke* (*F. E.*), Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten, ein Gegenstück zu Kant's Metaphysik der Sitten, &c. ; De veris Philosophiæ initiis, &c., 1821 ;—Erkenntnisslehre, nach dem Bewusstseyn der reinen Vernunft, in ihren Grundzügen dargestellt, 1820 ;—Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie, 1840 ;—System der prakt. Philosophie ;—Lehrbuch der Psychologie, Berlin, 1833 ;—Die Neue Psychologie, 1845.—*Berg* (*F.*), Sertus, oder über die absolute Erkenntniss von Schelling, 1804 ;—Epikritik der Philosophie, 1805.—*Berger* (*J.*), Geschichte der Religions-Philosophie, oder Lehren u. Meinungen der originellsten Denker aller Zeiten über Religion und Gott, 1800.—*Bergk*

(*J. A.*), Briefe üb. Kant's Rechtslehre, 1805;—Die Kunst zu Philosophiren, 1802;—Die Kunst zu Denken, 1802.—*Betrachtungen* über den gegenwärtigen Zustand der Philosophie in Deutschland überhaupt, u. über die Schelling'sche Philosophie insbesondere, 1813.—*Beweisgründe* über die einzigmöglichen, &c., gegen das Daseyn und die Gültigkeit der natürlichen Rechte; Von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, aus Vernunft u. Erfahrung, 1807.—*Bibliotheca Psychologica*, Leipsic, 1845.—*Biermann*, Beiträge zur Psychologie, Ebend., 1833.—*Biese*, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, &c., Altona, 1836.—*Billroth*, Religionsphilosophie.—*Birnbaum*, Anthropologie, 1842.—*Block (G. W.)*, Neue Grundlegung zur Philosophie der Sitten, mit beständiger Rücksicht auf die Kantische, 1802;—Die Fehler der Philosophie, mit ihren Ursachen u. Heilmitteln dargestellt, 1804.—*Bockshäuser (G. F.)*, Die Freiheit des menschl. Willens, 1821.—*Bodemeyer*, Commentatio de Kantianarum Categoriarum, &c., 1844.—*Böhme (C. F.)*, Beantwortung der Frage, Was ist Wahrheit? 1803;—Commentar über u. gegen den ersten Grundsatz der Wissenschaftslehre, 1802.—*Brandis (C. A.)*, Von dem Begriffe der Geschichte der Philosophie, 1815;—Commentationum Eleaticarum Xenophontis, Parmenidis, Melissi, doctrina ex propriis philosophorum reliquiis veterumque auctorum testimonii exposita, 1815.—*Brandis (J.)*, Die Logik in ihrem Verhältniss zur Philosophie, &c., 1823.—*Bräns (Prof. D. Jul.)*, System der Metaphysik, 1832.—*Brinkmann (C. G.)*, Philosoph. Ansichten, 1806.—*Brückner (J. A.)*, Blicke in die Natur der prakt. Vernunft, &c., 1814.—*Brüning (A.)*, Anfangsgründe der Grundwissenschaft oder Philosophie, 1809;—Zu einer künftigen Grundwissenschaft oder Philosophie, ein Fragment u. kleiner Versuch, der misslingen kann, 1822.—*Burja (A.)*, Lehrbuch der hylodynamischen Philosophie, von der Körperwelt, von Gott und der Menschh., 1812.—*Buczinski (F.)*, Institutiones Philosophicæ, Vienna, 1844.

Callisen (C. F.), Abriss der Logik u. Metaphysik, 1805;—Des philosoph. Rechts u. der Sittenlehre, 1805;—Der Seelenlehre, nebst Erläuterungen, 1807.—*Carrière*, Die philosoph. Weltanschauung. 1847.—*Carus (F. A.)*, Geschichte d. Psychologie, 1809;—Moral und Religionsphilosophie, &c. &c., 1809.—*Cäsar (C. A.)*, Denkwürdigkeiten aus der Philosophie;—Pragmatische Darstel-

lung des Geistes der neuesten Philosophie des In- u. Auslandes, 1803.—*Chalybäus*, Specul. Philos. von Kant bis Hegel, 1843.

—*Collmann*, Kritik der philos. Schule, 1836.

Dansel, Plato quid de Philosophandi Methodo, &c. 1841;—*Plato philosophiae parens*, 1845.—*Daub*, Philosophische Vorlesungen, 1840.—*Daumer (G. Fr.)*, System der Specul. Philosophie, Nürnberg, 1829;—*Anthropologism*. 1844.—*Deinhardt*, Der Begriff der Seele, 1840.—*Deutinger*, Grundlinien einer positiv. Philosophie, 1847.—*Diestel und Ebel*, Verstand und Vernunft, 1837.—*Dmowski*, Instit. philos. 1843.—*Drechsler (J. M.)*, Ueber Wollaston's Moral philosophy, 1802.—*Drusts (Hilfshof C. A. Von)*, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts u. d. Rechtsphilosophie, 1823.

Ebel, Erkenntniss der Wahrheit, 1837;—*Eberstein (W. L. G. Von)*, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bei den Deutschen, von Leibnitz bis auf die gegenwärtige Zeit;—Ueber die Beschaffenheit der Logik u. Metaphysik der reinen Peripatetiker, 1801.—*Ehrlich*, Metaphysik, 1841;—Zur Reform der philos. Ethik, 1847;—Lehre von der Bestimmung des Menschen, 1845.—*Engel (J. J.)*, Die Philosophie für die Welt, 1801;—Versuch einer Methode, die Vernunftlehre aus Plato's Dialogen zu entwickeln, 1805.—*Erdmann*, Leib und Seele, 1837;—Geschichte der Philosophie, 1840;—Natur und Schöpfung, 1840;—Grundr. d. Psychologie, 1840; Logik und Metaphysik, 1841.—*Erenberg (Fr.)*, Ueber Denken u. Zweifeln, zur Aufklärung einiger Missverständnisse in der höheren Philosophie, 1802.—*Erhard (And.)*, Handbuch der Moralphilosophie, 1841;—Metaphysik, 1845.—*Erhardt (S.)*, Grundlage der Ethik, 1821;—Ueber den Begriff und Zweck der Philosophie, 1818;—Philosoph. Encyclopädie, oder System der gesamt. wissenschaft. Erkennt. 1818;—Das Leben und Seyn, &c., 1816.—*Erklärung der Logik*, Metaphysik u. prakt. Philosoph., nach Fader; Der transcendentalen Phil. 1803.—*Ernesti (J. H. M.)*, Encyclopädisches Handbuch einer allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie und ihrer Literatur, nebst Beiträgen zum weiteren Gebrauch der Hissmann'schen Anleitung zur Kenntniss der auserlesenen Literatur in allen Theilen der Philosophie, 1807;—Pflichten- u. Tugendlehre der Vernunft u. Religion, nach den Bedürfnissen unserer Zeit, 1817.—*Eschenmaier (C. A. Von)*,

System der Moralphilosophie, 1818;—Moral-Rechte, 1819;—Psychologie, 1822;—Religions-philosophie, 1822;—Die Hegel'sche Religions-philosophie, Tübingen, 1834. — *Ewerts*, Metaphys. Kosmologie, 1837. — *Esner*, Ueber Leibnitz'sens Universal. Wissenschaft, 1843.

Feuerbach (Dr. Ludw. Andr.), Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Anspach, 1833; — *Fichte (J. G.)*, Antwortschreiben an K. L. Reinhold an dessen Beiträge zur leichteren Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beim Anfange, 1801;—Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, als Handschrift für seine Zuhörer, nebst Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, 1802;—Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgem. Umriss dargestellt, 1810;—Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten und seine Erscheinung im Gebiete der Freiheit, 1806. — *Fichte (J. H.)*, Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie, zur Vermittlung ihrer Gegensätze, Sulzbach, 1829;—System der Philosophie 1847;—Grundzüge des Systems der Philosophie, 1847. —

Fischer (Prof. Dr. Friedr.), Lehrbuch der Psychologie für akademische Vorlesungen und Gymnasial-Vorträge, Basel, 1838. — *Fischhaber (G. C. F.)*, Lehrbuch der Logik, 1818;—Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 1820;—Ueber das Princip u. die Hauptprobleme des Fichte'schen Systems, 1801. — *Franke (G. C.)*, Ueber die neueren Schicksale des Spinozismus, u. seinen Einfluss auf die Philosophie überhaupt, u. die Vernunft-Theologie insbesondere; eine gekrönte Preisschrift, 1808;—Ueber die Eigenschaften der Analysis u. der analytischen Methode in der Philosophie, 1805;—De ratione qua est critica philosophia ad interpret. librorum imprimis sacrorum, etc.;—Ueber die hauptsächlichsten Stufen der praktischen Philosophie, &c. &c. 1808. — *Franke (Prof. D. Fr.)*, Philosophie und Leben, Berlin, 1831. — *Fries*, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1839. — *Fries (Dr. Jac. Friedr.)*, Handbuch der psychischen Anthropologie, oder der Lehre von der Natur des menschlichen Geistes, Jena, 1839. — *Frorath (Prof. W.)*, Leichtfassliche Lehren aus der Psychologie und Logik, Frankfurt, 1833. — *Fürstenau (K. G.)*, Ideen zu einer gemeinfasslichen Metaphysik der Sitten;—Der prakt. Moral. Idealismus, im Gegensatz des Speculativ-metaphysischen dargestellt, 1803. — *Furtmaier (M.)*, Briefe über das Studium der Philosophie, 1816.

Gabler, Die Hegelsche Philosophie, 1843. — *George*, System

der Metaphysik, 1844.—*Gerd (J. J. H.)*, Grundriss der Philosophie, als Wissenschaft der Wissenschaften, 1819.—*Gerlach (G. W.)*, Lehrbuch der Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der bloßen Vernunft, 1802;—Philosophie, Gesetzgebung u. Aesthetik, &c. &c. 1804;—Anleitung zu einem zweckmässigen Studium der Philosophie, 1815;—Grundriss der Fundamentalphilosophie, &c. &c. 1816;—Der Logik, 1822;—Der Metaphysik, 1817;—Der Religionsphilosophie, 1818;—Der philosoph. Tugendlehre, 1820.—*Gerlach (Prof. G.)*, Lehrbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Halle, 1831.—*Gerlach*, System der Philosophie, 1843.—*Gerstenberg*, u. K. von Villers, über ein gemeinschaftl. Princip der theoret. u. prakt. Philosophie, &c. &c. 1821.—*Glaser*, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, 1841.—*Goldbeck (J. C.)*, Metaphysik des Menschen, 1806.—*Gräter (F. D.)*, Einleitung über den Begriff und die Theile der Philosophie.—*Grohmann (J. C. A.)*, Ueber die philosophische und ästhetische Cultur unseres Zeitalters, einige psycholog. Bemerkungen, 1810.—*Groos (Friedr.)*, Beleuchtung des Endzwecks und der Resultate der Philosophie, Heidelberg, 1833.—*Groos (K. H. Von)*, Lehrbuch der philosoph. Rechtswissenschaft, oder des Naturrechts, 1823.—*Gruber*, Philosophie des Denkens, 1841.

Hagen, Die Sinnestäuschungen, 1837.—*Hamberger*, Die Lehre Jacob Böhme's, 1844.—*Hartenstein*, Die allgem. Metaphysik, 1836.—*Heffler (K. C.)*, Philosoph. Darstellung eines Systems aller Wissenschaften, 1806.—*Heigl (G. A.)*, Die Platonische Dialektik, 1812.—*Heinroth (D. Chr. A.)*, Ueber die Hypothese der Materie und ihren Einfluss auf Wissenschaft und Leben, Berlin, 1828.—*Henrici (G.)*, Ueber die höchsten Grundsätze der Sittenlehre;—Ueber den Begriff u. die letzten Gründe des Rechts, ein historisch-kritisch-azientivischer Versuch zur Begründung einer philosophischen Rechtslehre, 1822.—*Herbart*, Freiheit des Willens, 1836.—*Herbst*, Die Philosophie u. d. Studium, 1836.—*Hermiz*, *Irris. gentil. philosoph.*—*Hersog*, der Mensch u. d. herm. System, 1837.—*Heydenreich (K. H.)*, Kleine Schriften zur Philosophie des Lebens, 1801;—Betrachtungen üb. die Würde des Menschen, im Geiste der Kant'schen Sitten- u. Religionslehre von Gruber, 1803.—*Heyserlingk (H. W. E. Von)*, Metaphysik, eine Skizze zum Leitfaden für seine Vorträge, 1818;—Vergleichung zwischen Fichte's und Herbart's

System, 1817;—Entwurf einer vollständigen Theorie der Anschauungsphilosophie, 1822;—*Hilgers (B. Jos.)*, Ueber Das Verhältniss zwischen Leib und Seele im Menschen, &c., Bonn, 1834.—*Hoffmann (K. J.)*, Die Central Philosophie, 1836;—Zur Philosophie, 1837.

Jackmann (R. P.), Prüfung der Kant'schen Religions-Philosophie; nebst einer Einleitung Von Kant, 1800.—*Jäger*, Darstellung d. Seelenkunde, 1837;—Empirische Psychologie, 1841;—Darstellung der Metaphysik, 1841.—*Jani (J. C.)*, Ueber den neuesten Idealismus der Herren Schelling u. Hegel, 1803.

Kannegiesser (Karl Ludw.), Ueber die Philosophie, 1833; Geschichte der Philosophie, 1837.—*Kapp*, Philosophie, &c., 1845.—*Karpe (F. S.)*, Institutiones philosophiæ dogmaticæ et moralis, 1804;—Darstellung der Philosophie ohne Beinamen, 1802.—*Kayssler (A. B.)*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der neuen Philosophie, 1804;—Ueber die Natur u. Bestimmung des Menschl. Geistes, 1804;—Einleitung in das Studium der Philosophie, 1812; Begriff der Ethik als Wissenschaft, 1816.—*Kerekes*, Abhandlungen über Metaphysik und Naturlehre, 1807.—*Kern (J.)*, Analyse der Grundbegriffe der kritischen Transcendental-Philosophie, 1806.—*Keyserlingk (D. H. Von)*, Die Wissenschaft vom Menschengesichte, oder Psychologie, Berlin, 1829.—*Kiesewetter (K. G. C.)*, Versuch einer fasslichen Darstellung der wichtigsten Wahrheiten der kritischen Philosophie für Uneingeweihte, 1803;—Die wichtigsten Sätze der Allgem. Vernunftlehre, für Richtstudirende, 1806.—*Klencke*, System der organischen Psychologie, 1841.—*Kocher (J. D.)*, Vereinigung der kritischen Philosophie mit der dogmatischen, zur neuen und festen Begründung der Religions-philosophie, 1812.—*König (Ed.)*, System der analytischen Philosophie als Wahrheitslehre, Leipzig, 1833.—*Köppen (Fr.)*, Ueber Offenbarung, in Bezug auf Kant'sche und Fichtesche Philosophie, 1802;—Schelling's Lehre, oder das Ganze der Philosophie des Absoluten Nichts, nebst einem Anhang von Briefen v. Jacobi, 1803;—Ueber den Zweck der Philosophie, 1807;—Leitfaden der Logik und Metaphysik, 1809;—Darstellung des Wesens der Philosophie, 1810;—Rechtslehre nach Platonischen Grundsätzen, mit Anwendung auf unsere Zeit, 1820.—*Krauss (K. Chr. Fr.)*, Vorlesungen über das System der Philosophie, Göttingen, 1828;—Abriss des

Systemes der Philos. Ebend. 1828;—Philosophischer Nachlass, 1837.—*Kretschmar (A. C.)*, Neue Darstellung der philosoph. Religionslehre, 1823.—*Kreyesi (Prof. Frs.)*, Versuch einer Ein- und Anleitung zum Studium der Philos. und Grundzüge der Erfahrungseelenlehre, &c. Wien, 1829.—*Krug (Prof. W. T.)*, Handbuch der Philosophie, Leipzig, 1828.—*Kunhardt (H.)*, Skeptische Fragmente, oder Zweifel an der Möglichkeit einer vollendeten Philosophie, 1806;—Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in einer fasslichen Sprache dargestellt, 1808;—Ideen über den wesentlichen Character der Menschheit, und über die Gränze der philosoph. Erkenntniss, 1813.

Lautier (D. G. A.) Philosophische Umriss, Berlin, 1828;—Die Philosophie des absoluten Widerspruchs, 1837; Programm zur Philosophie, 1843.—*Lavater (T. C.)*, Physiognomik, Wien, 1829.—*Lénstrom*, De Princ. Philos. Spinoz. 1843.—*Leo (T. B. A.)*, Krito, oder über den Wohlthätigen Einfluss der Kritischen Philosophie, 1806.—*Lessing*, Dass wir noch kein System der Philosophie gehabt, 1845.—*Lichtenfels*, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1836.—*Likawetz (J. C.)*, Elementa Philosophiae in usum auditorum philosophiae adumbrata, 1820.—*Lossius, (J. C.)*, Neuste philosoph. Litteratur;—Neues philosophisches allgem. Reallexikon, 1807.

Maass (J. G. E.), Briefe über die Antinomie der Vernunft;—Grundriss der Logik, zum Gebrauch bei Vorlesungen, 1823.—*Maczeck (J.)*, Entwurf der reinen Philosophie, 1803.—*Mager*, Ueber die Hegelsche Philosophie, 1837.—*Manschgo*, Die Lehre des Menschen, 1845.—*Marbach*, Geschichte d. Philosophie, 1837.—*Marheincke*, Zur Kritik der Schellingschen Offenbarungs-Philosophie, 1843.—*Martensen*, Moralphilosophiens System, 1841;—Grundriss der Moralphilosophie, 1846.—*Meilinger (Fl.)*, Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik, 1821.—Commentatio philosoph. de quæstione, 1812;—Ueber die Gründe der hohen Verscheidenheit der Philosophie im Ursatze der Sittenlehre bei ihrer Einstimmigkeit im Einzelnen derselben, &c., 1812.—*Menzser*, Naturphilosophie, 1847.—*Mets (G. B.)*, Grundlinien zu einem System der Allgem. prakt. Philosophie, 1802.—*Michelet*, Die letzten Systeme der Philosophie, 1837; Anthro. u. Psycholog., 1840;—Entwicklungsgeschichte der neuesten deut. Philosophie, 1843.—*Muratori*, Ueber den Ge-

brauch der Vernunft, 1837.—*Mutschelle* (S.), Beiträge zur Metaphysik in einer Prüfung der Stattler-antikant'schen, 1801; —Versuch einer solchen fasslichen Darstellung der Kant'schen Philosophie, &c., 1805.

Naumann (M. E. A.), Ueber die Gränzen zwischen Philosophie u. Naturwissenschaft, 1823.—*Nees u. Esenbeck*, Naturphilosophie, 1841.—*Neubig* (Prof. D. A.), Die Grundlage der Philosophie, 1829.—*Neumann* (Joh.), Principien der Philosophie und Moral, 1814.—*Nüsslein*, Die Metaphysik, 1836.—Geschichte der Philosophie, 1837.

Oken, Ueber das Universum, als Fortsetzung des Sinnensystems, &c., 1808;—Lehrbuch des Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1811, 1843.—*Orelli*, Spinoza's Leben u. Lehre, 1843.

Patie (C. L. A.), Philosoph. Betrachtungen, 1814.—*Paulus* (H. I. G.), Die posit. Philos. der Offenbarung, 1843.—*Philosophie* der Philosophie, 1840.—*Pöhlitz* (K. H. L.), Encyclopädie der gesammten philosophischen Wissenschaften, &c., 1807;—Die Philosophie, Wissenschaften, &c., 1813.—*Prussing*, Die Philos. d. sel. Hermes, 1840.—*Püllenbergh* (Prof. F.), Geschichte der Philosophie, &c., Lemgo, 1831.

Rätze (J. G.), Herder gegen Kant, &c. 1800;—Die Freiheit des Willens, 1801.—*Reif* (L.), Anfangsgründe der prakt. Philosophie, oder, Sitten u. Tugendlehre, nach Kant's Grundsätzen, 1818;—*Reiff*, Der Anfang der Philosophie, 1840.—*Reinhold*, Geschichte der Philosophie, Gotha, 1828, 1836;—Handbuch der allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie, Gotha, 1829;—Wissenschaft der Philosophie, 1837.—*Reuss* (M.), Initia doctrinae philosophiae solidioris, 1801;—Vorlesungen über die theoretisch-praktische Philosophie.—*Richter*, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1837.—*Ritter* (H.), Geschichte der Ionischen Philosophie, 1821;—Vorlesungen zur Einleitung in die Logik, 1823;—Geschichte der Philosophie, Hamburg, 1829, 1837.—*Risner*, Die Philosophie bei den Katholiken in Altbayern, &c. 1836.—*Rosenkranz*, Kritik d. Schleiermacherschen Glaubens-Lehre, 1836;—Psychologie, 1837;—Erläuter. d. Hegel'schen Systems, 1840.—*Rückert* (J.), Realismus, oder Grundsätze zu einer durchaus praktischen Philosophie, 1801.

Salat (J.), Ueber den Geist der Philosophie, &c. 1803;—Erläuterung einiger Hauptpunkte der Philosophie, 1812;—Grund-

zügen der allgem. Philosophie, &c. 1820;—Die Religions-Philosophie, &c. &c. 1821;—Darstellung der Moralphilosophie, 1821.—*Sander*, Ueber die Natur der Dinge, 1841.—*Schad* (J. B.), Geist der Philosophie unserer Zeit, 1800;—Grundriss der Wissenschaftslehre, 1800;—System der Natur- und Transcendentalphilosophie, 1804;—Institut. philosophiæ universæ, 1815.—*Schäferberger* (Fr.), Kritik der Schrift. Darstellung des Wesens der Philosophie von Köppen, nebst Darlegung der Philosophie des Verfassers, 1813.—*Schaller*, Die Philosophie uns. Zeit, 1836;—Geschichte der Natur-Philosophie, 1841;—Vorlesungen über Schleiermacher, 1843.—*Schelle* (K. G.), Welche Zeit ist's in der Philosophie? 1800.—*Schelling's* Offenbarungsphilosophie, 1843.—*Scherr*, Die Philosoph. &c. Ideen, 1840;—Geschichte der Philosoph. Ideen, 1841.—*Schirlitz*, Propäd. d. Philosoph. 1836.—*Schluter*, Die Lehre des Spinoza, 1836.—*Schmid* (Prof. Heincr.), Versuch einer Metaphysik der inneren Natur, Leipzig, 1834;—Ueber d. Wesen d. Philosophie, 1836.—*Schmölde*, Docum. phil. Arab. 1836.—*Schneider* (E. C. G.), Versuch einer Entwicklung und Berichtigung der Grundbegriffe der philosoph. Rechtslehre, &c. 1801.—*Schopenhauer* (A.), Die Welt, als Wille und Vorstellung, &c. 1819.—*Schubert* (Von), Innere Seelenkunde, 1837.—*Schwab* (T. C.), Vergleichung des Kant'schen Moralprinzips mit den Leibnitz-Wolf'schen, 1800;—Ueber die Wahrheit der Kantschen Philosophie, &c. 1803.—*Schwarz*, Die Philosophie der Gegenwart, 1846.—*Sengler* (Prof. D.), Ueber das Wesen und die Bedeutung der speculativen Philosophie, Mainz. 1834;—Speculative Philosophie, 1837.—*Sigwart* (Dr. H. C. W.), Das Problem von der Freiheit u. der Unfreiheit des menschlichen Willens, Tübingen, 1839;—Geschichte der Philosophie, 1844.—*Snell* (F. W. D.), Lehrbuch für den ersten Unterricht in der Philosophie, 1821.—*Snell* (J. F.), Geisteslehre, oder Unterricht über den Menschen, &c. &c. 1822.—*Snell*, Handbuch der Philosophie für Liebhaber, Giessen, 1833.—*Snellmann*, Idee der Persönlichkeit, 1841.—*Socher* (G.), Grundriss der Geschichte der philosoph. Systeme, von den Griechen bis auf Kant, 1803.—*Solger's* Philosophie v. Schmidt, 1841.—*Steck* (C. G.), Die Geschichte der Philosophie.—*Steininger*, La Philosophie Allemande, 1841.—*Stelling* (P. M.), Der Moderne Atheismus, 1843.—*Stöger* (J.), Prüfung des philosoph. Grundsatzes, &c., 1814.—*Struve* (Von), Geschichte der Phrenologie, 1843.—

Snabedissen (Prof. Th. A.), Von dem Begriffe der Psychologie, Marburg und Cassel, 1829;—*Grundz. d. Metaphysik*, 1836.

Tafel, Die Fundamentalphilosophie, 1847.—*Tennemann (W. G.)*, Geschichte der Philosophie, Leipzig, 1829.—*Thilo (L.)*, Begriff und Eintheilung der Allwissenschaft oder der sogenannten Philosophie, 1818.—*Thomas*, Kant und Herbart und Rosenkranz, 1836;—*Spinoza als Metaphysik*, 1840.—*Trendelenburg*, Logische Untersuchung, 1840.—*Trentowski*, Philosophie, 1837.—*Troxel*, Vorlesungen über Philosophie, 1841.

Ulrich, Kritik der Hegel'schen Philos. 1841;—Das Grundprincipium der Philosophie, 1845.—*Umbreit (A. E.)*, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, Heidelberg, 1831;—Nothgedrungene Beilage zur Psychologie als Wissenschaft, Heidelberg, 1833.

Venturini (K. H. G.), Vernunft oder Offenbarung, welcher soll ich glauben? Worte eines Unbefangenen, 1819;—Versuch einer allgem. verständlichen Darstellung der Kritischen Philosophie für Freunde des philosoph. Studiums, 1800.—*Vincas*, Systeme der Philosophie, 1846;—Die Natur ein System, 1847.

Weiller (Caj. Von), Anleitung zur freien Ansicht der Philosophie, 1804;—Verstand und Vernunft, 1807;—Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, &c. 1813.—*Weisse (C. H.)*, Grundzüge der Metaphysik. Hamburg, 1835.—*Wendell (J. A.)*, Grundzüge der Kritik der Philosophien Kant's, Fichte's u. Schelling's, &c. &c. 1810;—Skeptische Logik, &c. 1819.—*Wenzel (G. J.)*, Canonik des Verstandes u. der Vernunft, &c. 1801;—Elementa philosophiae methodo critica adorn. 1806.—*Werder*, Die Lehre v. d. menschl. Erkenntniss, 1841.—*Wickart*, Metaphys. Anthropologie, 1845.—*Wiggers (G.)*, Socrates als Mensch, als Bürger und als Philosoph., oder Versuch einer Charakteristik des Socrates, 1811.—*Willm*, Essai sur la Philosophie de Hegel, 1837.—*Windischmann (C. J. H.)*, Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte, Bonn, 1829.—*Wirth*, System der speculat. Ethik. 1841.—*Wötzel (J. K.)*, Versuch eines neuen Entwurfs des einzig richtigen u. zweckmässig dargestellten Systems der transcendentalen Elementar-Philosophie, &c. &c. 1802;—Versuch der einzig zweckmässigen Propädeutik der Vernunftlehre oder Logik, &c. 1802;—System der empirischen Anthropologie, &c. 1803.

Zeitschrift, Für Philosophie u. specul. Theologie v. Fichte, &c. —*Zeller*, Die Philosophie der Griechen, 1843.

NOTE E.

The following is a list of French Authors, with their respective publications, who discuss the principles of Philosophy more or less through the medium of Theology, and on whose writings we have not been able, for want of space, to make any remarks.

Allets (Edouard), Œuvres morales et religieuses.—*Alliot (l'Abbé)*, La philosophie des sciences, 1838, 2 vol.—*Archange (Capucin)*, Dissertations philosophiques, historiques et théologiques, sur la religion catholique, 2 vol.—*Blanc-Saint-Bonnet*, De l'unité spirituelle, ou de la société et de son but au-delà des temps, 1841, 3 vol.—*Bonnetain (Joanny)*, De l'humanité, et de ses divers ordres de civilisation, 2 vol.—*Boulland (Auguste)*, Histoire des transformations religieuses et morales des peuples, 1829, 1 vol.—*Brunod (l'Abbé)*, Réflexions philosophiques sur les rapports de l'intelligence créée avec l'intelligence créatrice, et sur les moyens que la divine providence a préparés à l'homme pour arriver à son bonheur, 1 vol.—*Cacheux (l'Abbé)*, Essai sur la philosophie du Christianisme considéré dans ses rapports avec la philosophie moderne, 1841, 2 vol.—*Delalle (l'Abbé)*, Cours de philosophie, 3 vol. ;—Manuel de philosophie, ou éléments historiques et critiques de la philosophie chrétienne, 1 vol. ;—Psychologie, ou traité de l'immortalité de l'âme, 1 vol.—*Forichon (l'Abbé)*, La phrénologie et le matérialisme combattus dans leurs fondements, et l'intelligence étudiée dans son état normal et ses aberrations chez l'homme et chez les animaux, 1838, 1 vol.—*Gerbet (l'Abbé)*, Des doctrines philosophiques sur la certitude dans leurs rapports avec les fondements de la théologie, 1 vol. ;—Conférences philosophiques catholiques ; introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire, 1834, 1 vol.—*Nicolas (Auguste)*, Etudes philosophiques sur le Christianisme, 1843, 2 vol. ;—Quelques considérations sur le panthéisme, 1842, 1 vol. ;—De l'éclecticisme, 1840.—*Saisset (Emile)*, Etudes sur *Ænésidème*, 1840, 1 vol.—*Sénac (l'Abbé A.)*, Le Christianisme considéré dans ses rapports avec la civilisation moderne, 1837, 2 vol.—*Véry (P.)*, Philosophie de la religion, 1838, 1 vol.

NOTE F.—Page 281.

We give the following extracts from M. Cousin, which bear upon his ideas of the Deity, His attributes, and Creation generally:—
 “Leusippe, Epicure, Lucrèce, Bayle, Spinoza, et tous les penseurs un peu exercés, démontrent trop aisément, que de rien on ne tire rien, que du néant rien ne peut sortir; d’où il suit que la création est, je ne dis pas possible, mais nécessaire.”... “Créer est une chose très-peu difficile à concevoir, car c’est une chose que nous faisons à toutes les minutes; en effet, nous créons toutes les fois que nous faisons un acte libre... Ainsi causer, c’est créer; mais avec quoi? avec rien? Non, sans doute; tout au contraire, avec le fond même de notre existence.”... “Toutes les idées que nous pouvons nous faire de la création, sont empruntées, en dernière analyse, à la conscience de notre causalité personnelle. Or, dans la *causation*, pour me servir de ce mot anglais, il y a création d’une détermination intérieure, ou d’un *mouvement externe*, c’est-à-dire la création de *quelque chose de phénoménal*. Partant de-là, qui peut nous permettre de concevoir légitimement la *création de substance*?”—(Fragments Philosophiques, pp. 181, 221.)

“L’idée d’attacher une substance à chaque objet conduisant à une multitude infinie de substances, détruit l’idée même de substance; car la substance étant ce au de-là de quoi il est impossible de rien concevoir relativement à l’existence, doit être unique pour être substance. Il est trop clair que des milliers de substances qui se limitent nécessairement l’une l’autre, ne se suffisent point à elles-mêmes, et n’ont rien d’absolu et de substantiel. Or, ce qui est vrai de mille est vrai de deux. Je sais que l’on distingue les substances finies, qui me paraissent fort ressembler à des phénomènes, le phénomène étant ce qui suppose nécessairement quelque chose au de-là de soi, relativement à l’existence. Chaque objet n’est donc pas une substance; mais il y a de la substance dans tout objet, car tout ce qui est ne peut être que par son rapport à *celui qui est celui qui est*, à celui qui est l’existence, la substance absolue. C’est là que chaque chose trouve sa substance; c’est par-là que chaque chose est substantiellement; c’est ce rapport à la substance qui constitue l’essence de chaque chose. Voilà, pourquoi l’essence de

chaque chose ne peut être détruite par aucun effort humain, ni même supposée détruite par la pensée de l'homme ; car pour la détruire, ou la supposer détruite, il faudrait détruire, ou supposer détruit, l'indestructible, l'être absolu, qui la constitue."—(Fragments, p. 348.)

"Comme la raison n'est pas autre chose que l'action des deux grandes lois de la causalité et de la substance, il faut qu'immédiatement la raison rapporte l'action à une chose et à une substance intérieure, savoir, le moi ; la sensation à une cause et à une substance extérieure, le non-moi : mais ne pouvant s'y arrêter comme à des causes vraiment substantielles, tant parce que leur phénoménalité et leur contingence manifeste leur ôtent tout caractère absolu et substantiel, que parce qu'étant deux, elles se limitent l'une par l'autre, et s'excluent ainsi du rang de substance, il faut que la raison les rapporte à une cause substantielle unique, au delà de laquelle, il n'y a plus rien à chercher relativement à l'existence, c'est-à-dire en fait de cause et de substance, car l'existence est l'identité des deux."... "Le fait de conscience contient déjà les trois grandes idées que la science plus tard divise ou résume, mais qu'elle ne peut dépasser, savoir, l'homme, la nature, et Dieu. Mais l'homme, la nature, et le Dieu de la conscience, ne sont pas vaines formules, mais des faits et des réalités. L'homme n'est pas dans la conscience sans la nature, ni la nature sans l'homme, mais tous deux s'y rencontrent dans leur opposition et leur réciprocité, comme des causes, et des causes relatives, dont la nature est de se développer toujours l'une par l'autre."—(Fragments, p. 76.)

"Eh bien ! Messieurs, ce monde ainsi métamorphosé par la puissance de l'homme, cette nature qu'il a refaite à son image, cette société qu'il a ordonnée sur la règle du juste, ces merveilles de l'art dont il a enchanté sa vie, ne suffisent point à l'homme. Sa pensée s'élance au delà et derrière ce monde, qu'il embellit et qu'il ordonne : l'homme, tout puissant qu'il est, conçoit et ne peut ne pas concevoir une puissance supérieure à la sienne, et à celle de la nature ; une puissance qui sans doute ne se manifeste que par ses œuvres, c'est-à-dire par la nature et par l'humanité, qu'on ne contemple que dans ses œuvres, qu'on ne conçoit qu'en rapport avec ses œuvres, mais toujours avec la réserve de la supériorité d'essence et de l'absolue omnipotence.

"Enchaîné dans les limites du monde, l'homme ne voit rien qu'à

travers ce monde, et sous ces formes mêmes il suppose irrésistiblement quelque chose qui est pour lui la substance, la cause et la modèlè de toutes les forces et de toutes les perfections qu'il aperçoit et dans lui-même et dans le monde. En un mot, par delà le monde de l'industrie, le monde politique et celui de l'art, l'homme conçoit Dieu. Le Dieu de l'humanité n'est pas plus séparé du monde qu'il n'est concentré dans le monde. Un Dieu sans monde est pour l'homme comme s'il n'était pas ; un monde sans Dieu est une énigme incompréhensible à sa pensée, et pour son cœur un poids accablant.

“ L'intuition de Dieu, distinct en soi du monde, mais y faisant son apparition, est la religion naturelle. Mais comme l'homme ne s'était pas arrêté au monde primitif, aux beautés naturelles, il ne s'arrête pas non plus à la religion naturelle. En effet, la religion naturelle, c'est-à-dire l'instinct de la pensée qui s'élance jusqu'à Dieu à travers le monde, n'est qu'un éclair qui illumine son âme, comme l'idée de l'utile. Mais, dans ce monde, tout tend à obscurcir, à distraire, à égarer le sentiment religieux. Que fait donc l'homme ? Il fait ici ce qu'il a fait précédemment, il crée, à l'usage de l'idée nouvelle qui le domine, un autre monde que celui de la nature, un monde dans lequel, faisant abstraction de toute autre chose, il n'aperçoit plus que son caractère divin, c'est-à-dire son rapport avec Dieu. Le monde de la religion, Messieurs, c'est le culte. En vérité, c'est un sentiment religieux bien impuissant que celui qui s'arrêterait à une contemplation rare, vague et stérile. Il est de l'essence de tout ce qui est fort de se développer, de se réaliser. Le culte est donc le développement, la réalisation du sentiment religieux, non sa limitation. Le culte est à la religion naturelle ce que l'art est à la beauté naturelle, ce que l'Etat est à la société primitive, ce que le monde de l'industrie est à celui de la nature. Le triomphe de l'intuition religieuse est dans la création du culte, comme le triomphe de l'idée du beau est dans la création de l'art, comme celui de l'idée du juste est dans la création de l'Etat. Le culte est infiniment supérieur au monde ordinaire en ce que, 1°, il n'a d'autre destination que celle de rappeler Dieu à l'homme, tandis que la nature extérieure, outre son rapport à Dieu, en a beaucoup d'autres qui distraient sans cesse la faible humanité de la vue de celui-là ; 2°, parce qu'il est infiniment plus clair, comme représentation des choses divines ; 3°, parce qu'il est per-

manent, tandis qu'à chaque instant, à nos mobiles regards, le caractère divin du monde s'affaiblit ou s'éclipse tout à fait. Le culte, par sa spécialité, par sa clarté, par sa permanence, rappelle l'homme à Dieu mille fois mieux que ne le fait le monde. C'est une victoire sur la vie vulgaire plus haute encore que celle de l'industrie, de l'Etat, et de l'art.

"Mais, Messieurs, à quelle condition le culte rappelle-t-il efficacement l'homme à son auteur ? A la condition inhérente à tout culte, de présenter ces rapports si obscurs de l'humanité et du monde à Dieu, sous des formes extérieures, sous de vives images, sous des symboles. Parvenue là, sans doute l'humanité est arrivée bien haut, mais a-t-elle atteint sa borne infranchissable ? Toute vérité, c'est-à-dire ici, tous les rapports de l'homme et du monde à Dieu, sont déposés, je le crois, dans les symboles sacrés de la religion. Mais la pensée peut-elle s'arrêter à des symboles ? L'enthousiasme, après avoir entrevu Dieu dans ce monde, crée le culte et entrevoit Dieu encore. La foi s'attache aux symboles ; elle y contemple ce qui n'y est pas, ou du moins ce qui n'y est que d'une manière indirecte et détournée : c'est là précisément la grandeur de la foi, de reconnaître Dieu dans ce qui visiblement ne le contient pas. Mais l'enthousiasme et la foi ne sont pas, ne peuvent pas être les derniers degrés du développement de l'intelligence humaine. En présence du symbole, l'homme, après l'avoir adoré, éprouve le besoin de s'en rendre compte. Se rendre compte, c'est une parole bien grave que je prononce. A quelles conditions, en effet, se rend-on compte ? A une seule : c'est de décomposer ce dont on veut se rendre compte ; c'est de le transformer en pures conceptions, que l'esprit examine ensuite, et sur la vérité ou la fausseté desquelles il prononce. Ainsi, à l'enthousiasme et à la foi succède la réflexion. Or, si l'enthousiasme et la foi ont pour langue naturelle la poésie, et s'exhalent en hymnes, la réflexion a pour instrument la dialectique ; et nous voilà, Messieurs, dans un tout autre monde que celui du symbolisme et du culte."—(Cousin, "Cours de Philosophie," 1840.)

NOTE G.—Page 322.

In presenting this list of modern French writers on philosophy

to our readers' attention, we sincerely regret, on account of our want of space, our having thus to pass over many distinguished authors without a word of comment on their several able and truly enlightened publications. There are very many names, on this list, for whose talents and learning in metaphysical science we feel the highest respect; and among the number, (without, however, insinuating the slightest disparagement of many others), we beg to mention M. Tissot, M. Rémusat, M. Armand-Saintes, M. Renouvier, Emile Saisset, and the Baron Barchon de Penhœn; all of whom are writers of splendid talents, and view philosophy through a rational and healthy medium.

Arens, Cours de Psychologie, fait sous les auspices du gouvernement, 2 vol.—*Allets* (Edouard), Harmonies de l'intelligence humaine, 1846, 2 vol.—*Alliot* (l'Abbé), La philosophie des sciences, &c. 1844, 2 vol.—*Allmeyer*, Cours de philosophie de l'histoire, fait à l'Université libre de Bruxelles, 1 vol.—*Amard* (L. F. F.), Homme, Univers, et Dieu, ou Religion et gouvernement universel, 1844, 2 vol.—*Amice* (F. S.), Manuel de philosophie expérimentale, &c., 1 vol.—*Ampère*, Essais sur la philosophie des sciences, &c., 2 vol.—*Armand-Saintes*, Histoire critique du Rationalisme en Allemagne, depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours, 1 vol.—*Auger*, Mélanges philosophiques et littéraires, 1828, 2 vol.—*Barbe* (l'Abbé E.), Cours élémentaires de philosophie, à l'usage des établissements d'éducation, 1846, 1 vol.—*Barthes*, Nouveaux éléments de la science de l'homme, 1806, 2 vol.—*Belorimo* (l'Abbé), Des passions dans leurs rapports avec la religion, la philosophie, la physiologie et la médecine légale, 1844, 2 vol.—*Bénard* (Ch.), Précis d'un cours élémentaire de philosophie, 1845, 1 vol.—*Berger*, Exposition de la doctrine de Proclus, 1841, 1 vol.—*Bersot* (Ernest), Du spiritualisme et de la nature, 1846, 1 vol.—*Bland*, Traité élémentaire de physiologie et de philosophie, &c., 3 vol.—*Blein* (A.), Essais philosophiques sur la dialectique, la métaphysique, la morale, le culte religieux et la physique, 1 vol.—*Bonstetten*, Etudes de l'homme, &c., 2 vol.;—Recherches sur la nature et les lois de l'imagination, 1807, 2 vol.—*Bordas-Demoulin*, Le Cartésianisme, ou la véritable rénovation des sciences, &c., 2 vol.;—Mélanges philosophiques et religieux, 1845, 1 vol.—*Bosselli*, De l'union de la philosophie avec la morale, 1 vol.—*Brun*,

Leçons idéologiques pour apprendre à la jeunesse à contracter des habitudes sociales et des habitudes morales, 1 vol.—*Buob* (Ch.), Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion, d'après la méthode psychologique, 1843, 1 vol.;—Philosophie de l'absolu en Allemagne, dans ses rapports avec la doctrine chrétienne, 1842, 1 vol.—*Caraman* (le Duc de), Histoire des révolutions de la philosophie en France pendant le moyen âge jusqu'au xvi^e siècle, &c. &c., 1845, 2 vol.—*Cardaillac*, Etudes élémentaires de philosophie, 2 vol.—*Caudenberg* (Gérard de), Rénovation philosophique, etc., 1838, 1 vol.—*Charma*, Essai sur les bases et les développements de la moralité, &c. &c., 1 vol.;—Leçons de logique, 1 vol.;—Leçons de philosophie sociale, 1 vol.;—Essai sur la philosophie orientale, professé à la faculté des lettres de Caen, 1842, 1 vol.—*Collineau*, (F. C.) Analyse physiologique de l'entendement humain, &c., 1842, 1 vol.—*Combalot*, (l'Abbé), Eléments de philosophie Catholique, 1842, 1 vol.;—*Cournault* (Ed.), Exposition des principes actuels de la philosophie, &c., 1 vol.—*Cros*, Théorie de l'homme intellectuel et moral, 1838, 2 vol.—*Crousse*, (L. D.) Des principes, ou philosophie première, 1846, 1 vol.—*Dassance*, (l'Abbé,) Cours de philosophie, 3 vol.—*Daube*, Question proposée par l'académie des sciences morales et politiques : Quelles sont les applications pratiques les plus utiles que l'on pourrait faire du principe de l'association volontaire ou privée au soulagement de la misère ? Examen de cette question, 1 vol.—*Decorde*, Des facultés humaines comme éléments originaires de la civilisation et du progrès, 2 vol.—*Delarivière* (P. S. T.), Nouvelle logique classique, 1 vol.—*Demouville*, Introduction à la philosophie primitive, &c., 1843, 1 vol.—*Desdouits*, L'homme et la création, ou théorie des causes finales dans l'univers, 1 vol.—*Doney* (l'Abbé), Nouveaux éléments de philosophie, d'après la méthode d'observation et la règle du sens commun, 2 vol.—*Dufour* (Ph.), Essai sur l'étude de l'homme considéré sous le double point de vue de la vie animale et de la vie intellectuelle, 1833, 2 vol.—*Duguet*, Pythagore, ou Précis de philosophie ancienne et moderne dans ses rapports avec les métamorphoses de la nature, ou la métempsychose, 1841, 1 vol.—*Farcy* (Fr. Ch.), Aperçu philosophique des connaissances humaines au 19^{me} siècle, 1827, 1 vol.—*Faure*, Aperçus philosophiques sur le monde physique et sur le monde

intellectuel et moral, 1843, 1 vol.—*Felets (l'Abbé)*, Mélanges de philosophie, d'histoire et de littérature, 1828, 6 vol.—*Flotte*, Leçons élémentaires de philosophie, 3 vol.—*Fortin-d'Urban (de)*, De l'immortalité de l'âme, 1 vol.—*Franck (Ad.)*, Esquisse d'une histoire de la logique, précédée d'une Analyse détaillée de l'*Organum* d'Aristote, 1 vol.—*Gabet*, Traité élémentaire de la science de l'homme, considéré sous tous ses rapports, 1842, 3 vol.—*Garnier (Ad.)*, Précis d'un cours de psychologie, &c., 1 vol.;—La psychologie et la phrénologie comparées, 1840, 1 vol.—*Gasc (F. P.)*, Philosophie générale des connaissances humaines, &c., 1845, 1 vol.—*Gasc (fil.)*, Etudes historiques et critiques sur l'instruction secondaire, &c., 1844, 1 vol.—*Genty (S. G. H.)*, Eléments de philosophie, contenant la logique, l'art du langage, la métaphysique et la morale, 2 vol.—*Gérard (l'Abbé)*, Essai sur les vrais principes relativement à nos connaissances les plus importantes, 1826, 3 vol.—*Gerdy (le Docteur N.)*, Physiologie philosophique des sensations et de l'intelligence, &c., 1846, 1 vol.—*Gérusez*, Nouveaux cours de philosophie, rédigé d'après le nouveau programme, comprenant la psychologie, la logique, la morale, &c., 1843, 1 vol.—*Gibon*, Cours de Philosophie, 1842, 2 vol.;—Fragments philosophiques, 1836, 1 vol.—*Harmotin (Emile)*, Nouvelle théologie philosophique, &c., 1846, 2 vol.—*Jacob (L. H.)*, Essais de philosophie sur l'homme, ses principaux rapports et sa destinée, fondés sur l'expérience et la raison, suivis d'observations sur le beau, 1 vol.—*Ladevi*, Réfutation du matérialisme, et démonstration du spiritualisme par la physiologie et la psychologie, 1 vol.—*Larroque (Patrice)*, Cours de philosophie, 1 vol.—*Leroux (Ant.)*, Pneumatologie, nouveau système philosophique sur l'origine et le but final de toute chose, d'après les théories élevées de la philosophie, depuis les brachmanes jusqu'à nos jours, 1 vol.—*Leroy (Charles-Georges)*, Lettres philosophiques sur l'intelligence et la perfectibilité des animaux, avec quelques lettres sur l'homme, 1802, 1 vol.—*Lorquet*, Discours sur la méthode de Descartes; *Novum Organum* de Bacon; Théodicée de Leibnitz; Fragments publiés avec des notes, 1840, 1 vol.—*Mallet*, Etudes philosophiques, 2 vol.;—Manuel de philosophie à l'usage des élèves qui suivent les cours de l'université, 1 vol.—*Matter (Jacq.)*, Histoire critique du gnosticisme, et de son

influence sur les sectes religieuses et philosophiques des dix premiers siècles de l'ère chrétienne, 3 vol. — *Masure*, Cours de philosophie, 2 vol. ; — *Etudes du Cartésianisme*, &c., 1 vol. — *Meister*, Mélanges de philosophie, de morale, et de littérature, 2 vol. ; — *Métaphysique nouvelle*, ou *Essai intellectuel et moral de l'homme*, 3 vol. — *Noël*, Cours de philosophie, ou *Logique complète de Condillac*, &c., 1 vol. ; — *Leçons de philosophie morale*, 1 vol. — *Ott*, Hegel et la philosophie Allemande, &c. &c., 1 vol. — *Osaném (A. J.)*, Dante et la philosophie catholique au xiii^e siècle, 1840, 1 vol. — *Osaneux*, Nouveau système d'études philosophiques, etc., 1 vol. — *Paffe (C. M.)*, Considérations sur la sensibilité mise en sa place, et présentée comme essentiellement distincte du principe intellectuel, 1832, 1 vol. — *Para Du Phanjas (l'Abbé)*, Théorie des êtres sensibles, etc., 3 vol. — *Perrard (J. F.)*, Introduction à la philosophie, ou *Nouvelle logique française*, 1 vol. ; — *Nouvelle logique classique*, etc. etc., 2 vol. — *Pickard*, Ebauche d'un essai sur les notions radicales, 2 vol. — *Pinel (Louis)*, Essais de philosophie positive, 1845, 1 vol. — *Ponelle (Edm.)*, Manuel complet de philosophie, etc., 1 vol. — *Rajon (J. M.)*, Cours philosophique et interprétatif des initiations anciennes et modernes, 1843, 1 vol. — *Raoux (Ed.)*, De la destinée de l'homme d'après les lois de sa nature, 1845, 1 vol. — *Receveur (F. G.)*, Essai sur la nature de l'homme, l'origine des idées et le fondement de la certitude, 1834, 1 vol. — *Redern (le Comte de)*, Considérations sur la nature de l'homme en soi-même et dans ses rapports avec l'ordre social, 1835, 2 vol. ; — *Modes accidentelles de nos perceptions*, etc. etc., 1 vol. — *Saisset (Emile)*, Essais sur la philosophie et la religion au xix^e siècle, 1845, 1 vol. — *Saphari*, L'école éclectique et l'école française, 1844, 1 vol. — *Schoen (F. L.)*, L'homme et son perfectionnement, 1845, 1 vol. — *Segretain (E. A.)*, Des éléments de l'état, etc., 2 vol. — *Servant De Beauvais*, Manuel classique de philosophie, 1834, 1 vol. — *Siard (Victor)*, Essai philosophique sur la loi de progressibilité universelle et son application au sort de l'homme, 1843, 1 vol. — *Thibault (J. B.)*, Pensées sur l'homme, 1844, 1 vol. — *Thurot*, De l'entendement et de la raison, introduction à l'étude de la philosophie, 1833, 2 vol. — *Tissot*, Anthropologie spéculative générale, etc. etc., 1843, 2 vol. ; — *Cours élémentaire de philosophie*, etc., 1840, 1 vol. ; — *Histoire*

abrégée de la philosophie, 1840, 1 vol.—*Vacherot*, Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie, 2 vol. 1846.—*Villain*, Dissertation philosophique et métaphysique sur l'identité de la vie intellectuelle et matérielle de tous les êtres qui vivent et qui végètent sur la terre; Théorie électrique et thérapeutique, 1833, 1 vol.—*Villeterque (Alex.)*, Veilles philosophiques, ou Essais sur la morale expérimentale et la physique systématique, 2 vol.—*Zeller*, Essai sur l'homme, 2 vol.

Mellin (M.), Principes Métaphysiques du Droit, suivis d'un projet de paix perpétuelle, &c., traduit de l'Allemand par M. Tissot. 1837.—*Rémusat (M. Ch. De)*, Essais de Philosophie, 1842, 2 vol.;—*Abélard*, Paris, 1845;—De la Philosophie Allemande, Paris, 1845.—*Tissot (J.)*, Critique de la Raison Pure, 1845, 2 vol.—*Barni (J.)*, Critique du Jugement, suivie d'un Essai sur le Beau, &c. 1845;—Critique de la Raison Pratique, précédée des fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs, &c. 1847.—*Ravaisson (Félix)*, Essai sur la métaphysique d'Aristote, 1846.—*Mège (Amédée)*, Le Philosophisme réduit à sa plus simple expression, &c., Paris, 1846.—*Nicolas (Auguste)*, Etudes Philosophiques, &c., Paris, 1846.—*Gerusez (E.)*, Cours de Philosophie, &c., Paris, 1846.—*Lorquet (A.)*, La philosophie et la religion, Paris, 1847.—*Javari (M.)*, De la Certitude, Paris, 1847.—*Pezani (André)*, Exposé d'un nouveau Système philosophique, Paris, 1847.—*E. Saisset*, Manuel de Philosophie à l'usage des Collèges, Paris, 1847.—*Plisson (F. E.)*, Les mondes, ou essai philosophique sur les conditions d'existence des êtres organisés dans notre Système planétaire, Paris, 1847.—*Lezard (M. P. L.)*, Résumés Philosophiques, Paris, 1847.—*Giordano Bruno*, Son histoire et ses œuvres, traduit par M. Christian Bartholmès, 1847, 2 vol.—*Frank (M.)*, De la Certitude, Rapport à l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, avec une longue introduction, 1847, 1 vol.—*Salines et De Scorbiac*, Précis de l'histoire de la Philosophie, Paris, 1848.

NOTE H.—Page 343.

The following observations, in defence of Rosmini's Philosophy,

are taken from the "Lettere di un Rosminiano a Vincenzo Gioberti," Brusselle, 1841:—

"La quale sentenza se, nella vostra maniera di esprimerla troppo esclusiva, è erronea, verissima si fa, quando invece di dire *fuori dell'ontologismo*, diceste solo, che *nel psicologismo* la scienza è incompetente a fondare la certezza e il dovere su basi inconcusse. Intesa a questo modo quella sentenza voi potete bensì con pienissima ragione pronunciarla contro quella scienza che, disperando della filosofia, finisce con dire che lo *scetticismo* è l'ultima parola che la ragione umana può pronunciare sopra se stessa, e che bisogna fare allo scetticismo la sua parte legittima nell'intelletto umano, legando così la scuola scozzese a quella di Kant, la quale veramente non è che uno sviluppo della prima. Voi potete anzi un simile giudizio portare su tutti quei filosofi, i quali vogliono edificare la scienza movendo da un punto di partenza puramente *Psicologico*; e non siete già solo a pensarla così, nè il primo. Ma una tale sentenza non può colpire il sistema del Rosmini, il cui punto di partenza è ideologico e non psicologico; e non è psicologico se non quanto l'ente ideale si prende, non com'egli è e a noi si mostra, ma come un prodotto soggettivo del pensiero astratto."—(Lett. 1. pp. 13, 14.)

"Certamente che noi riflettiamo sul pensiero in quanto ne abbiamo l'interno sentimento, cioè in quanto siamo tratti a riflettervi da un sentimento che è come l'occasione, e voleva quasi dire lo stimolo, che attua la nostra potenza di riflettere; a quel modo stesso che voi pure dite, che *l'insegnamento autoritativo è occasione o strumento indispensabile, non causa produttiva della razional cognizione*. Ma altro è dire che il sensibile interno è l'occasione o la condizione indispensabile per riflettere, altro è dire che non si può riflettere che al sensibile interno. E la vostra riflessione ontologica non è ella pure soggetta a questa medesima condizione? Non l'assoggettate voi come a condizione *sine qua non* ad appoggiarsi alla parola che reste l'idea d'una forma sensibile?"—(Lett. ii. p. 41.)

"Come distinguate voi la riflessione psicologica dall'ontologica? Dal fermarsi che ella fa al puro intuito, o dal ripiegare il suo pensiero non già sull'intuito solo ma sull'oggetto intuito, cioè sull'ente. La vostra riflessione ontologica non si distingue adunque dalla psicologica neppure per l'oggetto diverso su cui esse si portano, ma solo pel modo diverso con cui considerano l'oggetto

stesso, ossia l'intuito: l'una lo considera solo subbiettivamente, d'onde il suo nome di *psicologica*, dal nome che ha nella lingua greca l'*anima*, (soggetto); l'altra lo considera obbiettivamente, d'onde il suo nome *d'ontologica*, dall'ente che è l'oggetto dell'intuito; o meglio, l'una è parziale imperfetta, l'altra è imparziale perfetta." —(Lett. 3. p. 38.)

"Siccome la riflessione si porta come su proprio oggetto sull'intuizione o cognizione diretta, ella deve comprendere tutto, nè più nè meno, che è contenuto nell'intuizione. Che se ella comprende meno, è difettosa, mutila la verità; e comprender di più non può, se non quanto il di più che comprende, lo piglia dall'immaginazione. Nell'uno come nell'altro caso la filosofia è erronea per *difetto* nel primo, per *eccesso* nel secondo. Or voi credete che la riflessione del filosofo è essenzialmente difettosa, perchè la considerate come un'astrazione, quasi una sottrazione, per cui il pensiero sottrae il reale dall'essere intuito; e quindi dite che la riflessione non arriva e non può arrivare che ad un ente possibile astratto, come Primo psicologico." —(Lett. 1, pp. 18, 19.)

"La vera questione che forma il tema del Nuovo Saggio è questione d'osservazione, di fatto, d'osservazione interna e nulla più. Di che si vede come invano voi accusiate il Rosmini d'aver seguito un metodo vizioso trascinatovi *dalle preoccupazioni del suo secolo*. Il Rosmini nel Nuovo Saggio seguita appunto quel metodo che la natura della questione ivi trattata gl'imponessa. Egli non avrebbe potuto meglio servirsi di un altro metodo di quel che possa servirsi *delle mani e degli orecchi* per apprendere la luce e i colori." —(Lett. 1, p. 16.)

"Stabilito che la questione proposta dal Rosmini nel Nuovo Saggio si è quella del *principio dello scibile*, e non del *principio e base del reale*, chi per poco pon mente a ciò che può essere *principio dello scibile*, non può fallir di vedere che la questione di un tale principio non può consistere in altro, che nell'esaminare quale sia l'incatenamento naturale delle *idee* e de' pensieri umani, affinché, trovate le relazioni di dipendenza che hanno fra di loro, si riesca finalmente a conoscere e stabilire quale sia quella fra tutte le idee, quel *primo noto*, che non dipenda, non abbia bisogno delle altre per poter esser concepita dalla mente umana, e dalla quale le altre tutte dipendano, non possano cioè essere concepite, senza che essa mente concepisca insieme quella prima." —(Lett. 1, pp. 15, 16.)

NOTE I.—Page 389.

The Italian Universities, where mental philosophy is now cultivated with comparative ardour and zeal, are very numerous, and all of considerable antiquity. There are in all the libraries attached to them, an extensive collection of works on the Scholastic Philosophy, and on the age which immediately followed it. The names of the Universities are Bologna, Salerno, Naples, Padua, Rome, Perugia, Pisa, Sienna, Pavia, Turin, Parma, Florence, Catania, Cagliari, Genoa, and Modena. In addition to the Universities, there have been long established various literary and scientific institutions. These were commenced in the fifteenth century, and they have contributed greatly to the support of a free and independent tone in all speculative disquisitions and philosophical inquiries. One of the earliest of these societies is that of the *Accademia della Crusca* of Florence; the Imperial Institution of Milan, and the Academy of Sciences at Turin, have indirectly proved useful, of late years in particular, in fostering studies intimately related to the science of mind.

NOTE J.—Page 464.

We beg to notice here, in reference to the metaphysical philosophy of Belgium and Holland, that the name of Van Wymperse is twice inserted in this work; namely, in Volume II. p. 453, and in Volume IV. c. 5, p. 407. This last insertion was the effect of mistake, which was not discovered till after the sheet was struck off; but which we were not particularly anxious to rectify, inasmuch as his name seemed in some measure necessary to fill up that historical portion of time between the publication of the works of Hemsterhuys and the termination of the last century. We have therefore left the double insertion without any alteration.

We regret that we have not been able to obtain the metaphysical speculations of M. Van Meenen, jun., of Brussels; and our regret is considerably heightened from the circumstance that we have reason to believe, from the best authority, that they are not only

interesting in themselves, but that they give a promise of the author's taking a respectable position in the future philosophical history of his country. We have also to regret that we have not been able to meet with M. Quetelet's treatise, "On the Freedom of the Human Will." We understand it abounds with ingenious and original views of this knotty and hitherto unsolved question.

NOTE K.—Page 489.

We have not formally mentioned the philosophy of Portugal. Its scholastic speculations were incorporated with those of Spain, from which it has been separated only about two hundred years. The University of Coimbra was, in the latter part of the seventeenth and the greater part of the eighteenth centuries, the principal seat of metaphysical learning. Pombal, during his energetic government, from 1750 to 1777, imparted a more liberal spirit of philosophical criticism into scholastic studies, and a current of comparatively independent thinking has flowed through the educated classes of Portugal ever since. The speculations of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Locke, became known to several teachers of learning, and talent; and within the last century the range of scientific reading has been considerably extended.

One Portuguese work, containing some metaphysical speculations, has fallen into our hands. It is called "*Meditações ou Discursos Religiosos*," Lisbon, 1844, by José Joâ. Rodrigues de Bostos. This work has been extremely popular throughout Portugal. It treats of the general principles of theology and morality; and the parts of the treatise which bear more directly on mental science, are those in which the author shews the influence which the current notions of *philosophical liberalism* have exercised over correct ideas of religious duty and moral obligation. His statements are concise, clear, and forcible; and he shews himself no mean proficient in the philosophical literature of the times.

The general literature of Hungary, as well as its philosophy, seems to be little known in Europe. It would appear, however, from several historical sources of credit, that a speculative spirit existed among the monastic orders of this country in the eleventh century. In the twelfth, when the University of Paris was esta-

blished, many young men of birth and talent were sent from Hungary to this seat of learning, especially those who were destined for the Church. In the commencement of the thirteenth century the first *studium generale* was established at Wessprim, an institution modelled in almost every respect after the University of Paris. Here, it is said, the peculiar doctrines which form the staple articles of the Scholastic Philosophy were regularly and zealously discussed. A similar institution to the one at Wessprim was afterwards founded at Buda, to which learned professors were appointed, who discussed the principles of metaphysical theology with great learning and acuteness. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a more liberal system of philosophical inquiry was gradually introduced to the chief seats of learning in the country; and public teachers became acquainted with many of the leading metaphysical theories of Germany, France, and England. At the present day, the public Library at Pesth contains upwards of 100,000 volumes, among which may be found many of the works of the most distinguished mental philosophers of Europe.

NOTE L.—Page 542.

The metaphysical talents of Mr. O. A. Brownson are well known throughout the United States. He is an able critic on mental philosophy; and the several articles which have appeared from his pen in the *Quarterly Review* are of a first-rate character.

There are 168 Colleges or Academies in the United States, in all of which mental science is more or less cultivated. In most of them there are regular courses of Lectures delivered on the subject every year.

NOTE M.—Page 582.

The most full and practical development of the Doctrine of Temperaments, is unquestionably Huarte's Spanish work, which we have noticed in Vol. II. p. 154. This author attempted to do what the most zealous of the Phrenologists of the present day have endeavoured to accomplish; that is, to ground early educa-

tion upon certain physical or bodily qualifications or aptitudes. The speculations of the Spanish author are infinitely more ingenious, and scientifically developed, than any thing to be found in Combe's work relative to the bearings of Phrenology on general instruction.

In the writings of Dr. Thomas Forster, now of Bruges, in Belgium, some excellent remarks will be found on Physiology and other branches of knowledge nearly allied to it.

I beg to add in this Note a few observations on *Clairvoyance*, from the pen of a popular lecturer on Mesmeric phenomena, and a gentleman of great general knowledge and information, William Brookes, Esq., who has obligingly communicated to me his opinion on the subject. "I refer," says he, "all so called cases of *clairvoyance*, to the ordinary laws or principles of sympathy, sentiment, or thought. As an illustration of this I might cite the case of Alexis, and the experiment made at Victor Hugo's, in the presence of Lord Brougham and other distinguished individuals. Mrs. Damer Dawson, who was put *en rapport* with the patient, asked him some questions. Among other things, she told him she had left behind in her boudoir, a *locket*, containing the hair of three *great men*, and could he tell her their names? He did tell her, to the utter astonishment of all present; who conceived that Alexis had annihilated distance, and penetrated opaque bodies. The truth was, however, that he had before him, and *en rapport* with him, one who knew all she had asked, and thus her own mind furnished the answers to her own questions, without her consciousness of the fact. But in order to accomplish this, Mrs. Damer Dawson was placed as a third party in mesmeric relation with Alexis, when she asked this question; and, therefore, there arose out of this connection a communion of sentiment between them; and she, exercising highly active volitional powers upon his passive susceptibility, impressed him with the glowing images of her imagination, and the ideas of her intellect. Let us suppose he had seen the boudoir, the locket, and the hair in it. How from the colour or any other property would the knowledge be conveyed to him, whose heads the several lots of hair belonged to? Yet his answer was satisfactory and full; the one was Wellington's, the other Napoleon's, and the third Nelson's. Suppose his clear, and far-seeing eye had enabled him to penetrate all intervening obstacles, would

any power of vision have enabled him to pronounce to whom these several portions of hair originally belonged? Certainly not. But how much is the thing simplified, when we find that he was not required to exercise any extra power of vision at all; but that his fortunate answer was referable to the mere action of sympathy, increased to an unusual degree by the peculiar idiosyncracies of the beings concerned, and the operation called mesmeric or nervous relation."

"There is nothing in mesmeric phenomena repugnant to common sense or common observation. The word '*sympathy*' has invariably been indicative of *mutual sensations*, or the susceptibility of being affected by the feelings or emotions of another; therefore, I consider all such experiments as the one just mentioned, as mere elucidations of the general law. As a proof of this, I shall refer to the Rev. Chauncy Hare Townshend, a most trustworthy and amiable writer on matters relating to mesmerism. He operated on a valet of his own, a Frenchman, of respectable information in his sphere of life. He was, however, deeply tainted with infidelity; but when he was placed under mesmeric influence, he became extremely pious, and evinced a decided repugnance to every anti-religious sentiment. The Rev. Gentleman does not, however, seem to be aware, that when the mesmeric relation was once established, that he substituted his own more just and refined notions into his valet, who now no longer thought and acted for himself, but was the mere channel through which opinions and feelings opposite to his own were conveyed. And hence the chief features and advantages of mesmerism—its power under proper direction to correct and modify the *morbid* conditions of mind, as manifested in hypochondriacal and monomaniacal hallucinations approaching to insanity."

The following are the leading views of Mr. Brooks, on Mesmeric phenomena, which he laid before the Bishop of Oxford, and on which the whole of the examination of the subject was conducted by his Lordship and Mr. Brooks.

"That there is in the nervous system a fluid, (force, power, agency or influence, the name being taken as merely arbitrary) subject to the volition of the animal, though he is not conscious of its existence, and of which nothing can be predicated.

"That its primary function may be the transmission of im-

||

2 T

pressions from the peripheral extremities of the sensitive nerves to the sensorium, and the transmission of the will from the centre or seat of volition to the muscles, which are to be influenced by it in contraction, &c.

"That this fluid possesses a greater or less affinity for its like, in or around other bodies with which it is capable of entering into combination.

"That by the force of his volition, man is able to propel this influence still further beyond the surface of his own body, so as to force it into contact and combination with the like agency in or around another body placed in a certain degree of proximity.

"That when thus powerfully propelled into the system of another, it is capable of producing various changes in the condition and mode of action of the other.

"That the force of the operation will depend upon the quality and quantity of the operator's agency, and his power of propulsion on the one hand, and the quality and quantity of resistance on the other.

"That the *existence* of this agency is capable of proof, although its *substance* cannot be demonstrated."

The following observations are worthy of remark, from the pen of Mr. Townshend:—

"The fourth cause which has banished Mesmerism from the rank and position to which it is entitled, is the early attempt to assimilate it to the certain sciences in an erroneous manner. In our researches into the discovery of Mesmer, we have, from the beginning, struck into a path which never could lead us to the desired end; and then, most unreasonably, we have charged upon the subject of our inquiry the fault which existed in ourselves. Because we have found nothing, when we did not seek aright, we have impatiently concluded that there was nothing whatever to be found. Perhaps the error has originated with the Mesmerists themselves. To secure the suffrage of scientific men for their favourite pursuit is evidently desirable. How should they accomplish this? The days are long since past in which men were content to reason after the vague mode of the Aristotelian philosophy, which leant upon conjecture rather than experiment, and discussed absurdities as gravely as the ordinary phenomena of nature. The world has reached an era, in which facts, attested by the senses, independent

of the human will, and invariably reproduced under the same circumstances, can alone engage the attention of the learned. With the scientific men of our day, (and far be it from me to censure this) certainty is the great object. In order, then, to claim the notice and the fostering protection of science, the friends of Mesmerism have long endeavoured to identify their presumed agent with physical forces already ascertained and of invariable action. In their principle, perhaps, they are right—in its application, wrong altogether. Forgetting that Mesmerism is a mental and vital, not less than physical phenomenon, and that mind and life are in perpetual opposition to the laws of the material world, they have endeavoured to recognise in Mesmerism an operation as constant as that of the galvanic battery or the electric vial. A certain school of German writers, especially, have theorised on our subject after the false method of explaining one class of phenomena in nature, by its fancied resemblance to another. Wishing, perhaps, to avoid the error of the Spiritualists, who solve the problem in debate by the power of the soul alone, they have ransacked the material world for analogies to Mesmerism, till the mind itself has been endued with its affinities and its poles. Such attempts as these have done the greatest disservice to the cause we advocate. They submit it to a wrong test. It is as if the law of life should be applied to a question in acoustics. It is as if we should expect to find in a foreign kingdom the laws and customs of our own. Thus wrongly biassed, we turn away from Mesmerism, as provoked at finding it other than we deemed it to be; as the Prince in the fairy tale, who found his betrothed, though very charming, not in the least like her portrait, and so sent her back in disgrace. Who has not experienced a thousand times the same feeling? We read, perhaps, a description of some lovely scene; we thence form an image of it in our thoughts. We at length behold it, and are discontented to find it endued, perhaps, with even more beauty than we had imagined; because the beauty is of a different kind. There is rock where we expected smooth turf; there is wildness, where we looked for cultivation; there is a withered oak, where we had in fancy placed a human dwelling. If, in matters of taste, preconceptions like these prepare the way for disappointment; in matters of reason they are not less calculated to awake disgust. A science that is misconceived, labours under peculiar

disadvantages. Thus, then, till the initial step towards a comprehension of Mesmerism be taken anew, there is no hope that it will ever be understood or appreciated. Why unavailingly seek to reduce it to a formula of which it is unsusceptible? If we ascribe it to a power already ascertained, why not treat it, at least, as an entirely new function of that power? Why limit it to what we know, when possibly it may be destined to extend the boundaries of our knowledge? Why are we to be trammelled with foregone conclusions? Yet upon these very restrictions the opponents of Mesmerism insist: thus taking away from men the means of investigating the agency in question, by forcing them to set about it in the wrong way." (*Facts in Mesmerism, &c., 1844.*)

The following works may be consulted on this subject:—*Carra, Anti-Magnétisme, &c., Paris.*—*Acaïs, De la Phrénologie, du Magnétisme, et de la Folie, Bruxelles, 1840.*—*Berna, Magnétisme Animal, Paris, 1838.*—*Bertrand, Du Magnétisme Animal en France, Paris, 1828.*—*Billot, Correspondance sur le Magnétisme vital entre un Solitaire et M. Deleuze, Paris, 1848.*—*Burdin et Dubois, Histoire Académique du Magnétisme Animal, &c. &c. Paris, 1841.*—*Chardel, Essai de Psychologie Physiologique, &c., Paris 1838.*—*Charpignon, Etudes Physiques sur le Magnétisme Animal, Paris, 1843.*—*Deleuze, Histoire critique du Magnétisme Animal, Paris, 1819;—Instructions pratiques sur le Magnétisme, Paris, 1826.*—*D'Henin De Cuvillers, Exposition critique du Système et de la doctrine mystique des Magnétistes, Paris, 1822.*—*Dupau, Lettres physiologiques et morales sur le Magnétisme Animal, Paris, 1826.*—*Dupotet, Cours du Magnétisme Animal, Paris, 1840.*—*Foissac, Rapports et discussions de l'Académie royale de médecine sur le Magnétisme Animal, Paris, 1833.*—*Frapart, Lettres sur le Magnétisme et le Somnambulisme, Paris, 1839.*—*Gauthier, Introduction au Magnétisme, &c. &c., Paris, 1840.*—*Lafont-Gouzi, Traité du Magnétisme Animal, &c. &c.*—*Mesmer, System der Wechselwirkungen Theorie und Anwendung des thierischen Magnetismus als die allgemeine Heilkunde zur Erhaltung des Menschen, herausgegeben von Wolfart, Berlin, 1814;—Précis historique des faits relatifs au Magnétisme Animal, London, 1781;—Mémoire sur ses découvertes, Paris;—Mémoire sur la découverte du Magnétisme Animal, Genève, 1779.*—*Montègre, Du Magnétisme Animal et*

de ses partisans, &c., Paris, 1812.—*Pythagor*, Recherches, expériences, et observations physiologiques sur l'homme dans l'état de somnambulisme provoqué par l'acte Magnétique, Paris, 1811;—*Du Magnétisme Animal*, &c. &c., Paris, 1809.—*Ricard*, Traité théorique et pratique du Magnétisme Animal, &c. &c., Paris, 1841.—*Thourenel*, Mémoire physique et médical montrant des rapports évidents entre les phénomènes de la baguette Divinatoire du Magnétisme et de l'Electricité, London, 1781.—*Wolfart (C.)*, Der Magnetismus gegen die Stieglitz-Hufelandische Schrift oder den thierischen Magnetismus, Berlin, 1816;—*Formulaire oder Lehre der Abfassung von Rezepten*, Frankfurt, 1803;—*Ueber die Bedeutung der Zeichenlehre in der Heilkunde*, Berlin, 1812.—See also the *Phrenological Journal*, the *Critic*, the *Medical Times*, and the *Zoist*.

INDEX OF NAMES.

- ANNA, Andrea, iv. 351.
 Abelard, ii. 41.
 Abercrombie, John, iv. 65.
 Abicht, Joh. Heinr. iii. 365.
 Achard, iii. 184.
 Achillini, Alexander, ii. 139; iv. 546.
 Accordini, Sig. iv. 332.
 Adamantus, iv. 584.
 Adams, Rev. Jasper, iv. 541.
 Adalard of Bath, ii. 53.
 Adelung, J. C. i. 439.
 Ænesidemus, i. 182.
 Agnelli, Scipione, i. 71; ii. 163.
 Agrippa, i. 184.
 Agrippa, C. ii. 119; iv. 573.
 Aguesseau, Henry Francis d', ii. 402.
 Ahrens, H. i. 439; iv. 453, 630.
 Ahron, iv. 618.
 Akenside, iii. 470.
 Akibha, i. 372.
 Alain of the Isles, ii. 53.
 Albert the Great, ii. 66.
 Albertus, iv. 586.
 Alcinoüs, i. 70, 175.
 Alcuinus, i. 428.
 Alembert, d', ii. 326; iii. 173.
 Alexander de Halles, ii. 54.
 Alexander of Aphrodisias, i. 179.
 Alexandrianus, Clemens, ii. 276.
 Alexinus, i. 58.
 Alfarabi, i. 344.
 Alfred the Great, i. 411.
 Algaseli, i. 349.
 Alison, Mr. iii. 431, 509.
 Alkendi, i. 344.
 Allets, Edouard, iv. 625.
 Alliot, l'Abbé, iv. 628.
 Allmeyer, iv. 630.
 Almamon, i. 343.
 Almanzor, i. 343.
 Almaric, ii. 44.
 Almquist, C. J. L. iv. 483.
 Alphonsus, Petrus, ii. 179.
 Alraschid, i. 343.
 Alstedius, iv. 546.
 Altmeyer, M. iv. 486.
 Amard, L. V. F. iv. 630.
 Ambrose, i. 336.
 Amice, F. S. iv. 630.
 Ammonius, i. 99.
 Ampère, iv. 630.
 Anatolius, i. 261.
 Anaxagoras, i. 13, 14.
 Anaximander, i. 10, 444.
 Anaximenes, i. 12, 13.
 Ancillon, iii. 544; iv. 284.
 Andreas, Antonius Johannes, iii. 178.
 Andres, Abbate D. Juan, iii. 326.
 Andria, Antonius, ii. 178.
 Anselm, St. of Canterbury, ii. 35, 496.
 Anselme of Laon, ii. 52.
 Antiochus, i. 147.
 Antiochenes, i. 56.
 Antoninus, M. Aurelius, i. 175.

- Apelt, iv. 618.
 Aphrodisias, Alexander, l. 99.
 Apollonius, l. 13.
 Apollonius of Tyana, l. 994.
 Apuleius, l. 70, 928.
 Aquinas, Thomas, ii. 17, 86; iv. 566.
 Aranzo, Father Franciscus d', ii. 177.
 Arcesilanus, l. 143.
 Archelans, son of Apollodorus, l. 16.
 Archin, iv. 618.
 Archytas, l. 17.
 Arcisius, Gregorius Valentianus, ii. 178.
 Arexio, Cesalpina d', ii. 187.
 Argyropylos, John, ii. 181.
 Aristippus, l. 86.
 Aristobulus, l. 321.
 Aristotle, l. 2, 8, 11, 13, 15, 28, 83, 72.
 Armand-Saintes, iv. 630.
 Arnaud, Abbé, l. 70.
 Arnauld, ii. 333, 408.
 Arnobius, l. 257, 308.
 Arteaga, iii. 238.
 Aschenbrenner, iv. 618.
 Asclepiades, iv. 871.
 Askelöf, Chr. iv. 482.
 Asoto, Father Dominic, ii. 178.
 Assemani, l. 360.
 Ascheton, William, iii. 29.
 Ast, Fred. l. 439; iv. 618.
 Athanasius, l. 332.
 Athenagoras, St. l. 251.
 Athenodorus of Tarsus, l. 178.
 Atkinson, Mr. iv. 876.
 Attar, Ferideddin, l. 477.
 Atterbörn, P. A. iv. 483.
 Auger, iv. 630.
 Augustine, St. l. 16, 261, 306, 337;
 ii. 376.
 Aurivillius, Petr. iv. 472.
 Auvergne, William of, ii. 34.
 Avonpace, l. 363.
 Averroes, l. 92, 383.
 Avicobron, l. 381.
 Avicenna, l. 247, 476; iv. 672.
 Azelias, Isaac, iv. 473.
 Azelson, A. iv. 474.
 Ayleworth, William, ii. 399.
 Azals, H. iv. 256, 644.
 Azzolino, Pompeo, iv. 338.
 Baader, Frans Xavier, iv. 141, 618.
 Backmann, l. 99.
 Bacon, Lord, l. 89; ii. 11, 180.
 — Roger, ii. 90.
 Bailey, Samuel, iii. 106, 106; iv. 91.
 Bailly, ii. 449.
 Balbus, Camillus, iv. 846.
 Baldinotti, iii. 236.
 Ballanche, M. iv. 927.
 Ballantyne, John, iv. 63.
 Balthasar, Walter, of Silesia, ii. 167.
 Baltus, l. 276.
 Balsac, V. iv. 618.
 Balso, Father Del, iii. 212.
 Bannes, D. ii. 179.
 Barbe, l'Abbé E. iv. 630.
 Barbeyrac, l. 276.
 Barclay, iv. 846.
 Bardili, C. G. iv. 114.
 — W. iv. 618.
 Barham, Mr. iv. 88.
 Barkovich, Francesco Vincicalao, iii.
 226.
 Barni, J. iv. 634.
 Baroli, Pietro, iv. 388.
 Baronius, ii. 34.
 Barthez, iv. 630.
 Basil, l. 334.
 Basnaga, l. 368.
 Batteaux, Abbé, iii. 256.
 Bauer, iv. 618.
 Baumgarten, iii. 97.
 Baur, iv. 616.
 Bautin, Abbé, iv. 229.
 Baxter, Andrew, ii. 428.
 Bayer, Dr. Carl, iv. 618.
 Bayle, l. 38, 360; iii. 82, 522.
 Bayrhammer, Dr. K. T. iv. 618.
 Bazedow, iii. 70.
 Baser, Jean, ii. 395.
 Beasley, Rev. F. ii. 248; iv. 520.
 Beattie, Dr. James, iii. 316.

- Beaufort, Le Marquis de, iv. 436.
 Beaumont, Sir Henry, iii. 512.
 Beausobre, iii. 182.
 Beauvais, Vincent de, ii. 84.
 Bécart, M. iv. 480.
 Bede, i. 432.
 Beck, Cave, ii. 370.
 — Jacob Sigismund, iii. 391.
 Begnelin, iii. 182.
 Belgioioso, Le Princesse de, iv. 327.
 Bell, Sir C. iv. 611.
 Belorimo, l'Abbé, iv. 630.
 Belot, iv. 546.
 Belsham, iii. 309.
 Benard, Ch. iv. 630.
 Bencke, F. E. iv. 616.
 Bérard, F. iv. 349.
 Berchetti, i. 439.
 Berchon de Penhoen, i. 439.
 Berg, F. iv. 618.
 Berger, iv. 630.
 — G. D. iv. 146.
 — J. iv. 618.
 Bergk, J. A. iv. 616.
 Berington, ii. 33.
 Berkeley, Bishop, iii. 100, 441.
 Berna, iv. 644.
 Bernardi, i. 70, 99.
 Bernot, Ernest, iv. 630.
 Bertrand, iv. 644.
 Bessarion, Bishop of Nice, ii. 108.
 Bethón, A. iv. 482.
 Bhagavad-Ghita, The, i. 211.
 Bichat, iv. 555.
 Biemann, iv. 616.
 Biese, iv. 616.
 Bilberg, Joh. iv. 474.
 Billot, iv. 644.
 Billovius, J. iv. 473.
 Billroth, iv. 616.
 Bini, Vicenzo, iv. 331.
 Biran, Maine de, iv. 199.
 Birnbaum, iv. 616.
 Bivar, Father Franciscus de, ii. 177.
 Bjurbaeck, iv. 479.
 Blair, Dr. iii. 427.
 Blaindale, Rev. Ellen, iv. 541.
 Blanc-Saint-Bonnet, iv. 628.
 Bland, iv. 630.
 Blein, A. iv. 630.
 Blessig, Joh. Laur. i. 439.
 Elix, Magnus, iv. 479.
 Block, G. M. iv. 616.
 — M. G. iv. 473.
 Bockshaumer, G. F. iv. 616.
 Bodemeyer, iv. 616.
 Boethius, i. 279.
 — Dan. iv. 490.
 — J. iv. 473.
 Boerhaave, iv. 549.
 Böhme, C. F. iv. 616.
 — Jacob, ii. 149.
 Bühnen, iv. 546.
 Bohnius, Joannes, iv. 573.
 Boileau, ii. 409.
 Bonald, Viscounts de, iv. 231.
 Bonaventure, St. ii. 62.
 Bonnetain, Joanny, iv. 628.
 Bonnet, Charles, iii. 297.
 Bonstetten, iv. 630.
 Bordas-Demoulin, iv. 630.
 Born, F. G. i. 439; iii. 292.
 Bosovich, iii. 227.
 Bossuet, ii. 233, 286, 288.
 Bottara, Pietro, iv. 348.
 Boulainvilliers, Count de, ii. 455.
 Boullier, Fran. iv. 289.
 Boulland, Auguste, iv. 628.
 Bouterweck, Frederic, iv. 107.
 Bouvier, i. 439.
 — François, iv. 464.
 Bowen, Francis, i. 439; iv. 542.
 Boyer, J. B. Marquis d'Argens, iii. 185.
 Bosselli, iv. 630.
 Bragge, Robert, iii. 29.
 Braid, Dr. iv. 579.
 Brandis, i. 439; iv. 572.
 Brandis, C. A. iv. 616.
 Brandise, J. iv. 616.
 Branias, Prof. D. Jul. iv. 616.
 Bray, Charles, iv. 94.

- Brecciano, Pietro Tamburini, iii. 240.
 Bremari, Gregorio, iii. 233.
 Breton, Char. Joseph, iv. 464.
 Brinkmann, C. G. iv. 616.
 Briassot, J. P. iv. 289.
 Brokeby, iii. 22.
 Brooks, Mr. iv. 576, 577, 640, 641.
 Broughton, John, iii. 26.
 Broccasala, F. J. V. iv. 247.
 Brown, Dr. Thomas, iii. 190; iv. 28.
 Browne, Isaac Hawkins, iv. 38.
 —, Peter, iii. 124.
 Brownson, Mr. O. A. iv. 634.
 Bruce, John, iv. 20.
 Brucker, i. xii., 278, 368, 429; ii. 6, 409; iii. 363.
 Brückner, J. A. iv. 616.
 Brüning, iv. 616.
 Brummack, P. iv. 474.
 Brun, iv. 630.
 Bruno, Giordano, ii. 140.
 Brunod, l'Abbé, iv. 625.
 Benthogge, Richard, iii. 32.
 Buchanan, David, ii. 399.
 Buchez, P. J. B. iv. 238.
 Bucrinaki, V. iv. 616.
 Budd, i. 368.
 Baddus, i. 374, 440; iii. 76.
 Buffier, Father, iii. 149, 184, 429.
 Buhle, Prof. ii. 122, 285; iii. 270.
 — J. G. i. 440.
 Buob, Ch. iv. 630.
 Buonafede, Appiano, iii. 237.
 Baraens, Joh. iv. 471.
 Burdin, iv. 644.
 Burgonovo, i. 368.
 Burgnaave, J. G. iv. 572.
 Burigny, i. 440.
 Burja, A. iv. 616.
 Burke, Mr. iii. 428.
 Berley, i. 2.
 Burnet, Thomas, iii. 19.
 Burton, Asa, iv. 822.
 Busching, Ant. Fr. i. 440.
 Basser, H. iv. 474.
 Butler, Dr. iii. 12.
 Cabanis, i. iv.; iii. 410.
 Cacheux, l'Abbé, iv. 625.
 Cairns, Dr. iv. 100.
 Calabria, Peter, i. 4.
 Calker, Fred. von, iv. 112.
 Calvin, ii. 128.
 Callicles, i. 50.
 Callisen, C. F. iv. 616.
 Campagna, Battista, iv. 388.
 Campanella, Thomas, ii. 147.
 Campe, J. H. iii. 397.
 Canus, Melchior, ii. 170.
 Capafigue, i. 440.
 Capasso, J. B. i. 440.
 Capella, Martin, i. 271.
 Caraman, le Duc de, iv. 631.
 Caramuel, J. de Lobkowits, ii. 179.
 Cardaillac, iv. 631.
 Cardan, ii. 124; iv. 846.
 Carneades, i. 144.
 Carniani, ii. 117.
 Carroll, William, iii. 45.
 Carpenter, Dr. iv. 562, 598.
 Carra, iv. 644.
 Carus, i. 276.
 —, F. A. iv. 616.
 Carriere, iv. 616.
 César, C. A. iv. 616.
 Casman, Otto, ii. 162.
 Cassiodorus, i. 271.
 Casway, R. iv. 83.
 Caudenberg, Gérard de, iv. 631.
 Cave, i. 276.
 Cavour, Marquis Gustave de, iv. 229.
 Cepeda, Alphonsus de, ii. 103.
 Cesarotti, iv. 388.
 Chalybæus, iv. 616.
 Champeaux, William of, ii. 40.
 Chardel, iv. 644.
 Charlston, Mr. ii. 240.
 Charma, iv. 631.
 Charpentier, i. 99.
 Charnignon, iv. 644.
 Charron, ii. 220.
 Cheselden, Dr. iii. 103.
 Cheselopherus, iv. 472.

- Christiernin, P. R. iv. 478.
 Chrysippus, i. 133.
 Chrysostom, i. 338.
 Chrytrius, Daniel, i. 4.
 Cicero, i. 2, 16, 148, 170, 486.
 Ciruelo, Petrus, ii. 103.
 Clarke, Dr. Samuel, iii. 46.
 Clarendon, Lord, ii. 228.
 Claremontius, iv. 846.
 Clement, St. of Alexandria, i. 2, 202, 253, 328.
 Clementis, Joh. ii. 178.
 Clerc, i. 276.
 Clitomachus, i. 156.
 Cochet, iii. 258.
 Coeles, iv. 846.
 Coleridge, S. T. iv. 60.
 Colerus, Jean, ii. 382.
 Collier, Arthur, iii. 119.
 Collineau, F. C. iv. 631.
 Collins, Anthony, iii. 34.
 Collmann, iv. 616.
 Colonna, Ægidius de, ii. 68.
 Colquhoun, J. C. iv. 879.
 Combalot, l'Abbé, iv. 631.
 Combe, Mr. iv. 889.
 Comenius, Amos, ii. 398.
 Compte, Auguste, iv. 307.
 Conches, William of, ii. 49.
 Concio, James, ii. 126.
 Condorcet, i. 41; ii. 482; iii. 408.
 Condillac, Abbé, i. 398; iii. 186.
 Congreve, i. 201.
 Conring, Hermann, ii. 131.
 Conringius, iv. 846.
 Constant, Benjamin, iv. 349.
 Cordemol, Gérard de, ii. 297.
 Coronelli, Antonio, ii. 178.
 Corneto, Adrian Di, ii. 176.
 Cory, J. P. iv. 611.
 Cosmo de Medici, ii. 109.
 Costa, Paolo, iv. 388.
 Cournault, Ed. iv. 631.
 Cousin, M. i. xii., 23, 31, 70, 440; ii. 42, 249, 383, 471, 607; iii. 264, 324, 347, 432, 637; iv. 126, 197, 262, 626.
 Coward, William, iii. 32.
 Crassot, i. 99..
 Crispus, Jean Baptiste, i. 276.
 Cromasiano, i. 440.
 Crommelinck, C. iv. 464.
 Croon, iii. 70.
 Cros, iv. 631.
 Crousey, M., iii. 71, 428.
 Crousse, L. D. iv. 631.
 Crucius, iii. 79.
 Crybbace, J. T. iv. 611.
 Cudworth, Dr. i. xi.; ii. 281.
 Cullen, Dr. iv. 549.
 Cumberland, Richard, iii. 2.
 Cusmus, ii. 274.
 Cuoco, Sig. iv. 387.
 Cusa, Nicholas de, ii. 113.
 Cuvier, iv. 886.
 Cyprian, i. 331.
 Cyprinus, George, i. 278.
 Cyril, i. 332; ii. 276.
 Dacier, i. 70, 440.
 Dahne, i. 224.
 Dalgarno, George, ii. 331.
 Damascenus, St. John, i. 272.
 Damian, Peter, ii. 34.
 Damiron, i. 440; ii. 394.
 — M. Philippe, iv. 287.
 Dandelin, M. iii. 529.
 Dante, ii. 98.
 Dansel, iv. 616.
 Dardini, Jerome, ii. 179.
 Darwin, Dr. iii. 307; iv. 549, 654.
 Dassance, l'Abbé, iv. 631.
 Daub, iv. 617.
 Daube, iv. 631.
 David, i. 276.
 David de Dinant, ii. 498.
 David, Zernach, i. 274.
 Davies, iii. 184.
 — Rev. John, iv. 102, 610.
 Daumer, G. Fr. iv. 616.
 Dawson, Mrs. Damer, iv. 640.
 Day, Jeremiah, iv. 841.
 Dean, Amos, iv. 841.
 De Cock, Nicolai Joseph, iv. 449.

- Decorde, iv. 631.
 De Decker, P. iv. 462.
 Defoos, M. J. H. iii. 529.
 De Gerardo, i. xii. 44, 454; ii. 47,
 325, 500, 504, 511, 514; iii. 54,
 70, 82, 154, 351, 382, 410,
 525, 543; iv. 187.
 Dehaut, M. i. 230; iv. 422.
 Deinhardt, iv. 616.
 De La Forge, Louis, ii. 294.
 Delalle, l'Abbé, iv. 625.
 Delarivière, P. S. T. iv. 631.
 Delaunay, i. 99.
 Delouse, iv. 644.
 Demetrius, i. 175.
 Democritus, i. 2, 39.
 Demonax of Cyprus, i. 175.
 Demouville, iv. 631.
 Denzinger, Ignat. iv. 411.
 De Ram, P. F. Xav. iv. 443.
 Derodon, David, ii. 323.
 Descartes, ii. 222, 226.
 Desdoulis, iv. 631.
 Dealanda, i. 440.
 Destutt-Tracy, i. iv.; iii. 415.
 Deswert, Eug. iv. 463.
 Deutinger, iv. 617.
 De Whytt, iv. 555.
 D'Henin de Cavillers, iv. 644.
 Diderot, i. 440; ii. 492; iii. 144, 254,
 426.
 Digander, Joannes, iv. 546.
 Digby, Sir Kenelm, ii. 268; iv. 573.
 Diestel und Ebel, iv. 617.
 Dinant, David de, ii. 52.
 Diodorus, i. 58.
 Diogenes, i. 56.
 — of Apollonia, i. 13.
 — Laertius, i. 2, 70, 155.
 Dionysius, ii. 29.
 Diron, iii. 476.
 Dmowski, iv. 617.
 Dowell, Henry, iii. 21.
 Dolce, Lodovico, iv. 588.
 Douglas, James, iv. 611.
 Doney, l'Abbé, iv. 631.
 Draghetti, A. iv. 388.
 Drechaler, J. M. iv. 617.
 Drew, Samuel, iv. 19.
 Dreyer, Christian, ii. 131.
 Dorr, Joseph, iv. 260.
 Drummond, Sir William, iv. 14.
 Druste, Hülshof C. A. von, iv. 617.
 Dryden, iii. 472.
 Dubois, W. 644.
 Du Boullay, ii. 44.
 Dufour, Ph. iv. 631.
 Duguet, iv. 631.
 Duhamel, ii. 325.
 Dumarsais, iii. 165.
 Duncan, John, iv. 38.
 Duns Scotus, ii. 69.
 Dupau, iv. 644.
 Du Pin, ii. 23.
 Dapotel, iv. 644.
 Dutens, i. 440.
 Ebel, iv. 617.
 Eben, Ezra, i. 373.
 Eberhard, Joh. Aug. i. 276, 440;
 iii. 394.
 Eberstein, W. L. G. von, iv. 617.
 Eckhartshansen, iv. 165.
 Eckstein, Baron d'. iv. 326.
 Edwards, Dr. Jonathan, i. 116; iv. 492.
 Ehrensward, C. A. iv. 480.
 Ehrlich, iv. 617.
 Ekmark, A. iv. 474.
 Elbougne, A. F. L. d', iv. 418.
 Elliottson, Dr. iv. 576.
 Elmacinus, Geor. i. 360.
 Ely, Ezra Styles, iv. 540.
 Emerson, R. W. iv. 637.
 Empedocles, i. 35.
 Enander, S. N. iv. 472.
 Enberg, L. M. iv. 482.
 Enfield, Wm. i. xi. 386, 440.
 Engel, J. J. iv. 617.
 Engledue, Dr. iv. 606.
 Enbergh, J. iv. 472.
 Epictetus, i. 175.
 Epicurus, i. 2, 126.
 Epiphanius, i. 2, 334.
 Erasmus, ii. 114.
 Erdmann, i. 440; iv. 617.

- Erenberg, Fr. iv. 617.
 Erhard, And. iv. 617.
 Erhardt, S. iv. 617.
 Erigena, John Scotus, ii. 17, 23.
 Ernesti, I. 449; iv. 617.
 Eschenmaler, C. A. von. iv. 140, 617.
 Eubulides, I. 88.
 Euclid, I. 87.
 Eunapius, I. 3.
 Euripides, I. 16, 34.
 Eusebius, I. 3, 231.
 Eustratius, I. 275.
 Euthydemus, I. 59.
 Ewerts, iv. 617.
 Exner, iv. 617.

 Faber, James, II. 121.
 Fabre, M. III. 407.
 Fabriano, Sig. iv. 350.
 Fabricius, I. 276, 360.
 Facciolati, III. 231.
 Faches, I. 71.
 Fagani, Sig. iv. 349.
 Farcy, Fr. Ch. iv. 631.
 Faugère, M. Prosper, II. 263.
 Faure, iv. 631.
 Faxe, J. iv. 478.
 Fearn, John, iv. 86.
 Feder, J. G. H. III. 397, 844.
 Feith, Rhynvis, iv. 403.
 Felets, l'Abbé, iv. 632.
 Fénelon, De la Motte, I. 441; II. 233, 388.
 Ferguson, Adam, III. 324.
 Fernandez, Eleonora, iv. 611.
 Feuerbach, Dr. Ludw. Andr. I. 449; III. 400.
 Feyerlin, III. 70.
 Fichte, J. G. iv. 114, 618.
 — J. Hermann, iv. 177, 618.
 Ficinus, Marcellus, I. 3; II. 106.
 Field, G. iv. 611.
 Fischhaber, G. C. F. iv. 618.
 Fisher, Prof. Dr. Friedr. iv. 618.
 Flaschenius, J. iv. 473.
 Fleming, Malcolm, III. 23.

 Fleury, Abbé, I. 70.
 Flotts, iv. 632.
 Flourcus, P. iv. 867.
 Fludd, Robert, II. 148; iv. 846, 673.
 Foissac, iv. 644.
 Fontenelle, II. 394, 449.
 Forichon, l'Abbé, iv. 628.
 Formey, I. 441; III. 182; iv. 847.
 Forsakäl, P. iv. 474.
 Forster, Dr. Thomas, iv. 640.
 Forsius, S. A. iv. 472.
 Fortia-d'Urban, De, iv. 632.
 Foucher, Abbé Simon, II. 420, 612.
 Fourier, Charles, iv. 293.
 Fraguier, Abbé, I. 70.
 Franck, Ad. iv. 632.
 — M. iv. 634.
 Franke, G. C. iv. 618.
 — Prof. D. Fr. iv. 618.
 Frankenius, Joh. iv. 471.
 Frankonius, Fred. Aug. iv. 470.
 Frapart, iv. 644.
 Frassen, Claudius, II. 179.
 Frederic the Great, III. 178, 179, 185.
 Friedlander, Charles Martin, iv. 442.
 Fries, J. J. I. 4, 441; iv. 618.
 — Dr. Jac. Friedr. iv. 111, 618.
 Froling, M. S. iv. 474.
 Fromond, Claudio, III. 241.
 Fromondus, Libertus, II. 462.
 Fromath, Prof. W. iv. 618.
 Frougdonius, J. M. iv. 471.
 Fulleborn, Professor, I. 24, 441; II. 393.
 Fürstenas, K. G. III. 399; iv. 618.
 Furtmaler, M. iv. 618.

 Gabet, iv. 632.
 Gabler, iv. 618.
 Gale, Theophilus, II. 269.
 Galea, I. 2, 179.
 Gall, Dr. iv. 887.
 Gallupi, Baron Pasquale, iv. 244.
 Gaon, Rabbi, Saadiah, I. 272.
 Garnier, Abbé, I. 70.
 — Ad. iv. 632.

- Garrigue, A. iv. 261.
 Garve, C. iii. 396.
 Gass, F. P. iv. 632.
 — (File) iv. 632.
 Gassendi, i. 99; ii. 283, 492.
 Gaudentius, i. 276, 441.
 Gauthier, iv. 644.
 Gaze, Theodora, ii. 109.
 Gedike, i. 2, 441.
 Gemmet, ii. 34.
 Genovesi, iii. 220.
 Genty, S. G. H. iv. 632.
 Gentskenius, S. i. 441.
 George, iv. 612.
 Gérard, l'Abbé, iv. 632.
 Gerbert, (Silvester II.) ii. 32.
 — l'Abbé, iv. 623.
 Gerd, J. J. H. iv. 619.
 Gerdil, Cardinal, iv. 326.
 Gerdy, le Docteur N. iv. 632.
 Gerlach, G. W. iv. 619.
 — Prof. G. iv. 619.
 Gérard, M. iii. 414.
 Gêruses, iv. 632.
 Gerson, Chancellor, ii. 44, 64, 72.
 Gerstenberg, iv. 619.
 Geulinx, Arnold, ii. 393.
 Gesenius, iv. 472.
 Gibbon, Mr. ii. 449.
 Gibon, iv. 448, 632.
 Gilber, Bishop of Poitiers, ii. 48.
 Gillies, Dr. i. 76, 78.
 Gioberti, Vincenzo, i. lvii.; iii. 432;
 iv. 368.
 Gioja, Melchiorre, iv. 347.
 Glanvil, Joseph, ii. 307; iii. 136.
 Glaeser, iv. 619.
 Goclenius, i. 71, 441; ii. 138; iv. 846,
 572.
 Godes, G. Frid. i. 441.
 Goethe, i. 69; ii. 378.
 Goldbeck, J. C. iv. 619.
 Gomez, Bartholemi, ii. 179.
 Gonzalez, Francisco, ii. 177.
 Gordon, Bernard, iv. 804.
 Gorgias, i. 47.
 Gorlaeus, David, iii. 63.
 Gothus, Launtius Paulinus, iv. 471.
 Gottmark, J. iv. 479.
 Gottsched, iii. 77.
 Gouget, ii. 278.
 Gräter, F. D. iv. 619.
 Gratalorus, iv. 646.
 Gravesande, G. J. S', iii. 84.
 Gravius, i. 441.
 Greatraker, Valentine, iv. 873.
 Greaves, James Pierrepont, iv. 97.
 Gregory of Nyssa, i. 336.
 Gregory, St. i. 268.
 — Dr. James, iv. 21.
 Grétry, André Ernest Modeste, iv. 402.
 Grimaldi, Francesco Antonio, iii. 241.
 Grohmann, J. C. A. iv. 619.
 Gronos, Giuseppe, iv. 330.
 Groos, Friedr. iv. 619.
 Groos, K. H. Von, iii. 400; iv. 619.
 Grubbe, Samuel, iv. 481.
 Gruber, iv. 619.
 Gruyer, L. A. i. lviii.; iii. 628; iv. 438.
 Guarini di Verona, i. 70.
 Guedon de Berchere, iv. 419.
 Guenard, Antoine, ii. 249.
 Guevara, Petrus de, ii. 103.
 Guillery, M. Hippolyte, iii. 529.
 Guillon, i. 441.
 Garlitta, i. 441.
 Gyllenstople, M. iv. 472.
 Hagen, iii. 70; iv. 619.
 Halbertama, M. T. H. iii. 629.
 Hale, Sir Matthew, ii. 276.
 Hallam, i. xi., 441, 476; ii. 107, 118,
 132, 203, 218, 279, 306, 337.
 Halle, Dr. Hughes Fraser, iv. 611.
 Hallmann, Joh. iv. 474.
 Hamann, J. G. iii. 387.
 Hamburger, iv. 619.
 Hamskold, L. i. 441.
 Hammariköld, L. iv. 483.
 Hamilton, Sir William, iii. 190; iv. 80.
 Hampden, Dr. ii. 62, 494.
 Hampton, Benjamin, iii. 27.

- Harmotin, Emile, iv. 632.
 Hartenstein, iv. 619.
 Hartley, Dr. iii. 294.
 Hartman, G. L. iv. 482.
 Harria, Mr. iii. 160, 247.
 Haumont, M. iv. 421.
 Hedge, Levi, iv. 619.
 Hefster, K. C. iv. 619.
 Hegel, G. W. F. i. 441; iv. 149.
 Heigl, G. A. iv. 619.
 Heineccius, Jo. Gottl. i. 441.
 Heinroth, Dr. Chr. A. iv. 619.
 Helb, Maximilian, iv. 674.
 Helmont, i. 368.
 Helvetius, iii. 264.
 Hemert, Paul Van, iv. 404.
 Hemsterhuis, Francis, iii. 94.
 Henrici, C. iv. 619.
 Henricus, Androea, iv. 646.
 — Father Benedictus, ii. 170.
 Henry, Dr. i. 441.
 Heraclitus, i. 31.
 Herbert, Lord, of Cheshbury, ii. 264.
 Herbert, John Fred., iv. 169, 619.
 Herbst, iv. 619.
 Herder, John G. von, iii. 93, 329.
 Hermanson, Lambert, iii. 613.
 Hermas, i. 257, 303.
 Hermas, i. 99.
 Hermice, iv. 619.
 Hermippus, ii. 274.
 Hermotimus of Clazomene, i. 12.
 Herrera, Father Didacus de, ii. 171.
 — Joannes Arca de, ii. 103.
 Herzog, iv. 619.
 Hezychius, i. 3.
 Heusinger, T. H. G., iii. 400.
 Heydenreich, K. H. iv. 619.
 Heyserlingk, H. W. E. von, iv. 619.
 Hilaire, Saint, i. 441.
 Hilary, Saint, i. 306, 333.
 Hildebert of Tours, ii. 82.
 Hildreth, Richard, iv. 642.
 Hilgers, B. Jos. iv. 620.
 Hillebrand, Jos. i. 441; iv. 170.
 Hipparchus, i. 17.
 Hippeau, i. 441.
 Hippia, i. 60.
 Hippocrates, i. 2, 34.
 Hirschheim, ii. 460.
 Hismen, iii. 70.
 Hobbes, ii. 182, 206; iii. 137.
 Hoffbauer, J. C. iii. 399.
 Hoffmann, K. J. iv. 620.
 Hogarth, iii. 457.
 Hoijer, B. H. iv. 480.
 Holbach, Baron D', iii. 269.
 Hollman, Sam. Chris. iii. 82.
 Holstrom, P. iv. 474.
 Hooker, ii. 276.
 Hornejus, Conrad, ii. 131.
 Hornemann, Chr. iv. 484.
 Hornle, G. i. 442.
 Hottinger, i. 368.
 Hoveden, Roger, ii. 32.
 Huarte, John, ii. 164.
 Huet, Bishop of Avranches, i. 38,
 276, 442; ii. 416.
 Hufeland, G. iii. 399.
 Hugh of Amiens, ii. 62.
 — St. Victor, ii. 47.
 Hulsehoff, Allard, iv. 406.
 Humboldt, i. liii.
 Hume, David, ii. 201; iii. 126; iv. 40.
 Hangar, C. F. iii. 399.
 Hunter, Mr. iv. 667.
 Hurtado, Petrus, de Mendoza, ii. 172.
 Hatcheson, Dr. iii. 245.
 Hutchinson, Dr. iii. 426.
 Huygens, ii. 388.
 Hypphoff, Elias, iv. 474.
 Ignatius, i. 322.
 Irenæus, i. 257, 324.
 Irving, Christopher, iv. 673.
 Irwing, iii. 291.
 Isidore of Gaza, i. 241.
 Israel, Manasseh Ben, i. 366.
 Iternus, A. iv. 473.
 Jachmann, R. P. iv. 620.
 Jacob, L. H. iv. 632.

- Jacobi, Fred. Henry, iii. 399.
 Jacobus, iv. 646.
 Jäger, iv. 620.
 Jamblicus, i. 237.
 Jani, J. C. iv. 620.
 Janssens, Jean Herman, iv. 433.
 Januarius, Jalmus, ii. 163.
 Jariges, iii. 184.
 Jarrold, T. iv. 611.
 Jaucourt, Le Chevalier de, ii. 449.
 Javello, Chrysostomus, ii. 171.
 Javelin, H. L. iv. 472.
 Jeffrey, Lord, iii. 436, 437.
 John of Salisbury, ii. 42.
 Jouffroy, M. Th. iv. 252.
 Jourdain, ii. 83.
 Justin, St. i. 302.
 Kaimes, Lord, iii. 321.
 Kannegiesser, Karl. Ludw. iv. 620.
 Kant, Emmanuel, iii. 326.
 Kantimir, Prince, iv. 487.
 Kapp, iv. 620.
 Katschenofskj, Michael, iv. 488.
 Karpe, F. S. iv. 620.
 Kaysaler, A. B. i. 442; iv. 620.
 Kedrew, iv. 489.
 Kelsch, Michael, iii. 70.
 Kempe, Alex. iv. 472.
 Keratry, iii. 432; iv. 193.
 Kerekes, iv. 620.
 Kern, J. iv. 620.
 Keuka, i. 70.
 Keyserlingk, D. H. Von, iv. 620.
 Kiesewetter, J. G. C. iii. 375; iv. 620.
 King, Archbishop, iii. 9, 42, 620.
 Kinker, Johann, iv. 397.
 Kircher, Athanasius, iv. 672.
 Kirwan, Richard, iv. 24.
 Klein, George Mich. iv. 136.
 Kleincke, iv. 620.
 Knight, Mr. Payne, iii. 431.
 Knox, ii. 128.
 Knutzen, Martin, iii. 78.
 Kocher, J. D. iv. 620.
 König, Ed. iv. 620.
 König, O. iv. 476.
 Koppen, Fr. iv. 620.
 Köstner, ii. 449.
 Krause, K. C. F. i. 442; iv. 167, 620.
 Kretschmar, A. C. iv. 620.
 Kreydzi, Prof. Frz. iv. 620.
 Kreyger, J. F. iv. 474.
 Krug, W. T. iv. 109, 621.
 Kunhardt, H. iii. 399; iv. 621.
 Lactantius, i. 16, 206, 257.
 Ladevi, iv. 632.
 Lafont-Gouzi, iv. 644.
 La Fontaine, ii. 234.
 Lagerstrom, J. iv. 480.
 Lallebasque, iv. 329.
 Lallemandet, J. ii. 179.
 Lallerstadt, iv. 474.
 Lambert, John Henry, iii. 365.
 Lamennais, Abbé, iii. 434; iv. 212.
 La Mothe le Vayer, ii. 419.
 Lamy, ii. 456.
 Lancelin, M. iv. 204.
 Lanfranc of Pavia, ii. 33.
 Lapens, i. 442.
 La Ramée, i. 99.
 Lardner, i. 276.
 Laromiguière, P. iv. 195.
 Larroque, Patrice, iv. 632.
 Larsche, H. F. de, iv. 260.
 Laurinus, Ol. iv. 472.
 Laurentie, M. iv. 262.
 Lantier, D. G. A. iv. 621.
 Lavater iii. 465; iv. 847.
 — T. C. iv. 621.
 Lawrence, Dr. iv. 688.
 Le Cat, iii. 171.
 Lee, Henry, ii. 615; iii. 19.
 Leibnitz, ii. 234, 248; iii. 48.
 Le Maître, Rod. i. 442.
 Lenxus, Canuti, iv. 471.
 Léonstrom, iv. 621.
 Leo, i. 275.
 — VI. i. 275.
 Leopold, C. G. iv. 475.
 Lermintier, iii. 147.

- Lerniaier, G. iii. 171 ; iv. 304.
 Leroux, Pierre, iv. 300.
 — Ant. iv. 632.
 Leroy, Charles-Georges, iv. 632.
 Leslie, iii. 479.
 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, iii. 87.
 Leucippus, i. 37.
 Levret, iv. 673.
 Lewes, i. xi., 442.
 Lezard, M. P. J., iv. 634.
 Lichtenfels, iv. 621.
 Lidbeck, A. iv. 481.
 Liebaert, Prof. iv. 410.
 Likawetz, J. C. iv. 621.
 Lincoln, Robert of, ii. 65.
 Liungh, P. E. iv. 473.
 Lizarazu, Petrus Hieronymus Sanchez de, ii. 103.
 Locke, i. 390, 399 ; ii. 87.
 Lottmann, i. 442.
 Lombard, Peter, Bp. of Paris, ii. 45.
 Longinus, i. 231.
 Lorquet, iv. 632.
 Lossius, J. C. iv. 621.
 Loudon, Mrs. iv. 610.
 Lowde, J. A. iii. 26.
 Lacrocius, i. 2, 15, 168.
 Ludovicus, i. 360.
 Ludre, Viscomtesse de, iv. 231.
 Lully, Raymond, ii. 97.
 Lupus, Christian, iii. 63.
 Luther, ii. 128.
 Luzac, Elie, iii. 88.
 Maass J. G. E. iii. 399 ; iv. 621.
 Macaulay, ii. 607.
 Macino, Salvatore, iv. 101, 367.
 Mackintosh, Sir James, ii. 214, 487, 514 ; iii. 132, 180, 188, 281 ; iv. 101.
 MacKnight, Dr. ii. 276.
 Maczeck, J. iv. 621.
 Magentinus, i. 275.
 Magni, Jonas, iv. 471.
 Magnus, Albertus, iv. 665.
 Maimon, Solomon, iii. 376.
 Maimonides, Moses, i. 373.
 Maistre, Le Comte Joseph de, ii. 303, 306 ; iv. 209.
 Majus, Henry, ii. 260.
 Make, Paul, iii. 362.
 Malebranche, ii. 233, 315, 436.
 Maleville, Guill. i. 442.
 Malignati, Pietro Perolari, iv. 360.
 Mallet, iv. 632.
 Malmesbury, Wm. ii. 32.
 Mamertus, Claudianus, i. 289.
 Mamiani, Count Terenzio, iv. 304.
 Manio, Sig. iv. 367.
 Manoel de Goes, ii. 179.
 Manachgo, iv. 621.
 Marbach, iv. 621.
 Maret, M. iv. 233.
 Marheineke, iv. 621.
 Mariana, ii. 276.
 Marinus, i. 241.
 Mariotte, ii. 328.
 Marmontel, iii. 167.
 Marsilius Ficinus, i. 70.
 Martensen, iv. 621.
 Martin, Saint, iii. 403.
 Martini, Lorenzo, i. 442 ; iv. 361.
 Martunoff, Iwan, iv. 488.
 Martyr, Justin, i. 248, 222.
 Marmal, Franciscus, ii. 103.
 Massais, Le Baron, iv. 282.
 Matachita, Theodorus, i. 276.
 Matter, Jacques, i. 442 ; iv. 632.
 Maupertuis, iii. 183.
 Maurique, Angelus, ii. 178.
 Maurus, Rabanus, ii. 22, 23.
 Maxim, iv. 467.
 Maximus, of Tyre, i. 176.
 Maxwell, William, iv. 573.
 Mayer, iv. 621.
 Mazure, iv. 632.
 Mazzarelli, iii. 238.
 Mazzoni, i. 99.
 M'Cormac, Henry, iv. 88.
 M'Caul, G. iv. 86.
 Medicis, Cosmo de, i. 3.
 Meenen, M. Van, iv. 411.
 2 u

- Mège, Amédée, iv. 634.
 Melchle, James, iv. 611.
 Mellinger, Fl. iv. 621.
 Meiner, Ch. i. 442.
 Meiners, C. ii. 117; iii. 397.
 Meister, iv. 633.
 Melancthon, i. 70; ii. 111, 128.
 Melissus, of Samos, i. 28.
 Mellin, M. iv. 634.
 Mendelssohn, Moses, iii. 91, 813.
 Menzser, iv. 621.
 Merian, iii. 183, 344.
 Merode, Le Comte Henri de, iv. 428.
 Mersenne, P. ii. 423.
 Meryon, iv. 664.
 Mesmer, Fred. Ant. iv. 673, 644.
 Mesterton, C. iv. 474.
 Metrodorus of Lampasacum, i. 16.
 Metz, G. B. iv. 621.
 Meurissus, Martinus, ii. 179.
 Meyer, J. Fr. iii. 67; iv. 178.
 Michaelis, iii. 66.
 Micheli, Vincenzo, iii. 341.
 Michelet, iv. 141, 621.
 Middleton, Richard de, ii. 69.
 Mikkosi, Rabbi Moses, i. 374.
 Mill, James, ii. 614; iv. 63.
 — John Stuart, i. 67; iv. 99.
 Miller, Rev. George, iii. 613.
 Milman, Mr. ii. 376, 377.
 Milton, iii. 500.
 Miserini, iv. 386.
 Mitchell, M. A. iv. 617.
 Moens, Abbé G. iv. 433.
 Molander, A. J. iv. 474.
 Möller, H. iv. 474.
 Monboddo, Lord, i. 76; iii. 324.
 Monlorius, John Bapt. ii. 178.
 Montagnana, Peter, iv. 666.
 Montaigne, ii. 316.
 Montègre, iv. 644.
 Monti, Benedotti, iv. 396.
 Moor, Michael, ii. 416.
 Moore, Dr. iv. 664.
 More, Henry, ii. 411.
 Morel, William, i. 4.
 Morell, J. D. i. 442.
 Moritz, K. P. iii. 400.
 Morus, i. 369.
 Mosheim, Dr. ii. 13, 100, 276, 389, 495.
 Mudie, Robert, iv. 67.
 Müller, Augustus, Fr. iii. 82.
 Munk, D. iv. 483.
 Munster, Hisman, ii. 449.
 Muratori, iii. 219; iv. 621.
 Murcia, Franciscus de la Llana, ii. 176.
 Mussin-Puschkin, Count A. G. iv. 488.
 Musman, J. G. i. 442.
 Mutschelle, S. iv. 622.
 Nagel, i. 360.
 Naigepa, i. 442.
 Naumann, M. E. A. iv. 622.
 Naslanssen, Gregory, i. 336.
 Neeb, J. iii. 398.
 Nees und Esenbeck, iv. 622.
 Nelis, Bishop, iv. 398.
 Nemesius, i. 266; iv. 584.
 Nericius, Olaus Nicolai, iv. 471.
 Neubig, Prof. D. A. iv. 622.
 Neumann, Joh. iv. 622.
 Neve, M. F. iv. 464.
 Newnham, iv. 664.
 Newton, Sir Isaac, iii. 374.
 Nicephorus, i. 275.
 Nicholas, Auguste, iv. 626.
 Niethammer, F. J. iii. 400.
 Nieuport, C. F. de, iv. 407.
 Nieuwentyt, Bernard, ii. 380, 486, 487.
 Nieuwenhuis, M. iv. 443.
 Nizolini, Marius, ii. 139, 502.
 Noel, iv. 416, 633.
 Niphus, Augustin, iv. 646.
 Norris, John, ii. 302.
 Novalla, Frederic, iii. 389.
 Numenius, i. 226.
 Nunnesius, Petr. Joh. ii. 178.
 Nuquestius, Honoratus, iv. 546.
 Nüsslein, iv. 622.

- Nünstein, Fr. Ant. iv. 139.
 Nyaya and Vaischika, i. 211.
- Occam, William, ii. 78.
 Ocellus, i. 17.
 Oenomaus of Gadara, i. 175.
 Offred, Apollinaris, ii. 116.
 Oken, Lorenz, iv. 137, 622.
 Olavi, George, iv. 472.
 Olearius, i. 442.
 Omer, Talen, ii. 128.
 Orelli, iv. 622.
 Ortes, Giannaria, iii. 241.
 Origen, i. 263, 265, 329.
 Ottoma, J. G. iii. 629; iv. 419.
 Oswald, James, iii. 818.
 Ovid, i. 30.
 Owen, Dr. John, ii. 276.
 Oxford, Bishop of, iv. 641.
 Ozanesax, iv. 633.
 Ozanum, iv. 633.
- Pachymera, George, i. 275.
 Paffo, C. M. iv. 633.
 Paine, George, iv. 840.
 Palmblad, W. F. iv. 483.
 Panastius, i. 161.
 Panesio, Abb. iv. 387.
 Pantmaus, St. i. 263.
 Papin, N. iv. 573.
 Paquet, Joseph, iv. 463.
 Para du Phanjas, l'Abbé, iv. 633.
 Paracelsus, Theophrastus, ii. 122.
 Pardies, Father, i. 92.
 Parker, Samuel, i. 70; ii. 266.
 Parmenides, i. 26.
 Pascal, ii. 233, 261.
 Paschasius, Bartho. Joseph, ii. 178.
 Patie, C. L. A. iv. 622.
 Patricius, i. 70; ii. 136.
 Paulus, H. T. G. iv. 622.
 — Pierre, iv. 407.
 Payne, George, iv. 46.
 Poemans, J. iv. 454.
 Peisse, M. iv. 59, 601.
 Pelagius, i. 281.
- Pelleyn, Robert, ii. 52.
 Pellisson, M. ii. 249.
 Pelvert, i. 442.
 Pereira, Gomes, ii. 603.
 Pericles, son of Xantippus, i. 16.
 Perring, i. 360.
 Perrard, J. F. iv. 633.
 Perrault, Mr. iii. 427.
 Perren, F. iv. 246.
 — Sign. iv. 334.
 Pease, Gastano, iv. 388.
 Pestalozzi, Sig. iv. 387.
 Peter of Poitiers, ii. 82.
 — Saint, the Anchorite, i. 278, 296.
 Petrus, Andreas, iv. 474.
 Petrus de Fonseca, ii. 178.
 — de Oviedo, ii. 178.
 Pezzani, André, iv. 634.
 Pezzi, C. Antonio, iv. 388.
 Phædo of Elis, i. 68.
 Phavorinus, i. 188.
 Philo, i. 147, 221.
 Philolans, i. 17.
 Philopsechos, Alethinos, iii. 33.
 Phiscldeck, C. F. Schmidt, iii. 94.
 Photius, i. 278.
 Piccart, Michael, ii. 131.
 Piccolomini, F. ii. 134.
 Pichard, iv. 633.
 Picus, John, of Mirandola, ii. 115,
 119.
 Pieraccini, Luigi, iv. 352.
 Pinel, Louis, iv. 633.
 Place, Conyers, iii. 31.
 Platner, iii. 392, 644.
 Plato, i. 2, 18, 89, 486; ii. 8.
 Playfair, Professor, ii. 201.
 Planning, J. iv. 474.
 Pleasing, Fr. Vict. i. 442.
 Pletho, George Gemistus, ii. 104.
 Plexiacus, i. 442.
 Pliny, i. 13.
 Plisson, F. E. iv. 634.
 Plotinus, i. 231.
 Plouquet, iii. 89.
 Plutarch, i. 2, 8, 9, 11, 13, 228.
 2 u 2

Podschiwloff, Wassilj Sergejewitsch,
iv. 488.

Poiret, Peter, ii. 394.

Poli, B. iv. 339.

Pöhlitz, K.H.L. iv. 622.

Pomponatius, Peter, ii. 111, 672.

Pomponius, i. 3.

Ponelle, Edm. iv. 633.

Ponzius, Joh. ii. 178.

Pope, ii. 371; iii. 51.

Popofskj, Nikolaj, iv. 489.

Poppe, iii. 70.

Pordage, John, ii. 414.

Porphyry, i. 99, 238.

Porta, Baptista, iv. 546, 584.

Poelt, i. 442.

Posidonius, i. 150.

Potamon, i. 184.

Pownal, Governor, iv. 84.

Pratt, S. J. iii. 513.

Prætorius, iv. 546.

Prevost, iii. 365.

Price, Dr. Richard, iii. 313, 425.

Prideaux, i. 374; iv. 576.

Priestley, Dr. iii. 202, 230, 309.

Prior, Matthew, ii. 329.

Ptolemy, i. 17.

Pullen, Robert,

Pritchard, Dr. iv. 560, 591.

Proclus, i. 238, 487.

Prodicus, i. 50.

Protagoras, i. 45.

Prussung, iv. 622.

Puellus, Michael, i. 278.

Pullenberg, Prof. F. i. 443; iv. 622.

Puyagur, iv. 644.

Pyrrho, i. 121.

Pythagoras, i. 17.

Quetzlet, Adolphe, iv. 448.

Rajon, J. M. iv. 633.

Ramus, Peter, ii. 131.

Racour, Ed. iv. 633.

Rapin, René, i. 443.

Rashley, iv. 611.

Rathe, P. iv. 473.

Rätzke, J. G. iv. 622.

Rauch, Fred. A. iv. 541.

Raymond de Sebone, ii. 217.

Receveur, F. G. iv. 633.

Redern, le Comte de, iv. 633.

Regis, Pierre Sylvain, ii. 295.

Regius, Henry, iii. 63.

Regnault, Father, ii. 399.

Reid, Dr. i. 59; ii. 242, 245; iii. 157,
187, 427; iv. 40.

— Sampson, iv. 546.

Reif, L. iv. 622.

Reiffenberg, Baron, iv. 419.

Reinhardus, Laur. i. 443.

Reimann, i. 368.

Reimarus, iii. 89.

Reinhold, i. 443; iii. 366; iv. 622.

Rémusat, M. Ch. de, iv. 634.

Renon, iv. 564.

Renouvier, Char. i. 443.

Rensach, iii. 53.

Restitutus, iv. 572.

Reuchlin, John, ii. 111.

Reuss, M. iv. 622.

Reynolds, Sir Joshua, iii. 430. "

Rhazes, iv. 584.

Ribes y Mayo, Dr. Joseph, iii. 233.

Ricard, iv. 648.

Rieci, Father, iii. 212.

Riccioli, P. ii. 179.

Richard, Abbé of Saint Victor, ii. 49.

Richter, iv. 622.

Ritter, i. 11, 19, 29, 31, 34, 47, 53,
58, 146, 443, 447, 481; iv. 622.

Rixner, iv. 622.

— Ana. Thadd. i. 443; iv. 175.

Robertson, J. iv. 611.

Robertson, ii. 22.

Rodericus de Arriaga, ii. 178.

Rodriguez de Bostos, Jose, iv. 634.

Rodriguez de Castro, i. 360.

Roell, Hermann Alexander, ii. 452.

Roessler, i. 276.

Rogers, Mr. iv. 517.

Romagnosi, G. D. iv. 343.

- Roscellinus, H. 35.
 Roscoe, Mr. H. 105, 106.
 Rosenkranz, iv. 622.
 Rosmini, Antonio, iv. 325, 631.
 Rousseau, iii. 80, 165.
 Royer-Collard, M. iv. 190.
 Rubio, Antonius, ii. 175.
 Rückert, J. iv. 622.
 Rudbeckius, J. iv. 471.
 Rudiger, Andrew, iii. 73.
 Rufus, Musonius, i. 175.
 Runcberg, E. O. iv. 475.
 Rydellius, iv. 473.
- Saccas, Ammonius, i. 229.
 Sacchi, Defendente, i. 443; iv. 365.
 Saintes, Armand, iv. 110.
 Saisset, Emile, ii. 262; iv. 625.
 Salat, J. iv. 622.
 Salinis et De Scorbias, ii. 440; iv. 634.
 Salisbury, John of, ii. 50.
 Sallier, Abbé, i. 70.
 Sanchez, i. 443; ii. 501.
 — Francis, ii. 146.
 Sander, iv. 623.
 Sandona, Giuseppe, iv. 286.
 Sankhya and Yoga, The, i. 208.
 Saphari, iv. 633.
 Sawyer, Leicester A. iv. 642.
 Sayer, F. iv. 83.
 Scarella, J. B. iii. 234.
 Schad, J. B. iv. 623.
 Schaffberger, Fr. iv. 623.
 Schaffarik, Paul Joseph, iv. 469.
 Schaller, Karl Aug. i. 443.
 — iv. 623.
 Schantz, i. 70.
 Schaumann, J. C. G. iii. 398.
 Scheibel, Cornelius, ii. 131.
 Schelle, K. G. iv. 623.
 Schelling, F. W. J. iv. 126.
 Schenke, James, ii. 131.
 Scherbins, Philip, ii. 131.
 Scherr, iv. 623.
 Schimmelpennick, iii. 513.
- Schirlitz, iv. 623.
 Schlegel, K. W. F. iv. 170.
 Schleiermacher, Daniel Ernest, H. 373; iv. 162.
 Schluter, iv. 623.
 Schmalz, Th. iii. 400.
 Schmid, Prof. Heinr. iv. 623.
 Schmülder, iv. 623.
 Schmucker, S.S. iv. 530.
 Schneider, E. C. G. iv. 623.
 Schoen, F. L. iv. 633.
 Schoerbing, C. M. iv. 423.
 Scholarius, Georgius, ii. 109.
 Schönberg, A. iv. 475.
 Schoeckius, Martin, iii. 64.
 Schopenhauer, A. iv. 623.
 Schottus, Gaspar, iv. 546.
 — Michael, iv. 546.
 Schubert, Gotthilf Heinrich, iv. 145.
 Schulz, i. 70.
 Schulze, Gottlob Ernest, iii. 377.
 — Rev. John, iii. 540.
 Schwab, T. C. iv. 623.
 Schwartz, N. J. i. 443; iv. 487.
 Schwarz, F. H. C. iii. 400; iv. 623.
 Scott, R. G. iv. 23.
 Scotus, Duns, iv. 586.
 Sebonde, Raymond de, ii. 216.
 Segretain, E. A. iv. 633.
 Sellj, Nikodim, iv. 487.
 Sellon, J. iv. 611.
 Sénac, l'Abbé A. iv. 625.
 Seneca, i. 2, 175, 457.
 Sengler, Prof. D. iv. 623.
 Sepulveda, ii. 122.
 Sergeant, J. ii. 300.
 Servant, De Beauvais, iv. 633.
 Sewell, Rev. William, iv. 92.
 Sextus Empiricus, i. 2, 12, 142, 175, 185.
 Shaftesbury, Lord, iii. 4.
 Shepherd, Lady Mary, iv. 39, 610.
 Siard, Victor, iv. 633.
 Sibbern, Fred. Ch. iv. 486.
 Siculus, Diodorus, ii. 273.

- Sidonski, iv. 489.
 Sigwart, Dr. H. C. W. iv. 174, 623.
 Silvester II. ii. 23.
 Simon, M. Jules, i. 443.
 Simonides, i. 23.
 Simonius, Simon, ii. 131.
 Simplicius, i. 99.
 Sinaus, S. iv. 474.
 Sjöberg, G. iv. 473.
 Smart, Mr. iv. 66.
 Smith, Adam, i. 397.
 Smitha, Laurids, iv. 484.
 Snell, iv. 623.
 — C. W. iii. 397.
 — F. W. iii. 397; iv. 623.
 — Phil. Ludw. i. 443.
 Snellmann, iv. 623.
 Socher, Geo. i. 443; iv. 623.
 Société Littéraire de l'Université
 • Catholique, iv. 464.
 Soerster, son of Sophroniscus, i. 16, 61, 281.
 Solger, K. W. F. iv. 147; iv. 623.
 Sonner, Ernest, ii. 131.
 Soria, J. G. de, iii. 231.
 Soto, Dominic, ii. 178.
 Souverain, i. 276.
 Spagni, Andrea, iii. 242.
 Spalding, Samuel, iv. 97.
 Spinoza, ii. 234, 356.
 Spontanus, iv. 646.
 Spooner, Lyander, iv. 641.
 Sprengel, iv. 573.
 Spurzheim, Dr. iv. 587.
 Staël, Madame de, iii. 546.
 Stahl, iv. 564.
 — Daniel, ii. 131.
 Stair, Lord, ii. 429.
 Standia, i. 276.
 Stanley, Thomas, i. 443.
 Stock, Erh. Gottl. i. 443; iv. 623.
 Steffens, Henry, iv. 143, 486.
 Stelling, P. M. iv. 623.
 Stellini, Giacomo, iii. 226.
 Stellwaag, iii. 70.
 Stewart, Dugald, i. 89, 93, 96, 388, 400; ii. 7, 52, 80, 181, 231, 259, 307, 335, 356, 370, 429, 436, 447; iii. 43, 49, 123, 189, 282, 320, 352, 366, 436, 470, 634; iv. i. 41, 618, 681.
 Stillingfleet, iii. 16.
 Stjernhjelm, Geor. iv. 471.
 Stebeus, John, i. 3.
 Stüger, J. iv. 623.
 Strabo, i. 2.
 Streper, Dr. iv. 573.
 Stroikirch, M. Van, iv. 474.
 Struve, Von, iv. 624.
 St. Simon, Claude Henri Comte de, iv. 291.
 Stuck, ii. 393.
 Sturtzenbecher, Märt. iv. 478.
 Stutzmann, J. J. iv. 141.
 Styrlise, Kannuga, iv. 472.
 Suabediasen, Prof. Th. A. iv. 624.
 Suarez, Franciscus, ii. 171.
 Swedenborg, Emanuel, iv. 476.
 Sylvester, Franciscus, ii. 178.
 Synesius, i. 268.
 Syrbius, iii. 74.
 Szanianski, Joseph C. iv. 470.
 Tafel, iv. 624.
 Taisneras, iv. 546.
 Tamassia, iv. 382.
 Tandel, E. iv. 464.
 Tappan, Henry P. iv. 634.
 Tassoni, Alejandro, iv. 467.
 Tatian, i. 249, 223.
 Taurellus, ii. 138.
 Taylor, Dr. Brook, iv. 83.
 — Isaac, iv. 101.
 — Thomas, iv. 66.
 Telesier, ii. 132.
 Telesio, Bernardino, ii. 126.
 Teller, Balthasar, ii. 178.
 Tenenmann, i. 70, 276, 443; ii. 461, 482; iii. 369; iv. 624.
 Terrasson, Abbé, ii. 403.
 Testa, Alfonso, iv. 388.

- Tetsna, T. N. iii. 398, 444.
 Tertullian, i. 257, 326.
 Thales, i. 8.
 Thanner, Ignat. iv. 139.
 Themistias, i. 99.
 Theodorot, i. 306, 330.
 Théodicée, ii. 444.
 Theophilus, St. i. 252, 304, 387.
 Thibault, J. B. iv. 633.
 Thiebout, C. H. iv. 463.
 Thomas, Dr. iv. 350, 624.
 Thomasius, Christian, i. 70, 276; ii. 392.
 Thompson, James, ii. 370.
 — William, iii. 813; iv. 96.
 Thorild, Th. iv. 480.
 Thouvenel, iv. 645.
 Thrasymachus, i. 50.
 Thuronia, And. iv. 472.
 Thurot, iv. 633.
 Tiberghien, William, iii. 350, 636; iv. 457.
 Tiedemann, Professor, i. 347, 443; iii. 372.
 Tieftrunk, J. H. iii. 399.
 Tillemont, i. 276.
 Timmus, i. 17, 486.
 Tiraboschi, ii. 39, 117.
 Tissot, i. 443; iv. 596; iv. 633, 634.
 Todd and Bowman, iv. 462.
 Toledo, Franciscus, ii. 170.
 Tomeo, Leonico, ii. 139.
 Tommasco, Nicolas, iv. 362, 597.
 Tooke, John Horne, iii. 282.
 Trebizond, George de, ii. 109.
 Trendelenburg, iv. 624.
 Townshend, Rev. Chauncy Hare, iv. 641.
 Trentowski, iv. 624.
 Treschow, Niels, iv. 484.
 Troxel, iv. 624.
 Troxler, J. P. V. iv. 145.
 True, Charles K. iv. 542.
 Tschirnhausen, ii. 391.
 Tucker, Abraham, iii. 250.
 Turgot, Anne-Robert Jacques, i. 91; iii. 172.
 Turner, John, iii. 24.
 Tyge, Rothe, iv. 464.
 Ubaghs, G. C. iv. 449.
 Ulrich, iv. 624.
 Umbreit, A. E. iv. 624.
 Upham, Rev. Thomas C. iv. 623.
 Vacherot, i. 443; iv. 634.
 Valles, P. ii. 179.
 Valliant, Captain, iv. 576.
 Van de Weyer, M. Sylva, iii. 96, 526; iv. 423.
 Van Helmont, iv. 573.
 Van Heusde, W. iv. 433.
 Van Meenen, iv. 411—417.
 Van Meenen, jun. M. iv. 634.
 Vanini, Lucilio, ii. 161.
 Vaninius, Jul. Cass. iv. 372.
 Vasquez, Gabriel, ii. 175.
 Vauvenargues, iii. 166.
 Vasquez, Marcellus, ii. 179.
 Vedanta, The, i. 212.
 Vega, St. Alonso de, i. 200.
 Venet, George, ii. 116.
 Ventura, Gastano, iv. 334.
 Venturini, K. H. G. iv. 624.
 Vera Cruz, Alphonsus, ii. 178.
 Verbugh, Ab. Fred. iv. 463.
 Verney, iii. 232.
 Véry, P. iv. 625.
 Vesalius, or Wessel, Andrew, iv. 586.
 Vico, iii. 212.
 Victoria, St., Father Francis de, ii. 169.
 Villain, iv. 634.
 Villeterque, Alex. iv. 634.
 Vincas, iv. 624.
 Vincent of Lerins, i. 306.
 Vincent, G. iv. 611.
 Vio, Thomas de, ii. 168.
 Virey, M. iv. 255.
 Vives, John Louis, i. 4; ii. 10, 114.
 Vollbeding, John Christ. i. 443.
 Volney, iii. 407.

- Voltaire, ii. 321, 382; iii. 65, 155, 169, 286.
 Voetius, i. 444.
 Wagner, J. J. iv. 140.
 Wahlstrom, A. iv. 476.
 Walch, F. G. i. 444; iii. 80.
 Wallarius, N. iv. 474.
 Walleris, Nicholas, iv. 479.
 Walsh, Mr. iv. 611.
 Walter, B. ii. 187.
 Wanochius, iv. 473.
 Wardlaw, Ralph, iv. 89.
 Wasser, iii. 76.
 Watts, Dr. iii. 243.
 Wayland, Francis, iv. 541.
 Wedgewood, Hensleigh, iv. 102.
 Weigenmeier, I. 70.
 Weiller, Karl, i. 444; iv. 624.
 Weise, C. H. iv. 624.
 Welsh, Dr. iv. 32.
 Wendell, J. A. iv. 624.
 Wenzel, G. J. iv. 624.
 Werder, iv. 624.
 Werdermann, J. L. G. i. 444.
 Wettersten, B. iv. 474.
 Whateley, Archbishop, iii. 180.
 Whiston, I. 276.
 White, Thomas, ii. 284, 289.
 Whewell, Dr. ii. 478; iv. 69.
 Wichart, iv. 624.
 Wigan, A. L. iv. 610.
 Wiggers, G. iv. 624.
 Wilkins, John, ii. 338.
 Wilm, J. i. 444.
 William, Bishop of Paris, ii. 86.
 Willis, Dr. iv. 686.
 Willm, M. iv. 135, 616, 624.
 Winder, Dr. ii. 276.
 Windischmann, Carl. Joh. i. 444; iv. 624.
 Winspersee, Van, ii. 453.
 Wirdig, Sebastian, iv. 573.
 Wirgman, Thomas, iv. 611.
 Wirth, iv. 624.
 Witherspoon, Rev. John iv. 540.
 Wittich, Christopher, ii. 456.
 Wolf, i. 368.
 Wolfart, iv. 645.
 Wolff, J. Christian, iii. 65.
 Wollaston, William, iii. 7.
 Wood, Anthony, ii. 336.
 Woolsey, Sir Charles, ii. 276.
 Wötsel, J. K. iv. 624.
 Wympersee, Dionysius Van de, iv. 407.
 Wyttenbach, Professor, iv. 410.
 Xenophanes, i. 22.
 Xenophon, i. 2.
 Ximenes, Vincent, ii. 115.
 Yarnold and Bushman, iv. 564.
 Young, John, iv. 48.
 Yves-Marie André, iii. 435.
 Zabarella, James, ii. 138.
 Zacharias, K. S. iii. 400.
 Zanardo, P. ii. 179.
 Zantedeschi, Francesco, iv. 362.
 Zavalos, Fernando de, iii. 235.
 Zeidler, Melchior, ii. 131.
 Zeller, iv. 624, 634.
 Zeltner, I. 374.
 Zeno, i. 130.
 — of Elea, i. 29.
 Zorzi, Francis George, ii. 134.
 Zuniga, Father Didacus de, ii. 170.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

- Abstraction, Nature of.* Averroes on, I. 356;—St. Thomas Aquinas, II. 57; James Concio, 137;—Berkeley, III. 112; Dumasais, 166; Verney, 233; Diderot, 254;—Dugald Stewart, IV. 4; James Mill, 55; John Stuart Mill, 100; Rosmini, 336; Van Meenen, 415.
- Alexandrian Emanations, Doctrine of, I. 157.*
- Alexandrian School of Philosophy, I. 153.*
- Alexandrian Trinity, Doctrine of, I. 156.*
- Analysis. Nature of, I. 100; Galen on, 180; St. John Damascenus, 274;—Duhamel, II. 327;—S'Gravesande, III. 86; Kant, 339;—Herbert, IV. 160; Nieuport, 409.*
- Analogy, Nature of, I. 101.*
- Association of Ideas.* Hobbes on, II. 211;—Wolff, III. 68; Tucker, 251; Sir Isaac Newton, 273; Dr. Hartley, 275—288; Dr. Priestley, 288; Dr. Belsham, 290; Dr. Darwin, 308;—James Mill, IV. 55; Ballantyne, 65.
- Atheism.* St. Peter the Anchorita on, I. 279;—Dr. Cudworth, II. 283; Henry More, 413; Lamy against, 456; Vanini's notions of, 504, note;—Hemsterhuis on, III. 97; Zavalos, 235; Voltaire, 264;—Herbert, IV. 162.
- Atoms, Nature of.* Leucippus on, I. 38; Democritus, 41; Epicurus, 139; Lucretius, 169; Indian philosophical notions on, 212;—Bruno, II. 141; Leibnitz, 437;—Oken, IV. 138; Gallup, 357.
- Authority.* Pelagius on, I. 296; St. Justin, 302; Ilermas, 303; Clement of Alexandria, 303; St. Theophilus of Antioch, 304; Origen, 305; Arnobius, 305; St. Augustine, 305; Vincent of Lerina, 305; Lactantius, 306; St. Hilary, 306; St. Peter the Anchorita, 306;—Abbé Lamennais, IV. 213; Baron d'Eckstein, 226; Université Catholique, general remarks on, 242—247; De Larache, 261; Tommaseo, 364.
- Beauty.* See Sublime and Beautiful.
- Brain.* Joseph Glanvil's notions of images on, II. 310;—Fénélon on images of the, 389;—Mel. Gioja, remarks on, IV. 348.
- Categories.* Aristotle's, I. 76; Porphyry's notion of, 235; Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers' work on, 45;—William of Conches on, II. 49; Scholarius, 110;—Kant, III. 338 Maimon on Categories of Kant, 377;—Perron on the Categories of the Understanding, IV. 286.
- Causation.* Chrysippus on, I. 134; Ænesidemus, 183; Sextus Em-

piricus, 188; St. Peter the Anchorite on the nature of, 378; Algazali, 359;—Albert the Great, II. 67; Suarez, 173; Malebranche, 318; Fontenelle, on occasional causes, 397;—Wolff on, III. 69; Renach, 84; S'Gravesande, 86; Hume, 132; Baldanotti, 237; Abbé Batteaux, 355; Schulze, 378;—Dugald Stewart, IV. 7; Sir William Drummond, 18; R. G. Scott, 25; Dr. Brown, 30; Lady Mary Shepherd, 40; James Mill, 56; Dr. Whewell, 77; John Stuart Mill, 99; Royer-Collard, 198; Gallupi, 355; Tommaso, 366; Grayer, 440; Lady Mary Shepherd, 609, *note*.

Common Sense. Buffier on, III. 149—156; Vauvenargues, 168; Marquis D'Argens, 165; Dr. Reid, 187—191; Vico, 218; James Oswald, 315; Dr. Beattie, 317; Observations on Dr. Reid's notions of, 533, *note*;—R. G. Scott on, IV. 24; Sir William Hamilton, 81; Royer-Collard, 198; Jouffroy, 252; Zantedeschi, 362; Van Meenen, 416.

Conceptualists. John of Salisbury's notions of, II. 51; William Occam considered favourable to, 72;—Dr. Whewell on, IV. 73.

Consciousness. Descartes on, II. 224; P. Sylvain Regis, 297; Malebranche, 316; Spinoza, 355; Leibnitz, 435;—Richard Cumberland, III. 4;—Gottsched, 77; Kant, 334; Schulze, 379;—Dugald Stewart, IV. 2; Sam. Drew, 19; Sir William Hamilton, 81; Krug, 110; Fichte, 119; Hegel, 151; Herbert, 159; Krause, 168; J. Hermann Fichte, 177; Maine de Biran, 199; Baron D'Eckstein, 226; Berard, 250; Jouffroy, 253; Cousin, 267; Tiberghien, 459.

Deity. Anaxagoras's notion of, I. 15; Xenophanes' idea of, 23; Empedocles' notion of, 36; Plato on, 60; Chrysippus, 134; Alexandrian notions of, 157; Lucretius on, 169; Sextus Empiricus, 189; The opinions of the ancient philosophers, 191; Indian philosophical notions of, 210, 211; Vedanta, 215; Lucius Apuleius on, 225; Numenius, 227; Ammonius 230; Plotinus, 232; Jamblicus, 237; Tatian, 250; St. Athenagoras, 251; Theophilus, 269; The Persian Sophists' notion of, 361; Cabalistic notion of, 365; Sadducees' notion of, 370; Karmites' notion of, 371; Pharisees' notion of, 371; Essenes' notion of, 371; Alfred the Great on, 423; Bede, 423; Greek and Roman Sages' ideas of, *note*, 456;—John Scotus, nature of, II. 29; Peter Damien on, 34; St. Anselm of Canterbury, 37; Almeric, 44; Peter Lombard, 46; Hugh St. Victor, 48; David de Dinant, 53; St. Thomas Aquinas, 58; St. Bonaventure, 66; Gerson, 76; Raymond Lully, 101; George G. Pletho, 104; Cessalpini d'Arezzo, 127; Francis George Zorzi, 135; Bruno, 142; Robert Fludd, 148; Vanini's ideas of, 161; Descartes on, 236; Gassendi, 254; P. Sylvain Regis, 296; J. Sergeant, 301; John Norris, 303; Malebranche's ideas of seeing all things in, 316; Spinoza's nature of, 355, 362, 372; Bossuet on, 387; Regnault, 401; Michael Moor, 418; Baxter, 426; Leibnitz, 434;—William King, III. 9; Bishop Stillingfleet, 17; Lowde, 26; Dr. Clarke's demonstration of, 46; Bayle on, 59; Wolff, 68; Ploucquet, 90; Encyclopédie Française, 144; Frederic the Great, 151; Formey, 182; Man-

portais, 184; Vico, 314; Voltaire, 262; Kant, 342; Jacobi, 386; Hamann, 388; Novalis, 390;—
 Kirwan, IV. 35; Lady Mary Shephard, existence of, 43; Casway on, 83; Dr. Wardlaw, of the Will of, 90; J. F. Fries on, 112; Bardill, 114; Oken, 137; Nüssli, 139; Stutzmann, 141; Bader, 143; Treuker, 145; Solger, 147; Hegel, 158; Schleiermacher, 162; Krause, 166; Hillebrand, 170; Schlegel, 173; J. Hermann Fichte, 178; Keratry, 194; Abbé Lamennais, 216; Ballanche, 227; Université Catholique, 241; Benjamin Constant, 249; Laurentie, 262; Cousin, notion of, 277; Foerier on, 294; Pierre Leroux, 303; Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques, 306; Auguste Comte, 307; Gardil, 325; Accordini, 332; Ventura, 335; Rosmini, 341; Luigi Pieraccini, 352; Tommaso, 353; Gioberti, 370—374; Campagna, 386; Sandona, 386; Bishop Nells, 399; Van Hemert, 405; Hulshoff, 406; Van de Weyer, 430; Merode and De Beaufort, 436; De Cock, 449; Ahrens, 453; Société Littéraire de l'Université Catholique, 456; Bjurbaeck, 479; Tappan, nature of, 436; Willm's remarks on Schelling's notions of, 612; Cousin's remarks on, 626.
Eclecticism. Duhamel on, II. 327;—Buddhas, III. 76;—Marot, IV. 234; Damiron, 237; Romagnoli, 244; Wimperse, 407; Baron Reiffenberg, 420.
Fine Arts. Arteaga on, III. 339; Lord Kaimes, 321; Lord Monboddo, 325;—Costa, IV. 360; Tommaso, 366.
Free Will. Alexander of Aphrodisias,

Idea of, I. 179; Doctrines of among the Fathers of the Church, 317; Ignatius on, 322; Justin Martyr, 322; Tatian, 323; Irenæus, 324; Clement of Alexandria, 325; Tertullian, 326; Origen, 329; Cyprian, 331; Eusebius, 331; Athanasius, 332; Cyril of Jerusalem, 333; Hilary, 333; Epiphanius, 334; Basil, 334; Gregory Nazianzen, 335; Gregory of Nyssa, 336; Ambrose, 336; Jerome, 336; Augustine, 337; Chrysostom, 338; Theodoret, 338; Avicbron, 342; Sadducees, 370; Alfred the Great, 412; 473, *note on*;—Rabanus Maurus, II. 23; Pomponatius, 112; Sepulveda writes on, 122; Suarez on, 172; Dr. Cadworth, 264;—Crousaz, III. 73; Hemsterhuis, 97; Encyclopédie Française, 146; James Harris, 247; Voltaire, 260; Kant, 330; Observations, 518, *note*;—Dr. Gregory, IV. 23; Ballantyne, 66; Dr. Cairns, 100; Eckhartshansen, 166; Laromiguière, 196; Maine de Biran, 202; Cousin, 268; Manio, 367; Baron Reiffenberg, 421; Gruyer, 440; Dr. Edwards, 493—519; Essay, 540; Amos Dean, 541; Quetelet, *note*, 638.
Histories of Philosophy, I. 1; List of Histories of, I. 439, *note*;—Brucker on, III. 363; Tennemann, 369; Buhle, 370; Tiedemann, 373;—Schwartz, IV. 456.
Idea, Plato on, I. 62; Aristotle's notion of, 96; Zeno on, 132; Plato, 447, *note*; Aristotle, 451, *note*;—Duns Scotus, II. 70; Descartes, 228; Gassendi, 253; Pascal, 263; Samuel Parker, 267; Louis de la Forge, 295; John Norris, 302; Duhamel, 326; Fénelon, 390; Thomasius, 393; Regnault, 400; A. Arnauld, 405; Fordage, 414;

- Foucher, 423 ; Winspersee, 483 ; Locke, 463 ; Foucher, 511, *note*;—Lord Shaftesbury, III. 6 ; Bishop Stillingfleet, 18 ; Henry Lee, 19 ; Wolf, 68 ; Crousaz, 73 ; Syrbius, 75 ; Gottsched, 77 ; S'Gravesande, 85 ; Lezac, 89 ; Hemsterhuis, 97 ; Hume, 129 ; Condillac, 187—161 ; Damarais, 166 ; Vauvenargues, 167 ; Turgot, 172 ; Maupertuis, 183 ; Dr. Reid, 188—200 ; Genovesi, 221 ; Paeciolati, 232 ; Verney, 233 ; Artaga, 240 ; Dr. Watts, 43 ; Tucker, 250 ; Horne Tooke, 43 ; Voltaire, 260 ; Helvetius, 268 ; Dr. Darwin, 308 ; Dr. Price, 313 ; Lord Kaimes, 322 ; Schulze, 379 ; Sigismund Beck, 391 ; Irwing, 392 ; Cabanis, 411 ; Notions of Hemsterhuis on, 527, *note*;—Dugald Stewart, IV. 6 ; Dr. Gregory, 22 ; Dr. Whewell, 73 ; Sewell, 93 ; De Maistre, 210 ; Bonald, 224 ; Garrigue, 261 ; Rosmini, 336 ; Gioberti, 377 ; Société Littéraire de l'Université Catholique, 456.
- Identism.* Berkeley on, III. 113 ; Cellier, 119 ; Hume, 129 ; Dr. Reid, 193—208 ; Jacobi, 382 ; Observations on Berkeley's views of, 530, *note*;—Fichte on, IV. 124 ; Hegel, 161 ; Maine de Biran, 203 ; Poll, 334 ; Rosmini, 341 ; Ehrensvärd on, 480.
- Ideas, General or Universal.* Roscellinus' ideas of, II. 35 ; William of Champeaux, notions of, 41 ; Vincent de Beauvais on, 55 ; St. Thomas Aquinas, 87 ; William Occam, 71 ; Scholarius, 110 ;—Berkeley on, III. 108 ; Scarella, 234 ; Horne Tooke, 283 ; Bonnet, 300 ; Dr. Price, 314 ;—Dugald Stewart on, IV. 4 ; Dr. Gregory, 22 ; R. G. Scott, 24 ; Dr. Whewell, 73 ; Krause, 168 ; Perron, 286 ; Accordini, 332 ; Rosmini, 341 ; Gallupi, 355 ; Van Meenen, 416.
- Identity, Personal.* Dr. Young on, IV. 60 ; Cousin, 68 ; Fichte, 128 ; Thanner, 140 ; Maine de Biran, 201 ; Baron D'Eckstein, 226 ; Pierre Leroux, 302 ; Gallupi, 355.
- Infinite.* Anaximander's notion of, I. 11 ; Aristotle's notion of, 11 ; Anaximander's notion of, 444, *note*.
- Language.* Nature and influence of in mental philosophy, II. 82—91 ; Hobbes, 209 ; Theophilus Gale, 276 ; Cave Beck's universal character of, 330 ; Dalgarno, the Arts and Symbols of, 331 ; Wilkins' real character of, 338 ;—Hemsterhuis on, III. 97 ; Condillac's theory of, 163 ; Damarais on, 166 ; Turgot, 173 ; Vico, 216 ; James Harris, 247 ; Horne Tooke, 252 ; Lord Monboddo, 328 ; Hamann, 387 ;—Kirwan on, IV. 34 ; Schlegel, 174 ; De Gerando, 187—193 ; Lancelin, 204 ; Bonald, 221 ; Van Meenen, 417 ; Haumont, 422 ; Van de Weyer, 431.
- Logic.* Aristotle's System of, I. 95 ; Arnobius on, 259 ; Lactantius, 261 ; Claudianus Mamertus, 269 ; St. John Damascenus, 274 ; Avicenna, 348 ;—Peter Ramus on, II. 133 ; Talen Omer, 136 ; A. Arnauld, 408 ;—Wolf on, III. 66 ; S'Gravesande, 86 ; Reimarus, 89 ; Ploucquet, 90 ; Hume, 127 ; Genovesi, 223 ; Dr. Watts, 243 ; Lord Kaimes, 323 ; Kant, 329 ; Mako, 363 ; Abicht, 369 ;—John Stuart Mill on, IV. 99 ; Bouterweck on the apodictic, 107 ; Bardili, 114 ; Mich. Klein, 136 ; Hegel, 186 ; Schlegel, 171 ; Sigwart, 174 ; Rirner, 174 ; Romagnesi, 344 ; Fábriano on, 350 ;

- Liebaert, 411; Denzinger, 411; Baron Reiffenberg, 421; Van Houede, 448; Ubaghe, 460.
- Men.* Cardan's ideas of, II. 128; Hobbes' ideas of, 206; Charvon on, 220; Descartes, 227; — Dr. Butler on, III. 12; Hume, 127; Encyclopédie Française, 142; Helvetius, 266; Dr. Hartley, 294; Lord Kalmes, 323; St. Martin, 408; Condorcet on the perfectibility of, 409; Cabanis on, 412; — Stutzmann on, IV. 141; Stefens, 143; Troxler, 148; Schubert, 246; Eckhartshansen, 166; Mayer, 178; Maine de Biran, 200; De Maistre, 209; Abbé Lamennais, 216; Baron D'Eckstein, 226; Hallanthe, 228; Viscomte de Ladre, 232; Université Catholique, 241; Jouffroy, 252; Virey, 258; Azais, 258; Baron Massais, 282; St. Simon, 291; Fourier, 294; Pierre Leroux, 301; Auguste Comte, 309; And. Abba, 351; Luigi Pieraccini, 352; Martini, 361; Paulus, 407; Van de Weyer, 429; Merode and De Beaufort, 436; Ahrens, 453; Tiberghien, 457; Swedenborg, 476.
- Materialism.* Leucippus' idea of, I. 39; Hobbes favourable to, 212; — Encyclopédie Française on, III. 144; D'Alembert, 177; Frederic the Great, 180; Zavalos, 235; Diderot, 254; Voltaire, 261; D'Holbach, 269; Dr. Belsham, 309; Cabanis, 412; — James Mill, IV. 57; Auguste Comte considered in relation to, 307—322.
- Mathematics.* St. John Damascenus' notion of, I. 273; — Wolff on, III. 67; — Dr. Whewell on the nature of, IV. 77; John Stuart Mill on, 100; Romagnosi, 345; Gioberti, 380.
- Matter.* Primary and secondary qualities of, I. 39; Indian philosophical notion of, 309; Vedanta notion of, 214; Avicenna on, 351; — Egidius de Colonna, II. 69; Gassendi, 254; Sir K. Digby, 288; Henry More, Nature of, 412; — Richard Cumberland, III. 4; Bishop Stillingfleet, 16; John Turner, 25; Robert Bragge, 30; William Coward, 32; Malcolm Fleming, 33; Berkeley, 118; Collier, 121; D'Alembert, 177; Bosovich, theory of, 227; Voltaire, 263; D'Holbach, 269; Dr. Priestley, 304; Observations on Bosovich's theory of, 536, *note*; — Sir William Drummond, notion, on, IV. 18; Sam. Drew, 19; John Bruce, 21; Dr. M'Cormac, 59; M'Caul, 66; Oken, 137; Herbert, 161; Berard, 250; Azais, 257; Gerdil, 328; Bishop Nells, 406; Gruyer, 440.
- Memory.* Heraclitus' notion of, I. 33; Aristotle on, 74; Nemesius, 267; St. John Damascenus, 274; Alcimus, 429; — Hugh St. Victor, II. 48; Thomas White, 290; Joseph Glanvil, 312; — Dr. Hartley, III. 294; Dr. Darwin, 309; — Dugald Stewart, IV. 4; James Mill, 58; Mel. Gioja, 347.
- Mesmerism.* Nature of, IV. 570; Ancient writers on, 571—573; Modern writers, 574; W. Brooks, 640, *note*; Mr. Brooks, of Manchester, 641, *note*; Rev. C. H. Townshend, 642, *note*; Medical Times, 577; J. C. Colquhoun, 579; Dugald Stewart, 581.
- Method.* James Concio's notion of, II. 136; Lord Bacon's philosophical, 198; Duhamel's notion of, 326; Locke on, 466; Schlegel,

- IV. 171; Buchez, 238; Auguste Comte, 311; Mamiani, 384.
- Mind.* Spontaneity of, I. 8; Thales, Definition of, 8; Aristotle's notion of, 16; Pythagoras's idea of, 17; Parmenides' notion of, 27; Distinct faculties of, by Plato, 62; Indian philosophical notions of, 210; Longinus on, 231; Plotinus on the nature and faculties of, 233; Porphyry on, 236; Proclus, 239; St. Augustine's faculties of, 264; Pelagius on the nature of, 291; Distinct faculties of, 275—310;—St. Bonaventure on, II. 63; Albert the Great, faculties of, 66; J. Concio on, 137; Goclenius, 138; Suarez, 173; Franciscus Gonzalez, 177; Lord Bacon, 182; Hobbes, 212; Pascal, 261; Pascal, 262; Lord Herbert, 265; Louis De La Forge, 294; David Buchanan, 299; Joseph Glanvil, 310; Malebranche, 319; Spinoza, 363; Bossuet 386; Thomasius, 393; Fontenelle, 398; Regnault, 399; D'Aguesseau, 403; Marsenne, 424; Leibnitz, 432;—J. Broughton, spontaneity of, III. 26; Conyers Place on, 31; Bayle, 68; Lupus, 64; Crousas, 72; Syrbius, 73; Baumgarten, 88; Ploucquet, 90; Berkeley, 117; Peter Browne, 125; Hume, 128; Vanvenargues, 167; La Cat, 171; D'Alembert, 174; Dr. Reid, faculties of, 202; Genovesi on, 221; Barkovich, 226; Baldanotti, 236; Dr. Hutchison, 246; Tucker on faculties of, 251; Helvetius on, 268; Dr. Priestley, 266; Lord Kames, 222; Adam Ferguson, 324; Kant on nature of, 335; Mako on, 363; Abicht, 369; Kisevetter, 375; Irwing, 392; Platner, 393; Tetens, 396; Faber, 407; Condorcet, 409; Gerat, 414; Destutt-Tracy, 418
- Dugald Stewart, IV. 2; Sir William Drummond on the faculties of, 16; Sam. Drew on, 19; John Bruce, 21; Dr. Brown, states of the, 26; Kirwan on, 24; John Fearn, 36; George Payne, classification of the phenomena of, 47; James Mill on, 52; Dr. M'Cormac, 59; Coleridge, 60; Ballantyne, 63; Sayer, 64; Governor Pownal, 64; John Duncan, 86; M'Caul, 86; Smart, 86; Robert Mudie, 87; Dr. Cairns, 101; J. F. Fries, 111; Schelling on nature of, 123; Oken on, 139; Thanner, 140; Berger, 146; Solger, 147; Hegel, 151; Herbert, 161; Eckhartshansen, 166; Krause, 168; Schlegel, 173; De Gerando, 193; Laromiguière, 198; Lancelin, 204; Broussais, 247; Jouffroy 252; Tamassia, 328; Lallebasque, 329; Gronos on faculties of, 331; Poll's table of the faculties of, 332; Rosmini on, 339; Mel. Gioja, 347; Fabriano, 350; Luigi Pieraccini, 354; Gallupi, 356; Costa, 359; Martini on faculties of, 361; Tommaso on, 364; Mancino, 367; Gioberti, 369; Pestalozzi, 367; Kiaker, 397; Nieuport, 406; Gruyer, 439; Quetelet, 446; Bécart, 451; Ahrens, 453; Tiberghien, 459; Levi Hedge, 519; Dr. Beasley, 521; Burton, 522; Upham, 523; Schmucker, 530—534; Emerson, 537; Dr. Davies, 610, note; Mrs. Loudon, 610, note.
- Morals.* Evidence of, I. 311—316.
- Necessity.* Doctrine of, Xenophanes' idea of, I. 22; Zeno and his school on, 124; Carneades, 146; Note on, 478;—Suarez on, II. 172; Leibnitz, 440;—Anthony Collins on, III. 24—45; Wolff, 68; En-

- encyclopédie Française*, 144; *Mitchell*, 242; *Diderot*, 254; *Voltaire*, 261; *Dr. Hartley*, 296; *Bonnet*, 299; *Dr. Bolsham*, 309; *Kant*, 330; *Observations*, 619, *note*;—*Sir William Drummond* on, IV. 16; *Dr. Gregory*, 23; *Bray*, 94; *Baron Reiffenberg*, 421; *Grayer*, 440.
- Nominalists*. *Abelard*, a zealous nominalist, II. 42; *Almeric* on, 44; *John Charlier de Gerson*, 73; *Luther* in favour of, 128; *Nicollini*, 132;—*Bishop Stillingfleet* on, III. 16.
- Novum Organum*. *Lord Bacon* on, II. 180—205; *Hume*, remarks on, 201; *Professor Playfair*, 281; *Mr. Hallam*, 203; *De Maistre*, 203, 505, *note*; *Macaulay*, 507, *note*;—*Dugald Stewart* on, IV. 8; *De Maistre*, 210.
- Ontology*. *Keraty* on, IV. 192; *Cousin*, 267—275; *Pierre Leroux*, 301; *Gioberti*, 377.
- Pantheism*. *Marot* on, IV. 233; *Cousin's* doctrines considered in relation to, 277—281; *Rosmini*, opinions in relation to, 343; *Société Littéraire de l'Université Catholique* on, 455; *Remarks* against *Rosmini's* adoption of, 635, *note*.
- Perception*. *Antiochus* on, I. 149; *Indian philosophical notion* of, 208—212;—*Descartes* on, II. 242; *Lord Herbert*, 266; *Dr. Cudworth*, 282; *A. Arnauld*, 406;—*S'Gravesande*, III. 85; *P. Browne*, 125; *Davies*, 185; *Dr. Reid*, 188—200; *Genovesi*, 221; *Facciolati*, 232; *Arteaga*, 240; *Dr. Watts*, 243; *Dr. Hutcheson*, 246; *James Harris*, 247; *Dr. Darwin*, 209; *Kant*, 334; *Dr. Young* on, IV. 49; *Dr. Abercrombie*, 65; *Sayer*, 84; *Sewell*, 94; *Spalding*, 98; *F. Calker*, 113; *Mich. Klein*, 126; *J. Hermann Fichte*, 177; *Zantedeschi*, 262; *Upham*, 520.
- Philosophy*. *Nature of*, *Introd.* I. xviii.—xi.; *Influences of mental*, on other branches of knowledge, *Introd.* xxi.—xxiv.; *Its recent cultivation* in many European countries, *Introd.* xxv.—xxx.; *Necessity and advantages of*, *Introd.* xxxiii.—xl.; *Fundamental principles of*, *Introd.* xl.—xlvii.; *Progressive nature of*, *Introd.* xlvii.—xlix.; *Present state* in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, United States, Great Britain, *Introd.* li.—lxi.;—*Dr. Whewell* on, IV. 71; *Bouterwek*, 106; *Krug*, 109; *F. Calker*, 112; *Bardili*, 114; *Fichte*, 118; *Schelling*, 131; *Oken*, 137; *Näslin*, 139; *Wagner*, 140; *Schlegel*, 171; *French philosophy* since 1800, 180—186; *French theological school* of, 204—208; *Abbé Lamennais* on, 210; *Abbé Bautain*, 229; *Université Catholique*, 241; *St. Simon*, 292; *Pierre Leroux*, 301; *Dictionnaire des Sciences philosophiques*, 304; *Auguste Comte*, 30; *State of philosophy* in Italy from 1800 till present time, 323—325; *Gronos* on, 330; *Malignati*, 351; *Gioberti*, 369; *State of* in Belgium and Holland from 1794 till present day, 390—397; *Baron Reiffenberg* on, 420; *Van de Weyer*, 424—430; *Tiborghien*, 457; *History of*, in Spain, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, 465—489; *Szaniawski* on, 470; *History of*, United States of America, 490—492; *Tappan* on, 524; *Dr. Halle*, 611, *note*; *State of*, in Portugal, Spain, Hun-

gary, 638, *note*; State of, in America, 639, *note*;—Justin Martyr, notion on, I. 248; St. Clement, on the nature of the Greek, 266; Tertullian's ideas against, 268; Lactantius on, 260; St. Augustine, 262; St. John Damascenus, 273; Pelagius on nature of, 288; Alkandi, treatise on, 344;—John Scotus, idea of, II. 27; Richard Abbé of St. Victor on, 50; Francisus Patricius, 135; Tellez, 178; Adrian di Corneto, 176; Descartes, on the principles of, 227; Theophilus Gale on, 278; Joseph Glanvil, 307; Tachirhausen, 391; Terrason, 404; Foucher, 420; Mersenne, 424; Hirnhaim, 451;—Wolf on, III. 67; Walch, 81; Hollmann, 83; Rensch, 83; Hume, 127; Davies, 184; Vico, 218; Stellini, 226; Verney, 233; Baldinotti, 236; Kant, 332; Novalis, 389; Sigismund Beck, 391; Garve, 396; The Philosophy of France for the latter part of the 18th century, 401; Report of French Philosophy, 448.

Phrenology. Dr. Brown on, IV. 31; Early opinions of, 584—586; Dr. Willis on, 586; Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, 587; Organic classifications of the brain, 588; Dr. Pritchard on, 591; Insufficiency of, as a system, 592—606.

Physiognomy. Science of, IV. 544; Lavater on, 547.

Physiology. St. John Damascenus' notion of, I. 273;—Davies on, III. 184; Kant, 384; Broussais, IV. 248; Berard, 249; Mich. Noel, 418; Ancient writers, 553; Modern writers, 554—564; Nature and tendency of, 565—570.

Practical Reason. Kant on, III. 343. *Principles and Propositions*, general

and particular, notions of the different schools of philosophy of, I. 158.

Psychology. Goclenius on, II. 138;—Christ. A. Eschenmayer, IV. 148; Krause, 167; Berard, 250; Cousin, 267; Pierre Leroux, 301; Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques, 306; Poli, 332; Fageni, 349; Tommaseo, 368; Gioberti, 377—382; Campagna, 386; Baron Reiffenberg, 420; Ubaghs, 450; Ahrens, 453.

Pure Reason. Kant on, III. 328; Reinhold, 367; Cousin's observations on, 537, *note*; Stewart's observations on, 539, *note*; De Gerando on, 540, *note*;—Bouterweck, IV. 107; J. F. Fries, 111; Gioberti, 379; Kinker, 397; Feith, 404; Van Hethart, 404; Wytenback, 410; Christiernin, 479.

Pyrrhonism. Nature of, I. 131; *Ænesidemus'* doctrine of, 183; Agrippa on, 184.

Realists. William of Champeaux renounces the principles of, II. 41; Vincent de Beauvais on, 55; John Charlier de Gerson, 73; Nizolini, 139.

Reason. (See Reasoning.)

Reasoning. Euclid's mode of, I. 58; Chrysippus on, 133; Alcinous, 176; Galen, 180; Indian philosophical notion of, 208; Proclus on, 240; Isidore of Gaza, 241; St. Clement, 267; Pelagius, 266;—Hugh St. Victor, II. 47; James Concio, 137; Nizolini, 139; Fénelon, 390; Fontenelle, 398; Locke, 479;—Anthony Collins, III. 46; Crusius, 79; S'Gravesande, 86; Dr. Reid, 207; Muratori, 220; Facciolati, 232; Bonnet, 202; Dr. Darwin, 209; Kant, 340;—Dugald Stewart, IV. 4;

- Isaac Hawkins Browne, 39; Cos-
ridge, 60; Oken, 139; Cousin,
270; Mel. Gioja, 348; Fabriano,
350.
- Reasoning.* Van Hemert on, IV.
408; Baron Reiffenberg, 421;
Levi Hedge, 520.
- Religion.* The Religious principle
inseparable from the true philoso-
phic spirit, I. 6; Plato's system
favourable to, 78; Principles of,
161; Indian philosophical notions
of, 213; Apollonius of Tyana on,
324; Lucius Apuleius, 326; St. John
Damascenus, 273; Algasell culti-
vated the 'Religious Sciences,' 349;
Maimonides on, 374; Exposition
of Theology by Proclus, 457, *note*;
—Raymond de Sebonde on, II.
216; Theophilus Gale's, ideas of
the origin of heathen theology, 278;
Thomas White's treatise on, 289;
—Lowde on, III. 26; Cracius,
79; Vico, 216; —Gretry, IV.
93; Morode and De Beaufort,
436; Ubaghs, 450.
- Scepticism.* Nature of Greek and
Roman, I. 123; Later school of,
182; Sextus Empiricus on, 187;
St. Alonzo de Vega, nature of
unbelief, 280; —Montaigne's in-
clination to, II. 217; Pascal, in-
clination to, 262; La Mothe le
Vayer on, 420; Sanches, 501, *note*;
—Bayle, III. 84; Hume, 132;
D'Alembert, 177; Frederick the
Great, 180; Beausobre, 182; Bu-
nafede, 238; Schulze on Hume's,
378; Jacobi on, 381; On the Scep-
ticism of Bayle, 522, *note*.
- Scholastic Philosophy.* Origin and
nature of, II. 1—22; Luther on,
129; Melancthon, 130; Campa-
nella, 147; Dr. Hampden, 493, *note*;
Dr. Mosheim, 495, *note*; Tissot,
496, *note*; David de Dinant,
- 498, *note*; Robert Pullen, 498,
note.
- Sensation, Nature of.* Anaxagoras,
notion of, I. 14; Heraclitus,
32; Empedocles, 36; Democritus
on, 40; The Cynic and Cynical
Schools, 58; Plato, 64; Aristotle,
70; Epicurus, 128; Carneades,
146; Cicero, 171; Alcinoüs, 176;
Sextus Empiricus, 187; St. Au-
gustine, 264; Nemesius 267; St.
John Damascenus, 274; Averroes,
354; —Hugh St. Victor, II. 47;
Richard Abbé of St. Victor, 80;
Albert the Great, 62; Duns
Scotus, 70; Lord Herbert, 266;
Sir K. Digby, 286; Thomas
White, 290; Joseph Glanvil, 311;
Duhamel, 326; Mariotte, 329;
Bossuet, 387; Locke, 472; —
Richard Cumberland, III. 2;
Bishop Stillingfleet, 18; Thomas
Burnet, 19; Henry Lea, 20;
Crousaz, 72; Waloh, 81; Renach,
83; Herder, 94; Hamsterhuis,
97; Peter Browne, 124; Ency-
clopédie Française, 143; Condillac,
167—161; Vauvenargues, 167;
Le Cat, 171; D'Alembert, 177;
Mauportuis, 183; Dr. Hutcheson,
246; James Harria, 249; Diderot,
254; Dr. Hartley, 294; Bonnet,
300; Dr. Priestley, 306; Dr.
Price, 314; Reinhold, 368; Mai-
mon, 377; Irwing, 391; Platner,
393; Eberhard, 395; St. Martin,
405; Cabanis, 411; Destutt-
Tracy, 416; —Dugald Stewart,
IV. 6; John Bruce, 21; Dr. Brown,
27; Kirwan, 35; George Payne,
48; Dr. Young, 61; James Mill,
84; Dr. M'Cormac, 89; Ballan-
tyna, 63; Dr. Whewell, 73; J. Her-
mann Fichte, 177; Laromiguière,
195; Royer-Collard, 198; Berard,
250; Cousin, 274; Mel. Gioja,

347; Bottura, 349; Costa, 359; Martini, 361; Campagna, 365; Gretry, 403; Nieuport, 408; Van Meenen, 412; Gibon, 448; Upham, 526.

Seven Sages of Greece, I. 9.

Secretive Reasoning. System of, I. 82;—Hemsterhuis on, III. 96;—*Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques*, IV. 305; Van Heude, 444.

Soul. Thales' idea of, I. 8; Hermetismus' idea of, 13; Pythagoras's idea of, 16; Doctrine of the Transmigration of, 19; Heraclitus's notion of, 31; Plato on, 61—70; Epicurus, 126; Zeno's faculties of, 132; Panætius on, 152; Lucretius, 169; Cicero, 171; Maximus of Tyre, 177; Sextus Empiricus, 187; The opinions of the ancient philosophers, 197; Transmigration of, 200; Indian philosophical notion of, 210—212; Vedanta notions of 216; Philo the Jew on, 222; Plutarch, 225; Numenius, 227; Gnostic notions of, 228; Ammonius, 230; Plotinus, 232; Proclus, 239; Justin Martyr, 249; Tatian, 250; Origen on, 255; Lactantius, 260; St. Augustine, 263; Nemesius on the pre-existence of, 266; St. Gregory on, 268; Claudianus Mamertus, 269; St. John Damascenus, 274; St. Alonso de Vega on the immortality of, 283; Avicenna on, 248; Cabalistic notion of, 267; Karaites on, 371; Pharisees, 371; Essenes notion of, 371; Alcinus on, 429; Averroes, 476, note;—St. Thomas Aquinas on, II. 57; Albert the Great, 66; Richard de Middleton, 69; Marcellus Ficinus, 107; Pomponatius, 112; Cardan, 126; James Zabarella,

138; Antonius Rubio, 175; Charon, 220; Descartes, 228; Gasendi, 254; Sir K. Digby, 287; P. Sylvaia Regis, 296; Derodon, 324; A. Arnauld, 407; Henry More, 414; Michael Moor, 418; La Mothe le Vayer, 420; Baxter, 425; Leibnitz, 433; Winsperasse, 452;—Bishop Stillingfleet on, III. 16; Henry Dodwell, 23; J. Turner, 24; Lowde, 26; Benjamin Hampton, 27; William Asheton, 29; Robert Bragge, 30; Conyers Place, 31; Alethinos Philopsochos, 33; Wolff, 68; Meyer, 87; Mendelssohn, 91; Condillac, 162; Vico, 214; Arteaga, 240; James Harris, 248; Voltaire, 260; D'Holbach, on nature of, 270; Dr. Hartley on, 296; Bonnet, 300; Dr. Priestley, 303; Kant, 342; Platner, 394;—Sam. Draw on, IV. 20; John Fearn, 38; Greaves, nature of, 89; Schelling on, 129; Oken, 139; Keratry, 194; Maine de Biran, 200; Abbé Lamennais, 220; Berard, 251; Gerdil, 326; Gronca, 330; Gallupi, 357; Martini, 361; Bishop Nella, 401; Gretry, 403; Dehant, 422; Van de Weyer, 430; Gruyer, 439; Swedenborg, 477; Bjurbaeck, 479; Upham, 527.

Space. Zeno of Elea, notion of, I. 30;—Dr. Clarke on, III. 48; Kant, 336;—Ballantyne on, IV. 64; Dr. Brook Taylor, 83; Governor Pownal, 85; F. Calker, 113; Herbert, 163; Royer-Colard, 198; Accordini, 332; Fagnani, 349; Luigi Pieraccini, 354; Tommaseo, 365; Gioberti, 376; Mamiani, 384.

Spinozism. Nieuwentyt on, II. 456—460;—Budderus on, III. 76; Jacobi, 381;—Gerdil, IV. 326.

Spontaneity. (See Mind.)

Sublime and Beautiful. Nature of the ideas of, III. 419—426; Principal modern theories of, 426; Dr. Hutcheson on, 426; Mr. Price, 426; M. Crousaz, 426; Diderot, 426; Dr. Reid, 427; Dr. Blair, 427; Hogarth, 427; Perrault, 427; Mr. Burke, 428; Father Buffler, 429; Sir Joshua Reynolds, 430; Mr. Alison, 431; Payne Knight, 431; M. Cousin, 432; Kant, 432; Gioberti, 433; Abbé Lamennais, 434; Father André, 435; Lord Jeffrey, 435; Professor Stewart, 436; Of the true principles of, 438; They rest on mind, 439; Active power necessary to the formation of, 444; Illustrations of, from moral actions, affections, passions, sympathies, &c. &c., 445; Illustrations from the appetites, and moral affections, 449; Illustrations from our intellectual estimate of the various ordinary trades and occupations of life, 454; Illustrations of, from Milton, 465; From Shakspeare, 466; From the Old Testament, 466; From Smollett, 468; From Akenside, 470; From Virgil's *Georgics*, 472; Illustrations of, from painting, 473; Illustrations of, from music, 480; From sculpture, 482; From architecture, 484; From antiquities, 487; From the drama, 488; From landscape gardening, 489; Illustrations of, from a survey of the works of nature, 491; From landscapes, 492; Illustrations of, from theology, 498; Plato's ideas on, 550; Xenophon on, 550; Cicero, 550; St. Augustine, 550; Longinus, 551; *Enciclopedia Italiana*, 552; Tommaseo, 553; Pierre André,

553; De Loos, 554; Ten-Kate, 555; *Encyclopédie Catholique*, 555; Cousin, 556; Hemsterhuis, 556;—Grayer, 557; Sayer on, IV. 53; Tommaseo, 366; Grayer, 440.

Syllogism. Aristotle on, I. 80; Indian philosophical notions on, 212; Thomas White's defence of, II. 289.

Synthesis. Nature of, I. 101; Galea on, 100; Duhamel, II. 327;—S'Gravesande, III. 66; Kant, 339; Schulze, 380;—Gioberti, IV. 370.

Temperaments. Posidonius on, I. 161;—John Huarte, II. 165;—Ancient writers on, IV. 549; Description of, 551; On the doctrine of, 539, note.

Time. James Harris on, III. 348; Kant, 336;—Ballantyne on, IV. 64; Dr. B. Taylor, 83; F. Calker, 113; Royer-Collard, 196; Accordini, 332; Fagnani, 349; Luigi Pieraccini, 354; Tommaseo, 366; Gioberti, 376; Mamiani, 384.

Truth. Protagoras' notion of, I. 46; Gorgias, notion of, 47; Zeno on, 131; Chrysippus, 132; Notions commonly adopted by the ancients on, 136; Carneades on, 146; Philo, 147; Antiochus on the certainty of, 148; Potamon on, 158; Cicero, 173; Sextus Empiricus on the criterion of, 187; Philo the Jew on, 223; St. Augustine, 263;—St. Anselm of Canterbury, II. 35; St. Thomas Aquinas, nature of, 59; William Bishop of Paris on, 56; St. Bonaventure, 62; Ægidius de Colonna, 68; Nicolas de Cusa, 113; Lord Herbert, nature of, 266; J. Sergeant, 300; John Norris, 304; General Observations on, 340—354; Bossuet, 387; Huygens, 388; Tschirnhausen, 392;

Huet, nature of, 417; La Mothe le Vayer on, 420; Leibnitz, 444; —Wollaston, III. 8; Anthony Collins, 45; Lupus, 64; Martin Knutzen, 78; Müller, 82; Rensch, 84; Mendelssohn, 92; Buffier, 149 —154; D'Alembert, 177; Frederic the Great, 181; Davies, 184; Genovesi, 224; Faciolati, 232; Dr. Beattie, 317; Reinhold, 367; Kieseewetter, 376; —Thos. Taylor on, IV. 68; Dr. Whewell, 76; Samuel Bailey, 92; J. F. Fries, 112; F. Calker, 112; Fichte, 118; Schelling, 132; Nüßlin, 139; Troxler, 146; Herbert, 160; J. Hermann Fichte, 177; Abbé Lamennais, 212; Abbé Bautain, 230; Brissot, 260; Ancillon, 285; Gronos, 330; Rosmini, 337; Romagnosi, 344; Luigi Pieraccini, table on the development of Scien-

tific, 353; Tommaseo, 366; Mamiani, 385; Monti, 386; Van Hemert, 406; Van Meenen, nature of, 414; Van Heusda, 455; Tiberghien, 466; Upham, 523.

Understanding. Alfarabi on the nature of, I. 344; Algazel on, 350; Averroes, 356; Avenpace, 363; —John Scotus on, II. 25; Hugh St. Victor, 47; Albert the Great, 67; —Benjamin Hampton on, III. 28; Kant, 324; Reinhold, 367; Maimon, 377; Jacobi, 385; —Coleridge on, IV. 61; Berchère, 419.

Vibrations. (See Associations of Ideas.)

Vision. Theory of, Bishop Berkeley on, III. 101 — 108; Bailey, 105; Blackwood's Magazine, 107.

Vertices. Descartes on, II. 220; Gessendi, opposed to, 253.

3631-13
Digitized by Google

